

A HISTORY OF THE TEMNE IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

by

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ABBREVIATIONS

- C.O. Colonial Office (Public Record Office material).
- P.P. Parliamentary Papers.
- G.L.N.C. Governor's Letterbook to Native Chiefs (Sierra Leone Archives)
- G.A.L. Governor's Aborigines Letterbook (Sierra Leone Archives)
- C.S.L. Colonial Secretary's Office's Letterbook to Native Chiefs (Sierra Leone Archives)
- G.I.L. Government Interpreter's Letterbook (Sierra Leone Archives)
- S/L Stud. Sierra Leone Studies.
- S/L L.R. Sierra Leone Language Review
- S/L B.R. The Sierra Leone Bulletin of Religion
- F.B.C. "Sierra Leone" Fourah Bay College Library, Sierra Leone Collections.

Reference to Oral Tradition is made simply by giving the informant's name. For fuller information on this see "Appendix A" and also "Bibliographical Notes".

SUMMARY

With a population of over 650,000, the Temne are the second largest tribal group in Sierra Leone. Their country, which lies in the Northern Province of the Sierra Leone Protectorate, covers an area of over 10,000 square miles spread over most of Port Loko District, the whole of Tonkolili District, and parts of Bombali and Kambia Districts. This study, which covers, roughly, the period from 1816 to 1887, is concerned primarily with the Temne of Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts.

Accounts of Portuguese explorers reveal that the Temne, whose origins seem extremely varied and perplexing, were already well established on the coast by the middle of the fifteenth century. Trade with Europe particularly in slaves (which reached its peak in the eighteenth century) developed quickly. The boom brought many strangers - both from Europe and from other parts of West Africa - to Temne country which controlled some of the popular coastal and tide-water trading centres on the Scarcies and the Rokel Rivers.

But the control of the trade itself was not in the hands of the Temne. In Port Loko area the Susu ousted the Temne and Loko rulers in the middle of the eighteenth century, and assumed supreme authority. On the Rokel, the Loko dominated the territory's trade as well as its politics. Elsewhere in Temne country (as indeed in many other parts of the territory now known as Sierra Leone) Mandinka Muslims from the newly established theocracy in

Futa Jalon, established themselves as "bookmen", and made themselves virtual controllers of the territories they occupied.

Then in 1787 the Colony of Freetown, founded as a base for spreading what its promoters called "the blessings of industry and civilization" in that part of West Africa, was established on Temne territory. Later the Colony was not only to interfere actively in the way of life of the people around them, but also to drive the Temne away from their lands by force of arms. The establishment of the Colony, therefore, represents, for the Temne, no more than another of the series of disasters that befell them in the later half of the eighteenth century.

But, by the second decade of the nineteenth century, the Temne period of revival had begun. In 1816 they took up arms against the Susu and expelled them from Port Loko. In 1828 they rose against the Loko and drove them away from the Rokel and elsewhere. But they failed to contain the growing power of the Colony in Freetown.

After the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 by Britain, efforts to encourage trade in local produce with the territories in the immediate hinterland of the Colony were intensified. But competition for trade and desire to procure slaves to grow the "legitimate" produce led to wars, which increased with the trade. In the early 1840s the wars ended in Port Loko area, and with them, its trade. The Rokel region took over but was itself ruined by the wars by the early 1870s. Trade once again shifted,

this time to the Bumpe and Ribí area; but with it the ruinous competition and the wars.

In 1879 the Colony established a "protectorate" over the Bumpe and Ribí in order to keep the wars out. Bumpe and Ribí people refused the Yoni Temne access to the tide-water trading centres in the area. The Yoni attacked them. But although the people were not, the territory was British. In 1887 a military expedition crushed Yoni military power and brought to an end the trade wars in the Temne country. It also ushered in, though rather belatedly, a coherent and purposeful British Imperial policy over Sierra Leone as a whole.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

THE TEMNE AND THEIR ORIGINS.

The history of the origin of the Temne people, like that of so many other illiterate peoples of Africa, is shrouded in mystery. The earliest available written records about the Temne came with the Portuguese in the middle of the 15th century. Fernandes¹ and Pereira,² both Portuguese ~~explorers~~, writing about early 16th century, spoke of the Temne as though they were already well established on the coast (at the Scarcies mouth, and, further south, beyond the Sierra Leone Peninsula, on the east side). Pereira tells us that the Temne on the Scarcies traded in fine gold and slaves in exchange for brass basins, brass bracelets, bloodstones, red cloth, linen and cotton cloths.³ Vernacular terms collected by him and Fernandes have been identified as Temne, as have a large amount of "Sapi" vocabulary collected in the Sierra Leone region between 1500 and 1650 been identified as Temne.⁴

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1. Valentim Fernandes: Description de la Côte Occidentale d'Afrique. (ed. Th. Monod, A. Teixeira da Mota, and R. Mauny) Bissao, 1951, pp.81-97. Quoted in C.H. Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, O.U.P., 1964, pp.22-30.
 2. D.P. Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. (ed. Kimble) Hakluyt Society. London, 1937, pp.95-9. Quoted in C.H. Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, O.U.P., 1964, pp.41-3.
 3. Pereira, op.cit. (Fyfe, op.cit., p.41).
 4. P.E.H. Hair: "Ethnolinguistic continuity on the Guinea Coast". Journal of African History, VIII, 2 (1967), p.255. "Sapi" was the name by which the Portuguese referred to the coastal peoples.

It is not certain where the Temne came from originally, nor is it quite established who they really are. Oral traditions recorded in Yoni Mamela, Marampa-Masimera, Kolifa, Tane, Gbonkolenken, and Kunike reveal that many of the Temne of those areas not only came originally from Koranko country but regard themselves as Koranko in origin. But linguistically, Koranko belongs to the "Mande" group of languages, while the Temne language has been included in the "Mel" cluster of the West Atlantic group.¹ It has been further pointed out that the Koranko, in fact, are not a people by themselves but a sub-group of the "Malinke" of the French Guinea, where "La majorité des Koranko réside".²

Further, the present Yoni Mabanta country, and the southern portion of Gbonkolenken (i.e. Yele area) - as well as most part of the present Moyamba District, Southern Province - was at one time inhabited by a group of people known as Bantas. These Bantas, Dalby has suggested,³ again from linguistic evidence, were originally a sub-group of the Temne. Their country was over-run by Mende immigrants in the eighteenth century, and the Mende-occupied areas now speak the Mende language - a member of the "Mande" group - while Yoni Mabanta and Gbonkolenken Yele retain the Temne language.

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1. T.D.P. Dalby, "Language Distribution in Sierra Leone", S/L L.R. No.1, 1962, pp.62-67. Also, Dalby, "The Mel Languages: a Re-classification of Southern West-Atlantic". African Language Studies, VI, 1965, pp.1-17.
 2. Yves Person, "L'aventure de Porékèrè et le drame de Waima". Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines, 18, Vol. V, 1965, pp.248-316, f.n.4, p.260.
 3. T.D.P. Dalby, "Banta and Mabanta", S/L L.R. No.2, 1963, pp.23-25.

It has been suggested¹ that the Temne and the Baga-Landuma were, at one time, one and the same people; but that the Susu (who came to the scene in the eighteenth century) drove a wedge between them. The Baga-Landuma now occupy Guinea where they are being absorbed gradually by the Susu, but in Sierra Leone the Temne, their counterparts, have not only remained a separate entity, but have absorbed a large number of the coastal Bulom and Sherbro peoples; as well as Lokos, Korankos, Fulas, and even Susu, further inland.

The origins of the people now called Temne seem extremely diverse indeed. This diversity has been further heightened by what seems a later imposition on the polyglot indigenous "Temne" of a Mande-speaking oligarchy. These Mande immigrants established themselves as rulers in the various Temne territories they occupied. The legend of Bai Farma Tami - an account of the origin of a "Mande" ruling family over the Temne - if not true in fact, is most likely true in type. And the Bai Farma legend probably represents just one of many such incidental conquests. The nature and extent of these impositions can be seen in the fact that there are very few of the names known to exist all over Mande-speaking territories in the Western Sudan that are not represented in Temne country.²

1. W.A.A. Wilson, An Outline of the Temne Language, London, 1962, p.2.

2. E.F. Sayers, "Notes on the Clan or Family Names Common in the Area Inhabited by Temne-speaking people". S/L Stud. o.s. x Dec. 1927. pp.14-109. For an account of the life and work of Sayers in Sierra Leone, see an obituary on him by J.S. Fenton; S/L Stud. N.S. 4 June, 1955, pp. 237 - 9.

The Mande conquests had been facilitated, no doubt, by what Sayers called "the anarchic and fiercely independent nature of the Temne himself who does not easily co-operate even with his own people".¹ They proved easy to rule, continued Sayers, because easy to divide; but they tended to absorb their rulers. But Mande political hegemony was not based on conquest alone, many of the Mande immigrants were traders, who quickly acquired wealth and wealth usually conferred political power and influence.

The more common Mande family names found among the Temne today are: Kamara, Bangura, Kanu, Konte, Sise, Kargbo, Sanko, Koroma, Ture, and Sila. It must not of course be concluded that every family bearing the same name related back to one ancestor coming into the country. The original ancestor of the clan is thought of as someone far older than that, and not as himself having come to the present Temne territory.

Where rulers of the same name are grouped locally it may well be that it was an ancestor common to them all who first arrived in the country, but where people of the same name are found in widely separated localities, there is no particular reason to suppose that one common ancestor brought them into the country, or that they arrived all at the same time.

Contd. from p.3)

E.F. Sayers lived and worked for nearly 30 years in the Northern Province of the Sierra Leone Protectorate, mostly among the Temne. And his knowledge of the people, especially with regards to the traditions of the origins of the various Temne families, seems unrivalled. It is a pity that he did not publish more than he did, and that he presented what he published in such disorganised fashion.

1. Sayers, op.cit., p.34.

The stories and legends of Bai Farma Tami; Pa Kuniike of Kuniike country; the Banguras (Thalis) of Masimera; the Kabias of Marampa; the Fulas of Yoni; the Kanus, the Kontes, the Banguras, and the Kamaras of Port Loko; the Sankos of Kolifa; the Sises, the Polis (Koromas) and the Kanus of Gbonkolenken; the Tures of Tane; all exemplify the various modes of Mande migrations, conquests and settlements in the present Temne country.

Bai Farma Tami was probably the first "Mande" warrior to come to Temne country. The following Temne tradition about him was recorded in the 1840s by Rev. C.F. Schlenker¹ at Port Loko:

"Bey Farma came from the East where he was for a long time; he was a great warrior. More than three hundred generations have passed away since he lived".

"At that time the Temnes had no gun and no cutlass; they had only sticks, and spears, and bows and arrows, and bill-hooks, and knives to fight with: He destroyed the whole country. He took upon^{him} the office of a Captain of the Army of the East, and waged war against the East country, and went all over it. He was the first who got money, and guns, and gun-powder, and cutlasses, and all sorts of arms. He stayed a long time in the East, and did not straightways come down to Port Loko. He killed the Limbas and sold them; he was long there [that is in the Limba Country - C.F.S.]; he killed Lokos, and he destroyed it [country] entirely. He came into the Temne country and lived at Belia.

"Then he fought against Bey Yare, who ran, and went into the water with all his children, and with all his property, with all his rice, and with all his cattle; and Bey Farma remained and lived there; then he went forth, and waged war against all the Temne country, and went all over it. He expelled the Bakas, who were formerly at the Port Loko, and who went down the river in Canoes towards the West; and the Maruns [by this name the Settlers were called who first

1. C.F. Schlenker, A Collection of Temne Traditions, Fables and Proverbs. London, 1861. pp. 3-5.
Quoted also in C.H. Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance. London, 1964. pp. 19-20.

settled at Sierra Leone - C.F.S.], and all the people fled; he also expelled the Boloms and the Queas, and they came away from Port Loko; he entirely expelled [the people] on the whole of the Rokel, and they all fled.

"Then he settled in Quea country, and did not wage war again; he died, and it remained so then, they did not fight again. He taught people the art of war; there was no war before. Bey Farma was the first who waged war. Farma the Conqueror tied white men, and went and cut their throat, because he was superior to them ... "

Bai Farma apparently imposed his rule on the Temne/Baga and Bulkom inhabitants (on the coast), known collectively to the Portuguese as the Sapis. The confederacy which emerged was called a Sapis "empire". Bai Farma Tami was the first chief of this "empire", which had its capital at Robaga. Bai Farma himself lived at Robaga and was buried there. The town eventually became a holy place to the Temne, and was held in high reverence by them.

The Confederacy evolved perhaps the most efficient and best organised systems of administration in this part of the west coast at that time.¹ In spite of the high reverence and semi-divine nature attributed to their chiefs by the populace and despite the fact that they (the chiefs) attained their position

1. This account of the organisation of the Sapis Confederacy is based on T.G. Lawson's Information Regarding the Different Districts and Tribes of Sierra Leone and its Vicinity. Colonial Office, 1887. Mr. T.G. Lawson as Government Interpreter collected the material which his successor, J.C.E. Parkes of the Aborigines Department, arranged into a publishable form. Date of publication was incorrectly printed as 1886. Although repetitive, obscure and unreliable in parts (as Hargreaves, S/L Stud. NS 3, Dec. 1954, p.177 points out) it nevertheless remains a very valuable introductory account of the tangled histories of the various peoples of the Sierra Leone Protectorate.

through conquest, the chiefs were not despotic. They ruled, we are told, in co-operation with and on the advice of their counsellors. These counsellors comprised Naimbana, Pa Cappa (Kapr), Naimsogo, and the three "Mamy" Queens (in order of importance).¹ The titles were not hereditary, and appointment was by election. Each of the counsellors had the chance of becoming the ruler of the whole territory as Regent (although the three Queens ruled as a body usually with a man to assist them). If the Bai Farma died a new Bai Farma was not elected; Naimbana became ruler as Regent. The same if Naimbana died, Pa Cappa (Kapr) became Regent, and so on. When all the counsellors had died out then a new Bai Farma was installed, and with him a new set of Counsellors. Local Government and Administration was in the hands of sub-chiefs located in various parts of the territory. There was no Bai Farma when the settlers arrived in the Province of Freedom (first called Granville Town, later Freetown) in 1787; and that was why Naimbana signed the treaty of cession as the ruler of the whole of Koya Temne.

This peculiar set-up was probably felt necessary for peace and harmony among the various groups that made up the confederacy. Perhaps there was some sort of precarious peace, and trade with the Portuguese flourished, but it seems there was no harmony among

1. The three Queens are:

Bome Poseh
Bome Warah
Bome Rufah

them. And it was this lack of harmony that made it easy for the Manes to subdue the peoples perhaps in the middle of the 16th century.¹

The Portuguese slave traders welcomed these wars and conquests because they made for good business. (The Atlantic slave trade had just begun). The Manes established themselves as rulers of the various territories they captured, and apparently over most of the coastal confederacy. The new rulers however got quickly absorbed by the Temne. One Tura (Ture?) ruling in 1690 had the Temne title of Bai Tura (Ture?).² They were conquered by a combined force of Susu and Fula Warriors, who thus halted their advance further inland.

The coastal confederacy was not confined to the coast only, but seemed to have stretched far inland. Bai Farma's conquests covered extensive areas reaching as far inland as Port Loko area, Marampa - Massimera, and even Kolifa Mabang.³ The Temne of Port Loko maintained regular contact with their relations on the coast. This was probably a necessity. They were occupying a land which was originally Loko territory, and where they were heavily outnumbered by the "owners" of the land. Hirst⁴ tells us that the

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1. C.H. Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance. London, 1964, pp.43-49. Fyfe is quoting A.A. d'Almada's "Tratado Breve dos Rios de Guine do Capo Verde ..." Porto, 1841.
 2. C.H. Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone. O.U.P., 1962, p.3.
 3. "Bey Yare", one of the kings Bai Farma fought and conquered seems a title peculiar to Kolifa Mabang; I haven't come across it in connection with any other Temne chiefdom.
 4. Elizabeth Hirst: "An Attempt at Re-constructing the History of the Loko People from about 1790 to the Present Day." S/L Stud. N.S. 9 Dec. 1957, pp.26-39.

Loko urged Bai Farma to evacuate the Temne from their territory when they established themselves there in the 16th century. But the Temnes were not evacuated. Pushful, enterprising, resourceful, and above all energetic and warlike, the Temne proceeded to entrench themselves, and soon became joint rulers of the area with the Loko.

Tradition states¹ that the Kanu (or Gbaras) of Port Loko were the earliest Temne immigrants to that area. They were hunters and they came from Bombali district. They and the Lokos were the two groups that welcomed the Portuguese to the area when the latter arrived in the 16th century to trade. The Kanu immigrants could have been followers of Bai Farma Tami. The chieftaincy - "Bai Sebora", Sebora being a contraction of Seri Bora (Gbara) or Gbara Seri, and the Seris, the same as the Kamaras - was introduced to Port Loko area by them. It seems that they simply adopted the chieftaincy title in Bombali where they came from which is held by Kamaras and is called Bai Sebora. The title was, later in the 19th century, changed to "Bai Forki" - the name by which it is known today. It seems, however, that the Temne immigrants found it difficult to subjugate the Loko "owners" of the land completely and had to share the territory's governorship with them.

The resultant booming trade attracted others. In the 18th century the Sankos, who were Susu from Melikuri, came and were allowed to settle in the territory for trading purposes. Many more Susu immigrants joined the Sankos following the disruptions

1. Oral Tradition; Kurr, K., Bomporo, A.

caused by the Futa Jalon Jihad about the middle of the 18th century. Towards the end of the century these Susu immigrants successfully wrested political control from the Temne and Loko rulers of the territory. The Kamaras (the latest arrival) came from Sankara in the early 19th century.¹

The Fula of Yoni Mabanta, like the Susu of Port Loko, had been attracted to that area by trade.² They settled in different parts of this Banta country, which then had its principal trading town at Gbangbatok. In the eighteenth century when the Mende, hitherto an inland people, invaded the territory, the Fula rallied round the harassed Yoni Mabanta, helped them expel the invaders, and secured for themselves the political control of the area.

In Kolifa country the chieftaincy - the Masa Kama - was Koranko controlled until about the 18th century when the Temne revolted and overthrew the Koranko rulers.³ Tradition recalls⁴ that Bai Farma Tami, during his conquering drive to the coast, felt the Masa Kama sufficiently important for him to spend some time with the chief as his "stranger".

According to E.F. Sayers,⁵ the Thalīs (i.e. Banguras) who founded the Masimera crown were followers of Bai Farma Tami.

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1. Sayers, op.cit., pp.96-7.
 2. Oral Tradition; Sira, K; Kenkeh, K. also Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.38.
 3. Oral Tradition; Simgbī, Pa., also C.H. Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, London, 1964, pp.20-22. Fyfe is quoting an Oral tradition recorded in 1962 by V.R. Dorjahn.
 4. Oral Tradition: Bangura, F.
 5. Sayers, op.cit., p.97.

Their common ancestor was known as Simera, a name still borne as personal name in Simiria chiefdom, Koranko country. The first Thali was crowned by Farma Tami and was called Kolna, which strongly suggested a Wasulu Fula origin.

Songo Davies writing in 1928,¹ states: "The Masimera chiefdom of the Northern Province was formed by descendants of the Kurankos who were from Simia". These Korankos had been invited by the Masa Kama, chief of Kolifa Rowala, to help him in a war against the Mabanta people (the Yoni?). To secure the relationship "there was marriage alliance between himself and the chief and people of Simia". The Masa Kama won the war and afterwards some of his Koranko warriors, under Kelegbethle, decided to settle down permanently in Masa Kama's country. To further entrench himself Kelegbethle took to wife Bonkolifotho, the Masa Kama's sister.

The Korankos have the reputation of being great hunters, and it was for hunting purposes that the Masa Kama allowed Kelegbethle and his followers to settle in the present Masimera country. They named their settlement Simia "after the name of [their] own town in Kuranko country", and later many other towns were built by them over which Kelegbethle ruled as a sub-chief under the Masa Kama. He had a son named Koni-yoro who succeeded him after his death, and who "as a chief of the Masa Kama absolutely ruled the Simia (Simera) chiefdom ... "

1. Hon. J.A. Songo Davies, M.B.E.: "Origin of the Masimera Chiefdom in the Northern Province". S/L Stud. O.S. No. XIII, Sept. 1928, pp.22-24.

At the death of Koni-yoro, his son Simia Kolna became the chief of "Masimera" (which means "people of Simera"). A new Masa Kama gave his daughter as a wife to one of Kelegbethle's men. The woman's name was Kambaseki. She had a son, who, after the death of Simia Kolna, disputed the chieftaincy. To avoid conflict the elders decided to make Kambaseki a ruling house, to rule alternately to that of Kelegbethle. Kambaseki's son assumed the title of Simia-Kambaseki.

The foregoing accounts can be further supplemented by this abridged version of my own recordings at Masimera. According to Masimera informants,¹ "Masimera is a very old chiefdom. Rowala in Kolifa is the only chiefdom which is older than it. It was Rowala people who came here to crown our first chief, and they came with Farma Tami who brought chieftaincy here. The first Bai Simera was called Pa Nes [Koni-yoro?], and he was the son of Kelegbethle the founder of Masimera. Our ancestors came here from Simia in Koranko land to hunt. They travelled here along the River Seli (Rokel), and, on the instructions of their oracle carried a white cock with them. When they reached the present site of Masimera town, the cock crew, and following the oracle's instructions, they settled here. They named the settlement Simia (Simera) after their own country. Bai Simera Pa Nes [Koni-yoro?] had four sons; Tamabai, who also adopted his father's name (Pa Nes), Plein (also known as Gbara),

1. Oral Tradition: Bangura, A., Bangura, F., Bangura, B.Y.

Yesi (also known as Thonkla), and Kambaseki. These became the founders of the present four ruling houses in Masimera".

It is not improbable that Kolna was in fact a Wasulu Fula as Sayers suggested, and was Farma Tami's nominee for the chieftaincy. It is even probable that Kambaseki, the new Masa Kama's daughter, was married to no other than one of Koni-yoro's (Pa Nes's) sons. The disputed succession which Songo Davies speaks about probably was an organised Koranko revolt against the rule of the Fula immigrants.

Like the Masimeras (the Thalís), the Kabias of Marampa also say¹ their forebears came originally from Simia in Koranko land. Their leader was a man called Kekele who was a great warrior. There were Lokos in the land when the Kabias arrived, and the new comers had to fight for a long time before the Loko "owners" allowed them to settle. When the Kabias wanted a chief they sent to Simia, and it was from there that they brought the chieftaincy called "Bai Rampa".²

1. Oral Tradition; Kabia, C.

2. Many explanations of the origin of the title "Bai Rampa" have been put forward by Marampa people: One says it refers to a chieftainship held on behalf of the old "Pa" (at Simia) who allowed this branch (Mara) of the Kabias to continue the chiefly tradition. Another explanation is that during the early days of the settlement there were many 'palavers' both among the settlers themselves and with the Lokos. So people in Simia used to refer to the settlement as a branch (mara) where there was a lot of palaver (ka e pa). And the chief (o-bai) became known as the chief of the troublesome branch (Bai Mara M'pa, later, Bai Rampa).

There are now Six ruling houses in the chiefdom:

i. An Sankolo House	iv. Kegbele House
ii. Pathbana House	v. Queen House
iii. An Gbamathi House	vi. Kennedy House.

The present title - Bai Koblo - came about when a certain young hunter-warrior called Pa Kegbele, contrary to customary practice wanted to become chief. Because he knew that the elders would oppose him, partly because of his age, and partly because of his position in the ruling house, he decided to seek the assistance of a Devil (O-Kirfi - as the spirit of Sierra Leone Secret Societies are called). He set out from Marampa town, accompanied by some of his own brothers, in search of a Devil that would render the necessary help. At a site not far from the present town of Magbali, he met a Devil (O-Kirfi) called Ka Koblo. The Devil offered to assist him if he would change the chieftaincy title to "Bai Koblo" after himself. Pa Kegbele agreed, and when he became chief he changed the title of the chieftaincy. And it has been called "Bai Koblo" ever since. There had been (9) nine Bai Rampas before this time, and the present Bai Koblo is the (32nd) thirty-second bearer of that title.

According to local traditions¹ the first settlers in Malal chiefdom were Lokos. Their leaders were Pa Thagbonko and his brother Pa Wotho. They were the founders of the present Malal town which is now the chiefdom's ceremonial centre. They were later joined by the Gbara Seris, otherwise known as the Kalolos, who were elephant hunters. It was the Kalolos who brought the chieftaincy known as Bai Lal to Malal. During one of their hunting expeditions they came upon a sacred box, among the Katkant hills (in Malal), containing the sacred things of a chief. They

1. Oral Tradition: Bia, S., Kanu, Pa S., Karanke, Pa., Konteh, A.

took this box and its contents to Masimera where they originally came from, and where there was the nearest sacred chief who alone could decide what to do with such sacred objects. The then Bai Simera decided to make one of the Kalolos a chief (u-bai) over Malal. The new chief took the title of "Bai Lal" and after going through the necessary customary ceremonies in Masimera returned to Malal as the first Bai Lal Kalolo of the chiefdom. The first three Malal chiefs went through their Kantha¹ ceremonies in Masimera before Malal town was made into a sacred centre for crowning purposes.

Ropolon, Rochendokom, Malolum and Mara areas of the chiefdom (all on the Rokel) seem to be of later origin in their settlements; perhaps in the late 18th or early 19th centuries. In fact some of those regions became important only in the 19th century with the development of legitimate commerce. Ropolon, according to tradition, was founded by Pa Thonkara Gbla, who it was said came to settle in Malal primarily for trading purposes. His contemporary was Pa Bure Seri, a Mandinka, who, according to Hirst, had been sent there to open a warrior training camp for Loko people.² He (Pa Bure Seri) was later joined by a wealthy trader from Kolifa country called Pa Lolum, who gave his name to the town. The settlement, in the early days, was harassed by unfriendly neighbours to the north (Bombali). So Pa Lolum

1. Kantha ceremonies represent a period of confinement during which the chief-elect goes through the necessary rituals and training in preparation for his installation.

2. Hirst, op.cit., pp.31-2.

detailed one of his followers called Pa Kra who was a hunter, to remain at the other side of the river to keep watch on the activities of the unfriendly neighbours and to act as "ears" for the settlement at Malolum. This was why Mara (meaning branch) in those early days was known as "Ro-soelens" (meaning literally, "place of ears").

Malal, with its beautiful undulating terrain of open grass-land, attracted many other peoples, who came both to trade and to farm. The most important cultivated commercial crop in this area was groundnut. Rochendokom, which is now the most important town in the "Malal" section of the chiefdom,¹ was originally a groundnuts farm settlement. The Kontes who now rule this section came, it would seem, only early in the 19th century, "from the north". They first settled in Maseku (now a very small village opposite Malolum, on the other side of the river Rokel). Their leader was Pa Moi an Dander. Later the settlers, because Maseku was too muddy for farming, crossed the river and moved up to the present site of Rochendokom to grow groundnuts which, when harvested were taken down to Magbeli (on the Rokel) and even Freetown, for sale to local and European merchants.

Oral Traditions recorded in the territory of the "Eastern

1. Malal chiefdom got split into two sections following the Hut Tax War, but was re-united in 1943. Now there are four ruling houses in Malal chiefdom:

- Kalolo House
- Gbara House
- Kanu House
- Thula House

Temne" support very strongly the Koranko origin of most of the people of that area. The only exception here, it would appear, is Gbonkolenken Yele. According to Yele informants,¹ the founders of that section of the chiefdom were Bantas. They were hunters and their leaders were Pa Kongbe and Pa Kema, his father. When they arrived in this area they first settled at the place now known as Yele Mori. But in the 18th century, because of frequent Mende attacks, they moved to a small island formed by the Teye river. Such an island in Temne is called "an Yel", and the name Yele originated from this. But the island soon proved too small for the increasing ^{number of} Banta and other refugees who sought security on it and for whom the land available was too small to support, particularly agriculturally. The present site of Yele town (which is now the chiefdom town for the whole of Gbonkolenken) was originally a cassava farm belonging to one Pa Fode, and this was why the settlement was first named Ro M'foyoka (e-yoka in Temne means cassava). But as more and more people moved from their island settlement to this fine agricultural land, the name of their new, fortified, settlement was changed to "Yele". It was at this juncture that the Sises who were Korankos from Kuniike Gbarina brought the chieftaincy - Bai Komp.²

1. Oral Tradition: Gbogboro, Pa., Kamara, K.L.

2. The chieftaincy title came from the series of palm trees (ke-komp) which marked the chiefdom boundary with Mende land. Some, however, say that the title came from Na Komp, the name of the mother of the first Bai Komp.

However, the other three sections of Gbonkolenken¹ chiefdom: Gbonkolenken Mayeppoh, Gbonkolenken Poli and Gbonkolenken Masakon; the three sections of Kuniike country; Kuniike Gbarina, Kuniike Fula-oso, and Kuniike Sanda; and Tane chiefdom, seem to have very strong ties with the Korankos. In Mayeppoh² tradition states that the founders of that section of Gbonkolenken chiefdom came from Simbaria in Koranko country. Their leaders Pa Thangbara and Pa Yendewa were warriors. It is stated that Farma Tami on his way to Koya passed through Mayeppoh, and there he crowned a Kanu, one of his followers, no doubt, as the Bai Simera. But after the death of the first Bai Simera, the Koranko (Temme?) disputed the authority of the Kanus. And it seems their opposition was so strong that the Kanus were forced to install one of them, Yiragbasi, as the chief of a section of the chiefdom - Masakon (Masa means chief, and kon means corner). However, the Bai Simera seemed to have maintained some sort of seniority over the chief of Masakon, and it was he who conducted

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1. "Gbonkolenken" means, literally, "the other side of the forest" ("Gbonko" = forest, and "Lenken" = over there, other side). The name seems to have originated from the probing attitude of the settlers, particularly during the war years, when they refused to admit anybody into their strongholds until they were satisfied as to his real intentions - that is until they can see through him ("Gbonko", figuratively) to his mind ("Lenken", figuratively).
 2. Tradition states that Bai Farma had a pair of pliers (ta-yeppoh) with him when he rested at Mayeppoh. He left the pair of pliers on a piece of rock near his tent, and when he removed it the following morning the pliers had left its mark on the rock. That mark is still visible today but only to people who had not known about it before. The name "Mayeppoh" originated from this mark of the pair of pliers. Oral Tradition; Kome, B.

the installation ceremonies.

In Gbonkolenken Poli¹ tradition is also heavily weighted in favour of Simbaria origin. The leader of the Koranko settlers was Bemba Bar who came to that area with his family, including a great hunter called Pa Segbe. The party stopped for a while in what is now known as Tane before they finally settled in their present home. Bemba Bar was a wealthy trader. He had many sons who later became founders of many of the present towns of Gbonkolenken Poli. It was one of his sons, Pa Gboke Poli, that brought chieftaincy - Bai Sunthba² - to Gbonkolenken Poli. The chieftaincy is an exact replica of the ones in Tane and Simbaria.

The Bai Kafari of Matotoka (Tane chiefdom) is the only "Ture" chief among the Temne, and he alone wears a nose-ring.³ According to tradition,⁴ however, the present people of the chiefdom were originally Korankos. The Korankos who came to settle in the area came from Dalakur. They were led by a man called Mounkur who came with his family. Ropolo, about three miles from the present chiefdom town, Matotoka, was the capital town for many years; Matotoka took over from it only in the last

1. The Polis are the same as the Koromas, whom Sayers (op.cit., p.96) describes as "the Jews of West Africa", also Oral Tradition; Fonah, M., Poli, A.

2. The present Bai Sunthba, very old and bedridden, became chief long before the amalgamation of the four Gbonkolenken chiefdoms in 1947.

3. Sayers, op.cit., p.66.

4. Oral Tradition; Gbla, A.

century with the development of legitimate commerce, when it became the most important trading centre in the chiefdom. Ropolo, however, remains the ceremonial centre, and there all Tane chiefs go for their installation ceremonies.

"The Kuniike Temne" asserts Sayers, "are known to be heavily impregnated with Koranko blood".¹ In Kuniike country tradition² is silent as to where the founders came from originally, so presumably the area has always been inhabited (i.e. as far as tradition can go). Farma Tami, on his drive to the coast, passed through Kuniike where he left one of his outstanding followers, Pa Kuniike, who later gave his name to the territory. At his death the country was divided among his three most important supporters (some say, sons), and so came into being the three Kuniikes we know today; Kuniike Gbarina, Kuniike Fulaoso, and Kuniike Sanda.³

Today, as a ~~speech-group~~, the one outstanding feature that distinguishes the Temne from the other peoples of Sierra Leone is perhaps their language. This, along with Bulom, Sherbro, Kissi, Baga, Landuma, and Gola, has been classified with the "Mel" group of the West Atlantic classification.

1. Sayers, op.cit., p.48.

2. Oral Traditions: Bia, F., Sanda, K., Sori, A.

3. Kuniike Sanda and Kuniike Fulaoso were amalgamated in 1950 and are now known simply as Kuniike chiefdom. Kuniike Gbarina remains separate.

However, dialectical variations¹ (sometimes sharply distinct) have also been ascribed to various parts of Temne country. A Yoni Temne finds the "language" of the Kunike man crude and not easily understood, and vice versa. Until late 19th century, that is until the coming of colonial rule, the various Temne groupings did not seem to have regarded themselves as one people. The mode of their settlements in Sierra Leone probably accounts for this. The Temne settlements in the early days seem extremely small and far from one another. The various settlements maintained little friendly contact with one another. In fact they fought one another just as much as they fought the other peoples in the land for political and economic supremacy. A Koya Temne was Koya first and Temne last; so was a Ro Mendi Temne, and so were the other major groupings.

In fact one is tempted to conclude that the application now of the common name "Temne" in such a way as to supersede sectional feeling among the people is a colonial legacy. When a Yoni Temne did something bad, it always provided an opportunity for the colonial overlords to castigate all the Temne as inveterate trouble-makers, and to tell all the Mende how good they were by comparison. However, this policy (of divide and rule) helped indirectly to quicken the pace of "tribal" unity and

1. Dalby distinguishes five Temne dialects:-

- i. Western
- ii. Yoni
- iii. Bombali
- iv. Western Kunike
- v. Eastern Kunike or "Deep" Kunike

See Sierra Leone Language Review 1, 1962, p.64. (T.D.P. Dalby: "Language Distribution in Sierra Leone".)

co-operation. For, persecuted under one name, the Temne came to regard each other, irrespective of place of origin, as fellow sufferers.

The underlying cultural and linguistic unity made this coming together a lot easier. Temne Kamaras from say, Kolifa exhibit considerable affinities towards their namesake in Gbonkolenken and vice versa. And although a similar feeling of affinities may extend to other Kamaras among other peoples, ^{such feeling} ~~it~~ acts as a sort of unifying force among the Temne generally. So these family names are of tremendous importance historically because of the social bound they create among all men possessing them.

Secret societies also act as a unifying force among the Temne people. For example, the Gbenle Society,¹ which is the secret society concerned with the chieftaincy ceremonies in Kolifa, Tane, Kuniike (except Gbarina section), Gbonkolenken, Malal, and Masimera chiefdoms, brings the peoples of those areas together whenever there was a chieftaincy ceremony in any of them. In the same way the Poro, which is the secret society for all adult males in the chiefdoms involved, brings Koya and Yoni peoples together during the installation or death ceremonies of their "Poro" chiefs.


But neither of these secret societies is Temne in origin. The Poro, which Sayers asserts "is law and religion combined, ...

1. See Dorjahn, V.R. "The Organisation and Function of the Ragbenle Society of the Temne". Africa, Vol. 29, Apr. 1959, pp.156-169.

the custodian of the community's soul, and the guardian of the *genus loci*",¹ the Temne borrowed from the Sherbro people. And the Gbenle, which is the older of the two societies and much more definitely concerned with politics, is Koranko in origin. However, a Temne chief, whether installed by Poro or Gbenle is generally regarded by his people as semi-divine in his person, and enjoys far greater power and influence over his people than, say, a Mende chief who, by contrast, is a wholly secular ruler.²

1. Sayers, *op.cit.*, p.23.

2. Little K. "The Mende Chiefdoms of Sierra Leone". West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (ed. Daryll Forde and P.M. Kaberry) O.U.P., 1967, p.249.



(Temne Territories in the second half of the
19th C. Reproduced from P.P. 1886, Vol. XLVII)

CHAPTER IITHE TEMNE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth century, particularly the later half, was, for the Temne, a period of widespread disaster and general decline. At a time when the slave trade was at its height the Temne, who did not seem to have been adversely affected by the trade itself,¹ found their country "invaded" by traders from other parts of West Africa and Europe. In Port Loko area the Susu ousted its Temne and Loko rulers and seized control of its trade as well as of its politics. In Yoni country the Fula, who, tradition says, had settled in that area since the time of Bai Farma Tami, assumed a dominant role which has lasted till today.

European traders on the coast (the English and the French in particular) sent agents, mostly non-Temne in origin, to various inland centres in Temne country to tap the trade in those areas for them. On the Rokel River, Gumbu Smart, a Loko man, and an agent of the English slave traders on the Bunce Island, built a formidable Loko community in Rokon who dominated the commercial and political lives of the area for many years. Also along the Rokel River and the Port Loko Creek the Bundukas, Fula aristocrats from St. Louis in Senegal, agents of the French slave traders on the Gambia Island, dispersed in small numbers to

1. E.F. Sayers, "Notes on the Clan or Family Names Common in the Area Inhabited by the Temne-Speaking People", S/L Stud. o.s. x, Dec. 1927, p.14.

channel the trade in those regions to their employers. These Bundukas were to play a very important role in the lives of the Temne among whom they settled both politically, economically and militarily.

The booming trade also attracted other peoples. The Mende, hitherto an inland people, migrated towards the coast in the eighteenth century. In Gbonkolenken (Yele) area they clashed with the Temne whom they drove from their lands and forced to seek refuge in less productive regions. Further south-westwards they encountered the Banta people who it would appear, were a group of the Temne people originally,¹ swamped large sections of them, but failed to subdue the present Yoni country (which formed part of the northern Banta country); thanks to Fula intervention.

In various other parts of the Temne country, there were signs of political disaster and national decline. Internal strife in Kunike followed by a civil war (The Baba War), had forced many of its inhabitants into exile. And the return of these exiles to their land of birth probably in the later half of the eighteenth century, provides one of the most moving episodes in the eighteenth century history of the Temne people.

The "Ground-pig War" which arose out of border dispute

1. T.D.P. Dalby, "Banta and Mabanta", S/L L.R. No.2, 1963, pp.23-25. Dalby who calls the Banta a "tribe or sub-tribe", notes that "the Banta language, still spoken by a few old people in the Mende-speaking chiefdoms of Banta and Banta Mokele, is in fact an isolated dialect of Temne, with noticeable similarities to the Yoni dialect. The Banta concludes Dalby were originally "the southernmost tribe of the Temne-Baga-Landuma group of peoples".

between Marampa and Ro-Mendi peoples, involved the Masimera, Port Loko, and Bombali peoples, raged for many years, and threw large regions of Temne country into chaos. These wars received the full blessing of the slave traders and their agents who supplied arms and supported one section against another, for they made for good business.

Two important developments in the eighteenth century, both originating outside Sierra Leone, also immensely affected the Temne (as indeed they affected many other peoples of Sierra Leone, if only in varying degrees); one, directly and as it turned out later, disastrously; the other, indirectly. The Futa Jalon Jihad which began about 1725 transformed Islam and turned Futa Jalon itself into a theocracy. Itinerant Muslim scholars from the new state moved out in large numbers to propagate the purified religion. Many of them found their way to Temne country on this proselitizing mission, or invited by Temne chiefs to make charms (shebes) for them. The influence of these "Mori-men" (as they are called in Sierra Leone) over the lives of the Temne people (as indeed over those of many other Sierra Leone peoples) was tremendous throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and remains great even today. In the wars activated by the Muslim conquest of Futa Jalon they defeated Susu (many of whom rejected Islam), and many other Mandinka peoples (Muslim and non-Muslim) dispersed from the north and settled among the coastal peoples, including the Temne. In some places they became rulers.

By the second half of the eighteenth century the British people were becoming more and more fired with enthusiasm to demonstrate to the outside world the mastery and superiority of British knowledge and way of life. One of the practical results of this desire was the establishment of the settlement in Freetown in 1787, on Temne territory. Dedicated, in the words of its promoters (violent opponents of the slave trade which had stood between them and their claim to moral superiority) to the spread of the blessings of industry and civilization among the African peoples, the Colony was in the very near future not only to interfere in the "modus vivendi" of the people around them, but also to encroach on Temne territory and to drive the people away from their lands by force of arms.

But it was in Port Loko area that the situation remained most entangled throughout the eighteenth century. Situated strategically at the head of a navigable creek (particularly at high tide), and lying along the most important route to the interior - to Futa Jalon in particular - Port Loko area had become very important long before the eighteenth century. The original Loko inhabitants had been swamped by the pushful and more enterprising Temne who moved into that region perhaps in the fifteenth century, and who entrenched themselves and became joint rulers of the area with their Loko hosts. However, the relationship between the two communities did not seem very cordial, for the Loko found it necessary to appeal (unsuccessfully) to Bai Farma Tami (the legendary Temne warrior of Fula origin) to

evacuate the Temne immigrants from their country.¹

As trade with Europeans on the coast increased, so did Port Loko rise in importance, and so did the area assume a greater cosmopolitan outlook. The Portuguese had recognised its importance commercially since about the sixteenth century when they set up a trading depot in the area² - in the present Port Loko town (locally known as Bake Loko). Many Mande-speaking peoples also settled in the area primarily to trade. And prominent among these were the Susu, who inhabit the mountainous country northwards of the present Sierra Leone Peninsula.

The Susu had traded regularly with the coastal peoples long before the eighteenth century, bartering for salt, cloths woven by the Fula, and iron worked from the ferriferous rocks in their country. They also supplied a little gold.³ They were primarily agriculturists in their own country where they came into frequent conflict with the pastoral Fula.⁴ But when

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1. Elizabeth Hirst, "An Attempt at Reconstructing the History of the Loko People from about 1790 to the Present Day", S/L Stud. n.s. IX, Dec. 1957, p.27.
 2. N.G. Frere in his "Notes on the History of Port Loko and its Neighbourhood", S/L Stud., April, 1926, pp.63-69. States (p.63) that the Portuguese were the first settlers in the area where Port Loko now stands, but this is not supported by the traditions of Port Loko people themselves. It is not likely either that the Portuguese would settle in a place where there was no one to trade with.
 3. C. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, O.U.P., 1962, p.1.
 4. M. McCulloch, The Peoples of Sierra Leone, London, 1950, p.51.

they were both threatened by the Manes towards the middle of the sixteenth century, the two peoples united to defeat them. The Susu however thenceforth took their trade to the Rio Nunez for fear, no doubt, that the Manes-dominated "Sapis Confederacy" would be tempted to take reprisals on their traders.

But by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Susu had started once again carrying trade to the Sierra Leone Peninsula; this time from their base on the Port Loko Creek,¹ where they competed with the Temne, Loko and other traders in the area as middle men. The most important Susu family to settle in Port Loko area were the Sankos who came from Melikuri. Muslims by religion, they called their leader Alimami. They had been allowed to settle in Port Loko area by the Temne and Loko rulers of the area. They built their own town and called it Sendugu, after one of their towns in Susu country. (Sendugu now forms part of the present town of Port Loko). The settlement at Sendugu seemed to have grown very rapidly as more Susu immigrants found their way to Port Loko area. Some were attracted by the booming trade, particularly in slaves. Others were invited by the local inhabitants to assist them in the various conflicts that broke out from time to time in Port Loko area during the eighteenth century,² and were allowed to settle and to participate in the commercial life of the area in return

1. Lawson & Parkes: Information regarding ... Tribes of Sierra Leone. C.O. 1887, p.23.

2. Informants in Port Loko were unable to recall details of any particular conflict in the area during the period, but say there were many. Frere, op.cit., p.63. notes that it was one of these conflicts that brought the Sanko family to Port Loko.

for this assistance.

Many of the Susu who were forced out of their homes as a result of the Futa Jalon Jihad found new homes in Port Loko area among their kinsmen. The population of Sendugu increased considerably and it was felt necessary to build a new town, Robat. Many of the itinerant Muslim scholars who carried the new faith to Port Loko area settled among the Susu in Sendugu and Robat where there were already substantial numbers of Muslim converts. The Islamic school opened at Sendugu became very popular and many local Temme and Loko chiefs and other dignitaries in the area sent their sons to that school for the highly prized Islamic education.

Gradually the Susu, immensely successful in trade, highly respected by the local populace for their Islamic learning and their claimed power over the supernatural - witchcraft in particular - and often dreaded because of the outstanding qualities (and brutality) of their warriors, came to supersede the local rulers and wrested both the economic and the political control of the territory from them. They placed the traditional chieftain - the Bai Seborá - under a curse for allegedly refusing to compensate some Susu Muslim traders whose properties were alleged plundered by the Bai Seborá's people. The curse, which proved extremely effective, was intended to make it impossible for any future Bai Seborá to live long.¹ The result was that both the local inhabitants and the would-be chiefs became scared

1. N.G. Frere, op.cit., p.64.

of crowning, or accepting to be crowned, chief, and so had no alternative but to accept the rule of the Alimami in Sendugu over the whole of Port Loko.

The first Sanko chief of Port Loko was Alimami Namina Modu, who came to the country in the 1760s from Melikuri.¹ He was succeeded at his death by Alimami Amara. But the Sanko rule of Port Loko did not seem destined to last very long, even though they tried to secure their position by taking daughters of important Temne and Loko chiefs to wife. For during the reign of Namina Modu, a young man of Susu origin, Moruba Kindo Bangura by name, arrived in Port Loko from Sanda country. He attached himself to the Sanko ruler who was married to his aunt, and rose rapidly to the position of a Santigi. He was said to be thoroughly grounded in the Islamic Religion, and highly regarded by the Temne with whom he was very friendly. Moruba Kindo Bangura was to become, during the second decade of the nineteenth century, the leader of Temne revolt against Sanko domination.

Politically, economically, and even militarily, Mande domination of Port Loko area became, at a point, no longer tolerable to the local inhabitants. But ideologically they (particularly the local rulers) seemed to have welcomed it, attracted no doubt by the prestige conferred by Islam.

1. C.O. 267/232. McCormack to Kennedy, May 4, 1853. Enclosed in Kennedy to Newcastle, May 9, 1853

Islam, Fyfe and Trimingham¹ point out, is the religion of traders. The Muslim Mande traders had adopted it long before the Futa Jalon Jihad, for "it reinforced their solidarity and linked them with the wider world". The Muslim Mande traders came as peaceful traders, settled in villages along the trade routes, or formed villages of their own where they combined cultivation with trading. The people accepted them and there was often intermarriage between them and the local people. Some of the traders gained political influence at village level but "their primary passion was in trading and their Islamic influence was incidental".

But there were also the Muslim itinerant scholars, a group of devotees whose sole duty was the propagation of the Islamic teaching and practice. Representatives of this group had also reached the coast long before the Futa Jalon theocracy was established. But after the Jihad their number increased considerably.

"The Mandingoes", says John Matthews,² a representative of a London firm in Sierra Leone, writing about the activities of these marabouts, "who profess the Mahometan religion, are, in outward appearance, strict followers of the precepts of the Alcoran; nor could Mahomet himself have wished for more zealous

1. J.S. Trimingham and G.Fyfe, "The early Expansion of Islam in Sierra Leone". S/L B.R., Vol. 2, No.2, Dec. 1960, pp.33-40.

2. John Matthews, A Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, first published in 1788; new impression Lond. 1966, pp.68-9.

promoters of his law. Fully sensible of what importance it is to have the conscience in keeping, they neglect no means of policy to spread their religious doctrines - where they are strong they use coercive measures; and where they are not in a capacity to exert those means, they use every art that human subtlety can suggest - In the villages of the tribes around them they erect schools, and teach their youth gratis, to read and write Arabic; and their missionaries, by temporizing with the prevailing follies and foibles of the distant nations which they visit; by assuming to themselves the sanctity and authority of the servants of God; by abstaining from all strong liquors; and above all, by pretending to have power over every species of witchcraft; and, by their trade in making charms, do so insinuate themselves into the confidence of the chiefs and principal people; that I never visited a town in this part of Africa where I did not find a Mandingo man as prime minister, by the name of bookman, without whose advice nothing was transacted".

But although many local rulers welcomed Islamic religion, and some in fact became devoted Muslims, for the generality of their subjects Islamic impact on their lives remained very superficial. Many adhered to their traditional religions either in preference to Islam or in conjunction with the new religion. Parents were apparently very enthusiastic in sending their sons to the Islamic schools among them, but remained indifferent themselves. Because of its strategic position Port Loko remained throughout the eighteenth century the greatest centre of Islamic activities in Temne country. And it is not surprising that it

was here that Islam made its greatest impact on the lives of the indigenous population.

Another important Temne area where Islamic culture made an impressive impact on the lives and politics of the indigenous population, though on a much smaller scale than in Port Loko area, was Yoni country. Here the Fulas were the torch-bearers of the new religion. Like Port Loko, Yoni had become important long before the eighteenth century as part of the famed Banta country.

The Banta people¹ whose country seems at one time to have covered almost the whole of the present Moyamba District (Southern Province), the whole of the present Yoni, and perhaps part of the Gbonkolenken, chiefdoms (Tonkolili District), had their chief town at the present town of Gbangbatok. Situated at the head of the navigable Gbangbatok Creek which links it up with the Bagru River, and so the Sherbro trade, the capital of the Bantas had long become one of the leading trading towns in the area. And it was trade that attracted the Fulas to the area.

According to local traditions² the first Yoni Fulas came with the legendary Bai Farma Tami who, tradition says, (in the 1840s) came to Sierra Leone "more than three hundred generations" ago. He was a man of Fula origin, and it was he who gave the

1. The account given here, based largely on Oral Traditions (See Sira, K. and Bibinkoro, B) modifies and enlarges that contained in V.R. Dorjahn, "A Brief History of the Temne of Yoni", S/L Stud., n.s. xiv, Dec. 1960, pp.80-89.

2. Oral Tradition: Sira, K. and Bibinkoro, B.

Banta people their first Fula chief - Masa Kele. Masa Kele divided his domain into sections and placed the present Yoni area under two of his Fula followers; Araba and Amadu Jallo who were both Muslims. Amadu Jallo became the first Alimami of the Yoni area of the country, and was succeeded at his death by Araba, his second in command. After Araba, Kajoro, his eldest son, became the Alimami because at that time Amadu's eldest son was still young.

It was during the time of Alimami Kajoro that the Kpa Mendes began to arrive in Yoni territory. War broke out between them and the Temne (? Banta) inhabitants. The latter appealed to the Fula traders for support. The Fulas, anxious to protect and promote their own interests, rallied to the aid of the Temne. With this help the Temne succeeded in keeping the present Yoni territory free from Mende domination, and in appreciation of the assistance rendered by the Fulas openly and formally recognised their leader - the Alimami - as their own head as well, and called him Fula Mansa, that is, Fula chief. The first two Fula Mansas were Binbinkoro and Gbanshankoro, who were brothers, sons of Alimami Amadu Jallo. The Fulas entrenched themselves by marrying the daughters of important Temne leaders, and by bringing in the Poro Society which gave them greater authority and security by making the person of the Fula Mansa sacred and inviolable. The first Poro Fula Mansa was Kayito, the grandson of Araba.

But renewed Kpa Mende attacks under Kayito once again threw the Yoni territory into confusion. Fula Mansa Kayito, reputedly a very incompetent ruler, failed to rally sufficient force to counter the Kpa Mende challenge in spite of his Poro connections. He was forced into exile in a small Masimera town called Masawurr. Here he died with all the sacred things of the chieftaincy with him. Also because of his death in exile the customary Poro ceremonies following the death of a Poro - installed chief could not be performed. So for more than fifty years there was no Fula Mansa in Yoni territory, during which period the Bai Seboras of Yonibana ruled the whole country.

According to V.R. Dorjahn,¹ it was during the reign of Gbanshankoro that the title of Bai Seboras was introduced to Yoni. Selomeyenki, one of the two sons of Masa Munta Kasim of Kolifa Mamunta, settled in Banta area and married a sister of the Fula Mansa. He visited Yoni (Sherbro) where he was initiated into the Poro Society and given the Poro name of Kondo. He afterwards founded Maseri which has since become the most important Poro centre in all Temne country. Contact with Yoni (Sherbro) was severed during the troubled years of Kayito's reign and so Kondo founded Yonibana (i.e. big Yoni) and became the first Bai Seboras of Yoni Mamela.

But the story of how Kondo came to be associated with Yonibana has been told differently by Yonibana people themselves.²

1. Dorjahn, op.cit.

2. Oral Tradition: Kenkeh, R. and Hallowell, D.B.

According to Yoni (Mamela) traditions, because repeated Kpa Mende attacks under Kayito rendered ineffective the rule of the Fula Mansa in Petfu (then the main Yoni town, but now the chiefdom town of only Yoni Mahanta section), Yoni Mamelas felt they needed some strong person to protect them. Such a person must be an initiate like Kayito himself for only initiates can wear the crown - an Fari. They decided to invite Selomeyenki, the husband of Gbanshankoro's sister and brother of Kedi Kola Kamalefure (who became the Masabang of Kolifa Mabang in 1799)¹ to become their chief.

But first Selomeyenki must be initiated into the Poro Society. To satisfy this requirement he undertook a journey to the Sherbro country - to Yoni. Selomeyenki seem to have done this against the wishes of the other members of his family, for they refused to accept him into the family after the initiation, for they were Gbenle members and wished to have nothing to do with the Poro Society. In Yoni Sherbro, after going through the initiation ceremonies, Selomeyenki assumed the Poro name of Kondo, which it is said gives the impression of someone weak, hungry, and friendless; an outcast. From Yoni he was given an important official of the Poro Society to accompany him to his own country. This man's name was Mankota, and it was his duty to help establish the Poro Society in the Yoni territory Kondo had been invited to govern.

1. Dorjahn, op.cit.

On the instructions of Poro officials in Yoni (Sherbro), the two men carried a cock with them and travelled overnight along the Taia (Jong) River. They were to establish the Poro Society on the spot where the cock first crew. This was how Maseri became the Yoni centre of Poro up to this date. Selomeyenki became chief as Bai Seborá Kondo. It did not seem as if he ever lived at the present town of Yonibana itself (known in those days as Sar Ferah that is white stones because of the many white pebbles found in the area). His death place was Maseri and there he was buried. Thereafter Maseri became the burial place of all Yoni Mamela chiefs.

Kondo's successor was Mankota, who was allowed to become Bai Seborá in appreciation of his efforts in establishing the Poro Society in Yoni country. But Kondo's son disputed the chieftaincy with him, forcing him, after the Masabang had failed to settle the dispute, to move from Maseri. Mankota left Maseri with all the sacred things, and his intention was to return them to Yoni (Sherbro). But the people of Sar Ferah prevailed upon him to remain with them as chief. He agreed to stay and the name Sar Ferah was changed to Yonibana. Yonibana has since then become the main town of the Mamela section of the chiefdom, and the name Yoni became attached to the whole of the territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the Fula Mansas, that is the present Yoni chiefdom, comprising two sections: Mabanta and Mamela.

After Bai Seborá Mankota, Pa Sebaná, lover of a daughter of Kondo's and a great warrior, was invited to become the Bai Seborá.

He was not strictly entitled to become chief, and that was why he assumed the title of Bai Seborá Bumineh; Bumineh meaning someone holding something in trust, a caretaker. But his house later became recognised as a ruling family. After Bumineh, Bai Seborá Gbassa became chief. Gbassa's real name was Ngemononi, son of Gborokunda, by his wife Nasehe. He was of Koranko origin, and a great warrior. He established the fourth ruling house in Yoni Mamela.

The effects on the Temne of the devastating wars that accompanied Mende migrations in certain areas were not limited to Yoni country alone. The present Gbonkolenken (Yele) area, where the people call themselves Temne Mabanta, strongly suggesting a Banta origin, also seem to have suffered considerably. According to local traditions,¹ the Temne (Banta?) territory now called Gbonkolenken Yele originally extended much further southwards than it is today. But when the Mende came in the eighteenth century, and wanted land for their own use, they attacked the original inhabitants, and forced them to move northwards. The defenders sought refuge on a small island formed by the Teye River. Here they invited a famous Mori-man to help them meet this Mende challenge. But their small island home quickly proved inadequate for the needs of the Temne refugees whose number swelled rapidly by the addition of more of their number from the Mende-held regions of their lands. Large areas of the island also became flooded during the rainy season

1. Oral Tradition: Gbogboro, Kamara, K.L.

thereby making intensive farming impracticable. With the help of the Mori-man they were able to drive the Mende, and recover some of their land south of the Teye River. However when they felt it safe enough to move from their island home to a better location - the present Yele town - they established their settlement on the northern rather than on the southern side of the river, which afterwards formed a useful defensive barrier. Mende attacks, however, continued well into the nineteenth century, when peace was finally established by the local rulers themselves.

In Kunike, as in Yoni country, the earliest recalled chief of the area was a Fula, a follower of Bai Farma Tami - Pa Kunike by name - from whom the chiefdom's name emanated.¹ He was a Muslim. There were many other Fulas in the area when he arrived, who settled as farmers and cattle keepers. Some of these Fulas were Muslims like him, others not; but they all seem to have acknowledged him as their leader. Also like the Fula ruler of the Banta country, Pa Kunike divided his own territory into sections (or spheres of influence) among the more important Fula settlers. And this was how the three Kunikes we have today - Gbarina, Fulaoso, and Sanda - came to be.

It is not made clear where Pa Kunike himself resided in the country. Tradition refers to the Bai Kafari of Mamanso as the oldest chieftainship in the territory; so presumably Pa Kunike made that section of the country his capital. However it seems

1. Oral Tradition: Bia, F., Sanda K and Sori A.

the Fula chief in the Sanda section was a much older person than he was as suggested by the title of the chieftainship there - Bai Kurr - which means "old chief". One of the early Fula chiefs of Fulaoso section was reputedly a very wealthy man who had a lot of cattle. He apparently treated the local inhabitants badly and so was intensely disliked by them. But the people seemed powerless to bring him under control.

In Kuniike Gbarina the situation was rather less clear-cut than in other Kuniike areas. Gbarina, it has been suggested, was the name of one of Pa Kuniike's sons, whom his father made chief in the area. But it seems the local inhabitants were opposed to Fula rule right from the start, in spite of the fact that the chiefs were installed by the Gbenle Society, which the local people instituted in order to keep their alien rulers in check. Yatangbema, one of Gbarina's later successors, found himself confronted with a serious revolt by his subjects soon after his installation, perhaps early in the eighteenth century. His Temne subjects refused to work or fight for him. All the Fulas in the land united to teach the Temne, supported by their Koranko neighbours, a lesson. The war that followed is locally known as the Baba War.

The Baba War which spread to other parts of Kuniike country plunged the territory into chaos, especially Kuniike Gbarina where it forced many of its people into exile in other parts of the Eastern Temne country. Yatangbema sent some of his family out of the country to safety in Gbonkolenken Mayeppoh, took his head

wife - Yabomposeh - and all the sacred things of the chieftaincy, and ended it all in a pool not far from the present chiefdom town of Makali. And for many years Kuniike Gbarina remained virtually depopulated, during which period elephants and other wild beasts roamed freely in the area.

The return of the exiles to their fatherland, perhaps in the later half of the eighteenth century, which centres round the dead body of an aged woman, who had made her people swear not to lay her to rest in a foreign land, provided a spectacle that many Kuniike people recall today with a dignifying solemnity and a deep sense of reverence. Yabomkani (the woman's name) was a young many queen when her husband, Yatangbema, had to smuggle her out of the Kuniike country to safety, because of the civil war. At Mayeppoh she heard the story of his tragic end, and swore, and made the people around her swear also, that should she die in exile before she could return to Kuniike country her dead body must be carried back for burial in the land of her birth, for which her husband had sacrificed his life.

As the woman's life drew to a close so did preparation for the return journey mount, with the hope that the return journey might be completed before she actually died. The two leaders in charge of the preparations were Pa Konkomo (who was in Mayeppoh with the old lady), and Pa Lumpimduko (who was staying at Makande). They sent messages to all Kuniike refugees to assemble in those two centres in readiness for a return to the fatherland. But before the preparations could be completed Yabomkani died;

just after the planting season, and the beginning of the heavy rains.

This meant that the exiles would have to make the return journey as fast as possible not only in order to be able to convey the dead body to Kuniike before it became too badly decayed to carry, but also to avoid, luckily, the period of the really heavy rains which would make their journey, if not altogether impossible, extremely more difficult. The exiles were also returning at a time when it was already too late to plant new crops for the next harvest, but they remained undaunted; the dead Mamy queen's wish must be carried out.

With the dead body roughly embalmed (in the local way, by rubbing plenty of salt on it), the refugees set out in three groups. A few selected strong young men led the way, cutting through the thick jungle, making bridges where necessary, and rope ladders for scaling difficult mountain slopes. They were followed by the bearers of the dead body. Trailing behind were the old men, women, children with the rest of the remaining strong men to protect them. This terribly long and difficult journey was accomplished in four days! The dead woman's body was buried on the site now occupied by the present chiefdom town - Makali - which has known nothing but prosperity ever since.

But the Kuniike Gbarina people have remained without a sacred chief, that is, a Gbenle-installed chief, till today; Yatangbema having perished with the sacred objects necessary for this when he drowned himself. So when the refugees arrived

back in their home country, Pa Lumpimduko assumed the role of chief and law-giver.¹ He was assisted in this task by the family of Merbono, founded by an exiled Banta chief from Banta country who ran away from a "Poro palaver" in his country and was granted asylum by Yatangbema just before the civil war. Yatangbema directed that Merbono be accorded full recognition as a chief. During the period of exile his family remained in Kuniike country for they had nowhere to go. But the recognition of this family as a ruling house was revoked later in the nineteenth century as a result of their misrule.

While Kuniike lay desolate from the effects of the Baba War, the Ground-pig War was devastating large areas of Temne country along the Rokel River. Disputes over boundary lines had bedeviled the relations between the Kabias of Marampa and the Temne of Ro-Mendi for many years. The "palaver" had been submitted to various mediators for arbitration, and a sort of no-man's land had been carved out of the area in dispute in which

1. The laws of Lumpimduko were as follows:

- i. If any one felt thirsty and there was no water nearby, if he came upon any palm-tree being tapped he could drink from the wine to his satisfaction, and so long as he did not carry any of the wine away there would be no palaver.
- ii. If any one felt hungry and came across a cassava farm, he could eat to his satisfaction, and there would be no palaver so long as he did not take any of the cassava away with him.
- iii. That every member of the community had equal right to all parts of the country, and that any man who "brushed" first in any particular area had an undisputed claim to the portion he had brushed.

(See Oral Tradition: Sori, A.)

neither side was to farm. The area eventually became a favourite hunting bush. Sometimes the two sides co-operated in setting the traps, and took the catch alternately. But it was not always easy to predict what the next catch was going to be, and so there was always some argument about who should take it.

On one occasion one of the jointly set traps caught a fretamba,¹ a smallish type of bush rat, and the Marampa side took it. The next catch was a ground-pig, a much bigger animal than a fretamba, the Kabias got to the scene of the trap first, took the animal and was just about to make away with it when the Ro-Mendi representative arrived. A quarrel ensued which escalated into the widely known Ground-pig War. The war raged for many years, although not continuously. The Ro-Mendi people got assistance from their relatives in Bombali Sebora, and Port Loko,² the Kabias, from Korankoland and Masimera.

After many years of hard fighting had passed with no side seeming on the road to success, the local chiefs got together and decided to settle the palaver peacefully. Bai Simera, the oldest and the most senior chief involved in the dispute was asked by all sides to mediate. He found in favour of the Kabias of Marampa. The Ro-Mendis rejected his decision, accused him of

1. See also Hon. J.A. Songo Davies, "Origin of the Masimera Chiefdom in the Northern Province", S/L Stud., o.s. xiii, Sept. 1928, pp.22-24.

2. The Kanus (i.e. Gbaras) of Port Loko are said to have invited some Susu warriors to help.

partiality, and in the angry exchanges that followed shot him and seized the box containing the sacred things of the Masimera chieftainship. With their chief killed in a most uncereemonious way, and the sacred things of the chieftaincy lost, the Thalís of Masimera were unable to crown a new chief. They invited a close relation of theirs, Pa Fira by name, from Koranko country to help them run the affairs of the chieftdom, and to assist in the recovery of the lost sacred things.

This was the situation in Masimera country when in the last quarter of the eighteenth century a certain "stranger" known to history as Gumbu Smart, a man of considerable wealth and power, came to ask the Thali owners of the land for permission to settle in their country with his family. Gumbu Smart was to become, before the turn of the century, the most wealthy, most powerful, and most influential man among the whole of the Rokel Temne.

According to local tradition,¹ Gumbu Smart came originally from Kalangba in Loko country, where he was known as Koko (which means, in Loko language, the hide of a wild goat). His father, Kandeñ Gbanka Kalangba, was the chief of Kalangba area of Loko country. As a young man Koko was a palm-wine tapper. One day he went, accompanied by some of his brothers, palm-wine tapping, and as he was climbing the tree the sharp "chissel" used for tapping the palm fell from its sheath and fatally wounded his brother who was waiting for him at the foot of the tree. This

1. Oral Tradition: Kamara, A., Kanu, S., Fofanah, M., and Kanu, A.S.

was the accident that caused Koko to run away from home - from his father's wrath.

But he got captured by some slave raiders in Port Loko area and sold to the slave traders on the Bunce Island (then called Bence Island, and now known to Temne informants as Benshalí), intended for a ship bound for the West Indies.¹ But when the time came for the slaves to be put on board he concealed himself and so escaped transportation for that time. In the meantime he was employed in the boats, and, "showing much acute-ness and fidelity" was returned on the Island. He grew in favour with his English masters on the Island.

In the meantime his father was desperately looking for him, and sent people to various places for that purpose. After some time news reached him that Koko was on the Bunce Island (Benshalí) working for the Europeans. Koko too seemed to have told his masters about his father, for they reportedly sent him (the father) some gifts; rum, tobacco, and other goods, desiring to trade with him.

Koko's chance of really proving his worth, and of rising to the very height of his reputation came with his promotion to the rank of Factor. Having acquired a good deal of European taste and manners,² including the ability to speak some form of English, he dropped his uncivilized African name and adopted the

1. Journals of Zachary Macaulay, under date 3/6/1797. The original is in the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, and I am indebted to Mr. C. Fyfe of Edinburgh University for allowing me the use of his micro-film copy.

2. Journals of Zachary Macaulay, under date 1/11/1797.

name Smart, which was probably given him because of his smartness. Having been promoted factor, he was advanced goods and sent to the Rokel area to buy slaves. He moved from the Bunce Island first to Magbeni (Koya). At this time there was no principal chief in Koya Temne country and Naimbana, one of the important sub-chiefs, ruled as a regent. Here he stayed for a while as Naimbana's stranger, buying slaves for his masters with the goods advanced him.

On the Rokel Smart bought and redeemed many of his Loko people - an "active laborious people much sought for by slave traders"¹ - and kept them with himself rather than send them to Bunce Island for transportation to the West Indies. It was while Smart was here at Magbeni that his father sent him a Loko woman to marry. After some time, however, he found that he could no longer adequately provide for his many followers in Magbeni. He therefore requested his host Naimbana to give him his own place further up the Rokel River. Naimbana sent him to the Bundukas at Foreduga,² whose leader, Mori Bundu, Smart had earlier invited into the country, and asked them to lodge Smart and his followers. The Bundukas gave him the other side of the Mabiri stream just opposite Foredugu town itself. Here he remained for a long time serving his masters on the Bunce Island and increasing his own following.

After some time he again found his new settlement - later

1. C.O. 267/63. Jeremie to Russell, Mar. 4, 1841.

2. Mori Bundu had settled in Foredugu probably since 1770.

known as Mahera - no longer suitable. There seem to be two main reasons for this; his growing power and popularity may have roused the apprehension of his masters on the Bunce Island, and to avoid a clash he might have thought it wiser to move further up the river beyond their reach. He may also have been interested in staying closer to the troubled spot along the Rokel River, where he would be in a better position to tap the trade of the area.

This was the circumstance that brought Smart to Masimera country - to a land that had only recently lost its chieftaincy and was planning its recovery, to a land whose trade and politics he and his family were to dominate for over half a century. In Masimera he decided to settle at the present site of Rokon, about six miles beyond Magbeli, a town located at the farthest point easily accessible to large vessels along the river. He and his followers made their tents under the oak trees that abounded in large numbers in Rokon area (an oak tree in Temne is "Ka kon", and "Rokon" means a place of oak trees), and started firing shots partly to scare away the wild beasts in the area, and partly to attract the attention of the "owners" of the country.

Some Masimera hunters heard the shots and reported them to the Regent chief of the country, Pa Fira. Then Pa Fira sent Pa Komothi, a great hunter and the younger brother of the dead chief, to go and find out what was happening. When he arrived at Rokon, Smart told him of his desire to settle in the country with his followers, and his intention to seek the approval of the ruler of the land. So Pa Komothi escorted him to Masimera town

where the Regent received him with open arms. Pa Fira invited him to move to Masimera town with his followers, but this Smart politely refused, fearing no doubt of a possible future clash between his people and the local inhabitants. Also from the point of view of communication with the coast, the area Smart had chosen earlier on - Rokon - was a much better location.

The settlement at Rokon grew rapidly. Apart from the Loko slaves Smart bought and redeemed and kept with him, many more runaway slaves and voluntary settlers sought refuge with him at Rokon. Within a short time he had made himself independent of his Bunce Island masters who now "stood in awe of him and scarce venture to press for the payment of 150 slaves which he owes them".¹

Pa Fira gave Smart sufficient time to settle, sent for him, acquainted him with the situation in the country, and requested his assistance in recovering the lost sacred things of the chieftaincy. Smart agreed to help after Naimbana, his first landlord, and under whose protection some of his followers were still staying at Mahera, had indicated that he had no objection to it. Then Smart went to Melikuri to purchase arms, and also to invite a Mori-man (recalled as very light in complexion) to make Shebe for him. After this Smart went to Loko country, to his father's country, explained the whole situation to the old chief, and asked for some warmen to help him in the expedition. This request was granted.

Smart gathered all his warmen (including some Korankos as

1. Journal of Zachary Macaulay under date 3/6/1797.

well as Masimeras) on a small island formed by the Rokel River, near Rokon, and trained them three months. The Mori-man had forecast that the expedition would be successful, but that all this impressive military preparation was necessary in order to strike awe and terror in the hearts of the Ro-Mendis and their supporters. The preparations were to be given the widest possible publicity. Although, in fact, there was not going to be any serious fighting. On arrival in Ro-Mendi country, the warriors would find a young woman of Loko origin, light in complexion, and carrying a calabash of water. This woman they should neither harm nor tamper with in any way, for it was she who would show the warriors where the Ro-Mendis were hiding the sacred things.

Everything turned out as the Mori-man had predicted. On the approach of Smart's well-disciplined warriors, Ro-Mendi defenders withdrew from their stockades and ran away in panic. And on the outskirts of the Ro-Mendi stronghold Smart's men found the expected woman, who showed them where the sacred box was hidden. This young woman later became a wife to Smart himself.

When the sacred box was brought to Masimera the Thalís were overjoyed. In their appreciation of Smart's assistance in recovering it, Smart himself was offered the chieftaincy. But he declined it saying "I and my people are Lokos; we have our own different customs and ceremonies, and it will not be proper for me to be installed as a chief seeing that I do not understand



its ceremonies. All I want is a place of my own where my people and myself can settle permanently, and have control over". This, Pa Fira granted immediately, and confirmed Smart as a chief (under the overlordship of the Bai Simera) over the stretch of land between River Kapet (a tributary of the Rokel River, about 20 miles south-west of Masimeratown), to the Koya boundary, which was said in those days to have been marked by the Mabiri River, another tributary of the Rokel River further south-westwards.

With this arrangement the former "Landlord/Stranger"¹ relationship between Smart and Masimera people came to an end. The Smart family became one of the "owners" of the land, and Smart himself became a subchief under Bai Simera Pa Nes, which was the title Pa Fira adopted on becoming the new chief of Masimera country. Smart's chieftaincy was known as Gumbu - a Wunde warrior chieftaincy (the head of the Gumbuwas, who were fierce, fearless fighters) borrowed from the Kpa Mende of Taiama.² The title of Pa Balla went to his second in command, Pa Olgbiri, one of his outstanding Loko followers (some say his brother) who went through the chieftaincy ceremonies with him. Ever since, the Pa Gumbu, and the Pa Balla have been both elected at the same time; when one died the other looked after the territory until he himself died, and new elections took place.

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1. For the organisation and the working of this system, see V.R. Dorjahn and C. Fyfe, "Landlord and Stranger - Change in tenancy Relations in Sierra Leone". Journal of African History, vol. iii, 1962, No.3, pp.391-397.
 2. Hirst, op.cit., p.38, states that Smart actually went to Taiama and went through the initiation ceremonies of the Wunde Society.

Most of the Loko warriors who came from Loko country to help Smart in the Ro-Mendi expedition remained at Rokon with him after the expedition was over. Thomas Winterbottom, the Colony Medical Officer, described Rokon in 1794 as the "most considerable town I have seen hereabouts".¹ Its one hundred or so houses were all very neatly built of bricks hardened in the sun and thatched. Zachary Macaulay, writing in 1797,² states that Smart's "adherents amounted to several thousands, exclusive of his own family which consists of no less than thirty wives and eighty children alive". Rokon alone contained "near 1,000 inhabitants".³

Smart seemed extremely well disposed towards the settlement in Freetown which was established in 1787. He visited the colony on many occasions and "expressed a strong wish that the youth of his own place had a means of attaining knowledge". He welcomed enthusiastically the stationing of two missionaries, Campbell and Henderson, in his town, where they opened a school attended by twelve "native children, some of whom are tolerable proficient".⁴

The settlement also seemed to have relied very heavily on Smart. Macaulay saw in him a means of bringing to fruition "our

1. Clarkson Papers Vol. iii. Add MS 41263. Letter from Thomas Winterbottom to John Clarkson, under date Mar. 15, 1794 (British Museum).

2. Journal of Zachary Macaulay, under date 3/6/1797.

3. Journal .. under date 1/11/1797.

4. Journal .. under date 4/6/1797.

But the two missionaries did not accomplish much. Henderson who was reported shortly arrival to have learnt to speak Temne
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plans for covilization" in this part of Africa. All important matters, said Macaulay, depended on him as he possessed "as much power as all the other chiefs with their kings ... possessed ... and a far better understanding and clearer and juster views".¹ Smart's influence over the surrounding chiefs also seemed extremely great indeed. In fact some of them seemed to have relied on him for maintaining their authority even in their own countries. King Farma of Koya, who succeeded Naimbana in 1794 as the ruler of the whole of that country, had to send for assistance from Smart in 1798 in order to assert his authority over one of his sub-chiefs, King Tom, who was proving insubordinate.²

In Macaulay's estimation³ the man next to Smart on the Rokel River both in wealth and in political power and influence was Mori Bundu of Foredugu. Mori Bundu was a Bunduka Fula from "Mandingo country". Smart had met him during his visit to that country in 1770 and invited him to make Shebe (grigris) for him. Mori Bundu stayed at Foredugu (Koya) and married a daughter of Naimbana, who became Regent chief about 1775, and became the most wealthy man in Koya during the closing years of the eighteenth

Contd. from p.53]

fluently, fell ill and returned home. Campbell lost his wife a few months after arrival, and abandoned the mission a year or two later, married an African girl, and turned slave-trader.

1. Journal .. under date 23/4/1798.
2. Ibid.
3. Journal .. under date 1/11/1797.

century. As an outstanding Mori-man his personal prestige and influence was great over the surrounding chiefs including Smart. It was his presence at Foreduku that turned that town into the leading Koya town not only in the eighteenth but also in the nineteenth century. His own house, a massive building of about one hundred feet long was, according to Macaulay, "better built by far than any I have seen in this, indeed in any part of this country". Macaulay was also "most struck with .. the extreme cleanliness and neatness of everything about [his] place".

Later in the nineteenth century, particularly with the development of "legitimate commerce", the family of Mori Bundu was to grow even more powerful and influential for maintaining in their own area of Koya country the peace and order necessary for trade to prosper, which peace and order the weak and leaderless Koya Temne themselves were incapable of maintaining. But their success roused the envy and jealousy of the native population who aimed at destroying them; just as the success of the arrogant Smart family excited the hatred of the Temne of Masimera who sought to drive them away completely from their country.

Mori Bundu was not the only Bunduka of importance in Temne country in the eighteenth century. Another group of Bundukas, described by Amadu Wurie¹ (a man of Bunduka origin himself), as

1. A Wurie, "The Bundukas of Sierra Leone". S/L Stud., n.s.i. Dec. 1953, pp.14-25.

aristocratic Fulas, "reliable son of chiefs", from St. Louis in Senegal, came to Sierra Leone - to Temne country - during the last quarter of the century. They were agents of the French slave traders on the Gambia Island, situated at the mouth of the Bunce River. The French who had been trading on this Island since 1772, and which was formally ceded to them by the Koya regent chief Naimbana in 1785, despatched these Bundukas along the Rokel River and the Port Loko Creek to exchange "money, guns, powder" and other French manufactures for ivory, gold, and slaves. They did not seem to have relied exclusively on the protection of their "landlords" in their respective trading areas, for they "were guarded ... by well-armed mercenaries recruited in Senegal and French Guinea"; a pointer to the later French militaristic imperialism in West Africa. A group of the Bundukas went beyond Port Loko Creek to Sanda Magbolonto (a Limba/Temne chiefdom) and settled there to trade.

But in 1793 heavy mortality forced the French to abandon the Gambia Island. Their Bunduka agents who apparently were not informed of the evacuation of the Island, learnt about it later and decided to "settle down and make homes in their new sphere of life", trading on their own. Because of their wealth and military strength the native population feared and respected them. And to secure their positions further they took to wife daughters of the principal men in their new homes. These Bundukas were to play a very important (sometimes decisive) role

(on the Temne side) in the series of conflicts that broke out among the various peoples (Temne, Susu, and Limba) of Port Loko area during the first half of the nineteenth century.

When the settlers arrived in the Province of Freedom, and established the Colony (first known as Granville Town, later as Freetown) in 1787, the Temne, on whose territory the colony was founded, had been in contact with Europeans for more than three centuries. During this period there had emerged a code of behaviour between the coastal rulers (Temne, Bulom, Sherbro and others) and their European and other "strangers". It was a pattern of behaviour based on mutual trust and reciprocal responsibilities. In return for the regular customary presents or commissions (also known as "dash" or "Cole") from the "stranger", and his observance of certain agreed standards of conduct, his "landlord" (i.e. the local chief) would undertake not only to protect him, but also to be held responsible for his actions. It was a mutual arrangement that benefitted both sides.

The stranger recognised the sovereign authority of his landlord, who retained absolute control over the land on which the stranger was allowed to build his factory or to settle. The chief had the power to refuse to become the landlord of a particular stranger or to terminate the mutual relationship that existed between them. The present a stranger gave his landlord depended on the status of the particular chief. This arrangement, however, had to be renewed when a chief died and a successor was installed.

And if a stranger had more than one landlord (as very often happened), the stranger would then owe two sets of obligations, and was expected to keep both of his landlords informed of his activities. But the granting of land for building of factories or for settlement was entirely the responsibility of the principal chief of the territory involved, for he alone had any right, as the custodian of the community land, to make such grants. However, no section of the community land was alienable by any living member of the community - even the principal chief - for the land belonged not only to the living, but also to the dead, and even to the yet unborn generations of the community.

According to Thomas George Lawson¹ (who was the Government Interpreter during the second half of the nineteenth century), Koya country, when the colonists arrived, stretched from the present Peninsula of Sierra Leone (including the Banana Islands), and the Western bank of the Sierra Leone River, as far as Rosolo Creek, which separates it from Masimera country. To the south it was separated from the Ribí/Bumpeh country by the Camaranka. Clarkson reckoned the extent of the territory at about 1,800 square miles.² The population, however, was very small, even along the river bank (the main trade route). There was scarcely a town of more than fifty houses, although there were several of

1. Lawson & Parkes, op.cit., p.31

2. "Diary of Lieutenant J. Clarkson, R.N." S/L Stud., o.s.viii Mar. 1927, under date Oct 4, 1791.

them.¹ Naimbana who ruled the country as Regent had two towns to himself; Robaga which was the ceremonial town of, and held sacred by, the people; and Rogbane where the chief himself resided with his family.

Indeed Koya might have been small, both in extent and in population, but it was a sovereign state in its own right, and knew no superior authority to its own. King Naimbana referred to the King of England - King George III - as his equal and fellow king. A man of perhaps Mandinka origin, Naimbana was described as a ruler of "a peaceful disposition", who was generally respected and obeyed. He had a large number of domestic slaves (about 120) who took half the produce of their labours to him. He was "extremely desirous of all kinds of .. knowledge and improvement".² Three of his sons he sent to three different parts of the world in search of knowledge. Pedro (otherwise known as Bartholomew) he sent to France in 1785 (returning in 1790); another son, John Frederick (otherwise known as Henry Granville Naimbana) he sent to England in 1791 under the charge of the Sierra Leone Company "in order to gain useful knowledge of this country".³ A third son he gave to a Muslim teacher in order to acquire Islamic education.

1. See Report of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, 1791, p.6. (F.B.C. "Sierra Leone").

2. Report ... of Company, p.7.

3. For more details of John Frederick's experiences in England see, H.A. Rydings, "Prince Naimbana in England", S/L Stud., n.s.viii, June, 1957, pp.200-208.

Naimbana had many sub-chiefs under him who were responsible for various sections of the Koya country. Most important among these sub-chiefs was King Tom who was in charge of the territory's port - and so of its trade. (The Alikali of Port Loko and chief Lamina Bamoi of ~~Kambia~~, were to become very important later in the nineteenth century for holding similar positions in their own countries). When the colonists arrived in 1787, it was King Tom they made their landlord, and it was with him that the first treaty of cession was concluded on June 11, 1787.

But the establishment of this settlement¹ revolutionized the landlord/stranger relationship that had existed hitherto on the coast of West Africa. The treaty which King Tom signed supposedly on behalf of all Koya Temne, made him "for ever quit claim" to the strip of land (20 by 12 miles) stretching from Kroo Bay to the land opposite Gambia Island, which he was granting to the "free community of settlers ... to be theirs, their heirs and successors for ever". King Tom also "bind myself, my heirs and successors, to grant ... the lands ... for ever". It is open to doubt if King Tom really understood the meaning of the treaty he was signing; because for a Temne chief - and a sub-chief at that - to knowingly sign away the right of his people over a piece of Temne territory would be tantamount to high treason. It is probable that he regarded the arrangement in no way different from the customary landlord/stranger relationship.

1. This brief sketch of the founding of the Colony is based largely on C. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, O.U.P. 1962 (first four chapters).

It is also significant that Naimbana himself raised no objection to the granting of the land as such, which he could certainly not have regarded as involving alienation in any way, but merely on the ground that the colonists, being the representatives of a fellow reigning monarch, ought to have sought protection from him in the first place, and not from a sub-chief who had no right in any way to make any grant out of the Temne territory. And so the treaty which Naimbana himself signed on August 22, 1788,¹ which date later became regarded as the legal beginning of the settlement, also bound him and his successors "for ever" over the cession of that stretch of territory to the colonists. But it is hardly contestable that he could have regarded it as committing himself in any way than was involved in the customary landlord/stranger relationship.

Signatories to the treaty of August 22, 1788, included James Dowder, who succeeded King Tom, when he died about June 1788, as King Jimmy; Pa Bongee, and Dick Robbin, who later adopted the name of Prince Tom. This treaty, for which Naimbana and his chiefs received presents of the equivalence of just over eighty-five pounds, repudiated the earlier one signed by King Tom.² In addition it was agreed that the customary duties

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1. Treaty No.1 in The Ordinances of Sierra Leone, by A. Montagu, London, 1857-1881. The Treaty of June 11, 1787 is omitted from this collection but published in C. Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, London, 1964, pp.112-3.
 2. The total value of presents given to King Tom on the first Treaty was £59.1s.5d. This, added to Naimbana's £85.1s.7d. brings the total cost of the land to £144.3s.

(15 bars) payable by visiting vessels for the use of the Watering Place (formerly, Frenchman's Bay, later, St. George's Bay, now known as Kroo Bay) should be continued to be paid to Naimbana, his representatives or successors. But if the vessel merely anchored and did not water, a duty of ten bars was to "be paid to the free settlers ...". This was the first time any "stranger" had ever arrogated to himself the authority to share in the duties payable by visiting vessels to the Watering Place. It was also indicative of the future much more serious Colony encroachments, not only on the authority of the Temme chiefs of the area, but also on their lands and their way of life.

Naimbana and his chiefs, however, did not seem to have realized, at that time, the possibility of such a development. Naimbana, with a settler - Abram Elliot Griffith whom he gave one of his daughters, Clara, to marry - as secretary and interpreter, thoroughly convinced that the settlement would bring nothing but good to his country, was very friendly to the colonists. He welcomed their desire to spread education and civilization among his people; he embraced the abolitionist cause because it would put an end to the "horrid depredations" that the slave trade had brought to his country. He took no notice of the warning of the slave traders in his country (whose interests in any way were directly opposed to those of the settlement) who had told him that the settlers had come to "drive

me by force of arms back in the country and take my ports from me". In his opinion the slave traders were motivated by envy, for there could be no truth in what they said.

Several times, too, he successfully settled disputes between the settlers and some of his sub-chiefs, who, largely as a result of instigations by the slave traders, often picked quarrels with the former. "It was pleasure to do it" said Naimbana, "as I thought they [the settlers] would become useful to us all in this country". Also because of this he had willingly "put up with a great deal of insults from them".¹

But if the Regent chief - Naimbana - was all for the settlement, many of his sub-chiefs and people proved less readily co-operative. "Several of the neighbouring chiefs" said William Dawes, one of the early governors, commenting on the early difficulties of the settlement, "viewed it [the Colony] with suspicious solitude ... extremely jealous of any attempt at forming a permanent settlement protected by any sort of fortification among them ... and the Europeans engaged in the slave trade did not fail to take advantage of this ... to instil in their minds the strongest and most unfavourable prejudices respecting the intentions of the Sierra Leone Company in forming the settlement".² Two of the settlers annoyed King Tom, and he sold them to a passing French slave ship.

1. Report of Company, p.8.

2. C.O. 267/29. William Dawes to Governor Columbine (ill in England). "Observations on the situation of Sierra Leone with respect to the surrounding natives", 1810.

King Tom died in June, 1788, and was succeeded by King Jimmy, whom Naimbana appointed landlord for the settlers. The slave traders, afraid of attacking a government sponsored settlement themselves, incited King Jimmy to attack it, supplying the necessary arms and ammunition. In November, 1789, the settlers complained about King Jimmy to captain Henry Savage of H.M.S. "Pomona" who had just arrived in the colony. Savage invited King Jimmy on board the "Pomona" but he refused to go. Then he sent a party of the Marines, with some settlers as guide to fetch him. In the encounter that followed the Marines burned down King Jimmy's town, and took away some of his property: some family spoons and a gold cross. But King Jimmy's followers killed two officers of the Marines, and a Settler, and forced them to withdraw. Savage appealed to Naimbana, the settlers' landlord, for protection for them. A few days later King Jimmy's people shot dead another settler. But Savage sailed away before King Naimbana could arrive to settle the palaver.

After Savage had left Jimmy gave the settlers three days to quit the settlement (then called Granville Town) and burnt it down. The Colony had to be virtually re-founded in 1790, strengthened in 1792 by the arrival of the Nova Scotians from North America. The new proprietor of the settlement, the Sierra Leone Company, chartered in 1791, engaged in extensive commercial activities in order to finance the secondary motive of the company - philanthropy. John Clarkson, who had accompanied the Nova Scotians from North America and was later appointed governor by

the Directors of the Company, was extremely ingratiating towards the Temne chiefs, particularly Naimbana. The Regent chief gave him his full support, but many of his sub-chiefs remain rather lukewarm towards the settlement, now known as Freetown.

But in spite of their lukewarmness towards the Colony generally, the various chiefs and headmen seemed very anxious to send their children to the colony school, for the white man's education, which was so useful for commercial transactions. Clarkson received several applications from them for the admission of their children to the schools. Naimbana expressed disappointment at the inability of the Directors of the Company to send a schoolmaster to him, "to live with him, to teach him ... to be a good man, to learn him and his family book, and to make their heads good".¹ He also wrote to Clarkson requesting him to send him articles of trade, promising to pay for them "in the produce of the country".² He wrote a similar letter to Henry Thornton, the banker, and a director of the Sierra Leone Company.

But Clarkson soon ran into difficulties with the local people. Pepys, the Colony surveyor, started cutting roads through Temne farms and villages which were still scattered throughout the territory ceded to the settlers. The villagers resisted his attempt to interfere with their farms and villages and tried to stop him. It was believed by the Temne (many of whom had no

1. Clarkson's Diary, under date Sept. 10, 1792.

2. Clarkson's Diary under date Sept. 13, 1792.

idea that their lands had been ceded to the settlers) that the surveying was in preparation for a war the Colony was planning to launch on them for the purpose of taking their lands away from them.

Pepys complained to Clarkson. Clarkson invited Naimbana and his chiefs to a "palaver" to discuss the problem.¹ Mr. James Watt, who later became the overseer of the Clarkson's Plantation on the Bulom Shore, went, on September 25, in the "Ocean" to collect Naimbana, returning the following day. By the 27th all the other chiefs had arrived. They included King Jimmy, Signior Domingo, Captain Smart, Robbin Dick, Pa Will and many others. The meeting assembled at 11 o'clock at "Harmony Hall", (a mess-room for the Company's Officers).

The chiefs, after giving full expression to their fears regarding Pepys' activities, proposed as a solution that the Colony gave up the sea coast from "Fora" Bay, from which a new line (which would cut off the abandoned Granville Town) of division was to be drawn up the country, as far inland as the colonists wished. This, Clarkson rejected, on the ground that first, he was not authorised to alter the Colony's boundary, and secondly, that such an alteration would drastically reduce the settlers' access to, and enjoyment of, the sea coast, which is perhaps more fertile than the inland areas. But Pepys would be given instructions to circumvent such native farms and villages

1. Clarkson's Diary under dates Sept. 26, 27, 28, 1792.

as he came across in his surveying.

King Jimmy demanded 100 bars indemnity for the property pillaged by the Marines when they attacked and burnt his town in 1789. Clarkson paid it at once, wishing to ingratiate himself with cantankerous King Jimmy. Next King Jimmy asked that a piece of holy ground (society bush) on the western bank of the Watering Place, included in the territory ceded to the Colony, be restored back to him so that he could continue the annual sacrifice to the great Snake that dwelt in that wood, for the continuance of the spring of fresh water at the Watering Place depended on the annual sacrifice to this great Snake. Clarkson got that piece of ground enclosed and warned settlers against tampering with it in any way.

Signior Domingo, "a shrewd and designing man", whose town lay to the east of the abandoned Granville Town, expressed apprehension at laying open the country round his town, for that would expose his people to outside attack, particularly from the Colony, should the settlers feel like so doing at any future date, and the local inhabitants would have no place to go for safety. Clarkson instructed that the grounds immediately surrounding his town be untouched, and guaranteed undisturbed access to the sea coast for him and his people. A similar guarantee was extended to the other chiefs and their people.

The palaver lasted two days, and ended with King Naimbana promising to do everything possible to get all the chiefs more favourably disposed towards the Colony in future. But these

promises never materialised. In February, 1793, King Naimbana died. Two months later, John Clarkson, the conciliatory governor of the Colony, who had sacrificed some of the interests of the settlers in order to win the co-operation of the local chiefs, was dismissed, for promising the colonists more than the Directors authorised him to do. The removal of these two people (one through death, the other through dismissal) marked a turning point in the Colony/Temne relationship. William Dawes, Clarkson's successor, lacking the latter's patience and personal appeal drove the colonists to desperation and they began to plot against the Colony authority in co-operation with the Temne.

When the French destroyed the settlement in 1794, Pedro (Naimbana's French-educated son) took the new King of Koya, Bai Farma, to meet them, on a friendly visit. For a time the Colony authorities were apprehensive of another Temne attack with French co-operation, but it did not come. In May, 1796, King Jimmy died, and was succeeded by Pa Kokelly who adopted the title of King Tom. Bai Farma nominated him Landlord of the settlers. He demanded of his strangers the customary "dash" due to a new landlord. Zachary Macaulay, now governor, regarded this as a demand that the land be bought all over again, told King Tom the land had been alienated, and refused to give him any presents.

Gradually, and extremely painfully, the Koya Temne became aware of what must have appeared to them the real intentions of the Freetown settlers - to take away their country from them. They became bitter, and highly provocative, in their attitude

towards the Colony authorities. The colonists, they taunted and harrassed in every way. King Tom refused to accept the boundary line drawn in 1792 by Clarkson marking the western limit of the Colony, and drove the settlers resident in the area away from their farms. Bai Farma was not very friendly towards the Colony either, for the settlers had given refuge to some of his runaway slaves whom they refused to hand over to him. The attitude of the Colony authorities also changed dramatically towards their Temne neighbours, whom they began to see as "indolent, faithless and ferocious", and their chiefs as "rapacious, drunken and deceitful".¹

In 1801, Dawes, back as governor, told Bai Farma that he must either depose King Tom, or settle the western boundary dispute at once. This was the last straw. As an ultimatum and a challenge to the king's authority it amounted to a declaration of war. The Colony had paid no rent for the land it was founded on, it had refused to observe the customary tribute due to a landlord. The arrogant settlers had given refuge to Temne runaway slaves, and refused to give them up, and ever since its establishment the settlement had engaged in building fortifications and other defence works. The Koya Temne, encouraged by the European slave traders among them, and some disgruntled Colony settlers, decided to destroy the Colony before it became too strong for them to handle.

1. PP. 1801-2, Vol. II, p.14.

The attack which came early in the morning on November 18, 1801, had been well planned.¹ The attacking Temne force killed three soldiers and thirty civilians, including women and children, before they were beaten off. Some friendly chiefs, including Gumbu Smart, sent forces to assist Colony defenders. But many of these the Colony authorities sent back because of the expense of maintaining them. A second Temne attack in April of the following year proved less successful. King Tom was driven away from the west of the Colony, and his attempts to secure assistance from Bulom Shore chiefs, among whom he had taken refuge, were foiled. The Koya Temne accepted defeat, and a peace treaty was concluded with them in 1807.

The peace treaty of 1807,² by which Colony right through cession was supersede by right through conquest, ushered in a new phase in the Colony/Koya relationships. Temne territory to the west of the settlement, as far as False Cape, was added to the original grant, purely on right of conquest. Signior Domingo's Town to the east was also incorporated into the Colony in return for a "reasonable compensation". However, the Colony continued payment of the 100 bars agreed upon in 1794 as annual present to Bai Farma, and ^{guaranteed} his continued collection of the customary dues at the watering place (from which Colony vessels were exempted).

In the same year (1807) Britain made the slave trade illegal

1. PP.1801-2, Vol. II, p.12.

2. Treaty No.4., op.cit.

for her subjects, took over from the Sierra Leone Company the administration of the Colony in Freetown, and made it the base for the suppression of the trade in West Africa. The growing Colony encroached further and further upon Koya Temme territory throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, and the weak and leaderless Koya people had no alternative but to give way.

So for the Temme the establishment of the Colony of Freetown was a national disaster. The defeat of the Koya people by the Colony forces in 1802 completed the almost total eclipse (which began at the opening of the 18th c.) of the Temme people as a whole. The only Temme area which posed an exception to this general decline was the Kolifa country, where the Temme overthrew their Koranko rulers, consolidated their hold, and expanded their territory and rule.

According to local traditions,¹ at approximately the time when the Kpa Mende of Taiama were harrassing the Banta people, serious conflicts were occurring between the Temme of Kolifa and the Korankos, the original inhabitants and rulers of Kolifa country. At that time the four Kolifas - Kolifa Rowala, Kolifa Mamunta, Kolifa Mayoso and Kolifa Mabang - were one.² One of the more important early Temme immigrants, Pa Bambara (or Gbora), a Kamara, was granted permission by the then Koranko chief,

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1. These were recorded in 1962 by V.R. Dorjahn, and published in C. Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, O.U.P., 1964, pp.20-22.
 2. Kolifa Rowala, Mamunta, and Mayoso were amalgamated in 1953, and are now collectively known as Kolifa chiefdom. Mabang remains a separate entity.

Masa Kama Koranko, to hunt in the southern portion of his domain. To secure his position, Pa Bambara married Boi Sanko, a daughter of the Masa Kama. Pa Bambara was apparently a very successful hunter for he was said to have killed elephants, "taking the tusks to the Masa Kama [his host] according to custom".

During one of his hunts, he came upon an iron pot containing the sacred things of a chief, and the Masa Kama made him a chief as a result of that; a sub-chief in the area allotted him for his hunting. However, hostilities developed between the Temne immigrants in Kolifa as a whole and their Koranko hosts. After the death of the Masa Kama Koranko, the Temne drove the Koranko ruling house away and crowned a Temne man of Sanko family - the founder of Mabum near Magborka - as Masa Kama Kabonko.

But the Temne of Kolifa had not got their own sacred things of a chief at this time; so they approached Boi Sanko who was still keeping the iron pot her husband found some years before. She agreed to release the pot and its contents on the agreement that her eldest twin sons, Kefifi and Kefita, would be crowned kings. Kefifi became the Masa Munta Kasim of the territory, that later became known as Kolifa Mamunta, and Kefita was crowned Bai Yoso Chancha, of what later became Kolifa Mayoso.

Masa Munta Kasim named his eldest son Kefita (otherwise known as Se Yare) after his own brother. And it was this Kefita who later became the Masabang Kedi Kola (or Kurr Kamalefure) of Kolifa Mabang in 1799.¹ Masa Munta Kasim, Bai Yoso Chancha, and

1. V.R. Dorjahn "A Brief History of the Temne of Yoni", S/L Stud. n.s.XIV, Dec. 1960.

Masabang Kedi Kola were all sub-chiefs under the Masa Kama at Mabum. Masabang Kedi Kola's younger brother was Selomeyenki, the man who brought Poro to Yoni Mamela, from where it spread to other Temne areas including Kolifa, the first Bai Seborá Kondo of Yoni Mamela.

So the history of the Temne people in the eighteenth century is not entirely one of unrelieved disaster and decline. The extent of the impact of the wars they fought, the crippling effects of domination by outside elements, and the general picture of weakness and insecurity, on the people, can be very easily exaggerated, if only because the historian has to rely heavily on the traditional accounts which tend to recall more of the people's hardships (wars, famine, epidemics, etc.) than the less "exciting" aspects of their lives.

The Mende swamped large areas of the Banta country which was probably all Temne originally. But the Temne also drove the Koranko away from Kolifa, and had earlier swamped the original Loko owners of Port Loko area. The wars that loom so large in Temne traditions were probably not as destructive as often made out. Contrary to general belief, traditional African warfare was far from being total war of annihilation. The intention was to incapacitate, not to kill, and success in battle was reckoned on the number of captives and the amount of plunder. These wars - always fought for some rational cause - provided the slaves needed both for domestic consumption, and later, for the Atlantic market (which opened in the sixteenth century).

As the Atlantic trade expanded so did the slave-motive of the wars mount, and so did the wars increase both in frequency and magnitude (although some of the encounters dignified as wars were probably no more than small raiding expeditions). However, if E.F. Sayers could be credited, the Temne did not suffer much from even the relatively more destructive slave raiding wars. As well entrenched middlemen, they constituted, with the Mande traders among them, "the entrepreneurs in the business".¹ Nevertheless, there was a lot of movement of peoples - exiles on the run from war-infested areas - to avoid capture and enslavement.

The Susu in Port Loko, wealthy and powerful though they might have been in the eighteenth century, always accorded the Temne the respect due to them as landlord (although the same cannot be said of the Loko who, though numerically stronger, were militarily weak, and had become overshadowed by the Temne before the end of the century). By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the Susu seemed to have become rather overbearing and indiscriminate in their raids for slaves, who now included some Temne. The Temne revolted, lead by another Susu, overthrew their rulers, and assumed the dominant position in Port Loko area. This overthrow of Susu hegemony, in 1816, marked the beginning of Temne "revival".


In Yoni country the Fula Mansa's rule was never total and absolute, even with the Poro Society to back him. When Kayito,

1. E.F. Sayers, op.cit., p.14.

a Poro-installed chief, became tyrannical, the local Temne people refused to fight for him, and the Kpa Mende forced him into exile. Another Fula Mansa did not rule in Yoni until late nineteenth century, and even then only with the backing of the Administration in Freetown. In Kuniike the local inhabitants rejected Fula rule (particularly in Gbarina section) right from the start. And Fula attempt to force obedience threw the whole country into civil war.

On the Rokel River, Gumbu Smart, wealthy, powerful and influential, never at any time arrogated to himself the authority of the principal chief (now called Paramount Chief), and throughout his life (he died probably early in the nineteenth century) continued to treat the Bai Simera with the respect due him as a principal chief. The same is true of Mori Bundu in Foredugu with regard to his own landlord, the chief of Koya. The power and influence, of course, of a Mori-man is necessarily of a different sort. With his ability to control the supernatural - witchcraft in particular - he was feared and respected by the people; and his integrity was beyond reproach.

The local rulers did not seem to have regarded these strangers as "invaders". In fact they vied with one another over who was to lodge an important stranger; it was an honour and pride to have as a stranger a man of wealth and repute. Whenever a stranger flouted their authority, or treated the people with disrespect, they rose against him. The only strangers that proved too strong for them to handle were the colonists in Freetown, and this, because they had the might and power of the British Empire behind them.



CHAPTER IIIPORT LOKO 1816-1861:THE BATTLE FOR SUPREMACY

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Susu domination of Port Loko area (which had lasted for over half a century) had become intolerable to the local inhabitants, the Temne in particular. Sanko rule had become overbearing and indiscriminate. In 1816 the Temne rose against their Susu rulers and drove them away from their country. This Temne revolt against Susu domination came so suddenly and so unexpectedly that it has been described as dramatic. The Susu were certainly unprepared for it. The Temne, described in 1810 as "a most weak and disunited people"¹ obviously did not strike the Susu as being capable of such a remarkable feat.

Brimah Konkori,² who became the Alimami of Port Loko in the early part of the nineteenth century, had been engaged some years before 1816 in entrenching his rule over the area. A Mori-man and a powerful warrior of the Sanko family from Melikuri, Brimah Konkori, was not strictly entitled to the Alimamiship of Port Loko. But the original Sanko rulers seem to have acquiesced at his usurpation, and within a very short time he had entrenched himself so firmly that no one dared question his right openly.

1. C.O. 267/29 (1810). "Observations on the situation of Sierra Leone with respect to the Surrounding Natives". Dawes to Columbine (ill in England) n.d.

2. Ibid.

Described by William Dawes¹ as a "most enterprising, ambitious and warlike" man, Brimah Konkori was a warrior with a burning passion to rule. He had declined the offer of a Melikuri chieftainship in order to become the chief of Port Loko because the latter's "natural advantages could easily raise a chief like himself to a considerable height of wealth and power". He saw in the abolition of the slave trade, disaster and ruin for himself and his plans. And so he was one of the loudest in the complaints, accompanied with execrations and threats, that were vented against the Colony over the abolition by the neighbouring chiefs.

He played a leading role in the organisation of the general attack which the chiefs planned against the Colony. Apart from the Bulom and Sherbro chiefs, whom he brought in and who suffered directly from the impoverishing effects of the abolition, Brimah Konkori also tried to draw in the "powerful" Fulas. His avowed object was the expulsion of the English from Africa, which he calculated would follow the destruction of Freetown. He constructed a war camp fifteen miles nearer to the Colony, along the Port Loko Creek, built eight new large canoes in addition to an equal number he already possessed, and maintained a regular and friendly contact with his Susu relatives and the Fula chiefs to the north of Port Loko. Tradition states that he sent one hundred slaves as present to Melikuri chiefs every year. And in addition to about five hundred war men that were constantly

1. Ibid.

about him, Brimah Konkori was said to be able to command two or three times that number within two days "from the nearest point of the Mandinga country".¹

Brimah Konkori's hatred of, and war preparations against, the Colony, caused considerable alarm in Freetown, which blamed the machinations of the slave traders for the unhappy situation. Rumours² of an impending attack created a charged atmosphere, and led to the drawing of elaborate plans for the defence of the Colony. But this dreaded attack never came.

There were two main reasons for this. The dislocation of commerce, which the chiefs had feared would follow the British abolition of the slave trade and the consequent closure of the Sierra Leone estuary, was not as disastrous as had been anticipated by them. They quickly found alternative markets in the northern rivers - Rio Pongas and Rio Nunez. And, lying about midway between these markets in the north and the Sherbro and Gallinas markets to the south (themselves affected by the abolition), and placed on the direct line from the interior, which strategic position made Port Loko extremely suitable as a meeting point on this extensive mart, Port Loko town was able to maintain its former position of a flourishing market. And

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/24. Thompson to Castlereagh, Nov. 2, 1808.

trade in slaves which had become the main source of income for most of the coastal chiefs remained brisk.¹

But in spite of this, Brimah Konkori remained implacable in his hatred of the Colony, and kept on strengthening his war camp at Komagbon. However, just as he was uncompromising in his attitude towards the Colony, so was he also harsh and ruthless in his handling of the indigenous people of Port Loko - particularly the Temne - who it is said smarted under his "austere and arbitrary"² rule. Further, he sold large numbers of them into slavery. In retaliation, the Temne began to plan the total overthrow of Susu hegemony in Port Loko. They found a leader in Moruba Kindo Bangura, a man of Susu origin himself.

Moruba Kindo Bangura had come to Port Loko since the closing years of the eighteenth century. Closely connected with the Sanko rulers of the territory (his aunt married a former Alimami), and described as the son of one of the principal chiefs of his country, Sanda, he rose quickly to the rank of Santigi (a position second only to that of the Alimami). Moruba Kindo Bangura seemed a very kind-hearted and likeable person.³ He was thoroughly sympathetic towards the Temne, who regarded him as one of them. He lived in the Temne section of Port Loko (Ro Marong),

1. P.P. 1842, Vol. XI, p.286.

2. Lawson and Parkes, Information Regarding the Different Districts and Tribes of Sierra Leone and its Vicinity. C.O. 1887, p.23.

3. Oral Tradition; Bomporo. Moruba Kindo helped to repair the house of a neglected Temne wife of Brimah Konkori.

and was closely associated with the people. He seemed very ambitious too, and had had his eyes on the Alimamiship of Port Loko before the Temne revolt, which he organised and directed, gave him his opportunity.

Moruba Kindo Bangura had visited Susu country, Melikuri in particular, several times in order to learn more about the Sanko rulers of Port Loko.¹ At Maligia, during one of these visits, he heard about the title of Alikali (El Cadi, judge) which caught his fancy. He got the people to confer the title on him in return for the payment, in goods, of the equivalence of seven slaves, reckoned at about £20 in cash at that time.

A secret meeting held by the Temne to plan the overthrow of their Sanko rulers,² attended by the Bai Seborá (although the chieftaincy still remained under the curse placed upon it by the Susu in the eighteenth century), and an influential chief of "Mandingo descent" called Fatima Brimah Kamara, organised by Moruba Kindo Bangura, put final touches to the planned revolt. After taking an oath of secrecy, the assembled Temne leaders empowered the Bai Seborá to hand the country over to Moruba Kindo Bangura, who would lead the struggle against the Susu and drive

1. H.C. Hodgson, "Historical Sketch of Port Loko", S/L Stud., o.s. xvii, Feb. 1932, pp.40-42.

Hodgson records that "a secret Timne mission to the Susu country discovered that Brimah Konkori was a slave who had run away from the Susu country ... and ... this fact determined the Timnes to throw off his domination ...". This tradition seems hardly creditable judging from Konkori's close connection with Susu chiefs, supported by contemporary written evidence, and from my own oral recordings at Port Loko.

2. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.23.

them out of Port Loko. The assembly also acknowledged him the ruler of Port Loko (under the title of Alikali), and nominated Fatima Brimah Kamara as his second in command.

Moruba Kindo Bangura then raised secretly, a large Temne force, and caused a Tabule, the ceremonial drum found only in possession of ruling authorities, to be made for him. He invited the Bunduka Mori-men in Port Loko to make the necessary shebes (charms) for him and his warriors in order to ensure that the plan came off successfully.¹ After these arrangements had been completed, Moruba Kindo Bangura ordered his Tabule to be beaten early one morning. Alimami Brimah Konkori heard it and ordered 150 of his war men to proceed to Ro Marong (the direction from which the drumming came), and instructed them to seize the drum and to arrest those responsible for that infringement of the law of the land.

But Moruba Kindo Bangura had anticipated this, and had taken appropriate measures.² The 150 war men ran into a Temne ambush, and were all captured without a single gun fire. A few of their leaders were killed and the rest were taken to Moruba Kindo Bangura as his slaves. Moruba Kindo Bangura then sent five of the captives back to Sendugu, the Susu section of Port Loko, and seat of the Alimami, to inform the Sanko rulers that the Temne no longer recognised their rule, and were prepared to fight to defend themselves.

1. Oral Tradition; Bomporo.

2. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.24.

This challenge came as a complete surprise to the Alimami and his people, who were not prepared for it at all. The Susu, however, fought desperately, but the Temne completely surrounded Sendugu, gave them no chance to get food or water, and so forced them to surrender. Many Susu were killed, or captured, and sold into slavery. Alimami Brimah Konkori tried to escape to the Scarcies, but was captured at Ro Mange attempting to cross the Little Scarcies River. His head was cut off and carried in triumph to Port Loko. However, Momo Sanko, his brother, was allowed back to Port Loko to remove his dead brother's goods.¹ The Temne also allowed children of Susu fathers, by Temne mothers, to remain in, and to make Port Loko their home, and were allowed the "privileges of the citizens".² Between 1816 and 1861 these Susu descendants were to make repeated, though unsuccessful, attempts, supported by their relatives in the Scarcies, Melikuri and elsewhere, to regain the dominant position from which they had been ousted.

Moruba Kindo Bangura was, after the successful expulsion of the Susu, publicly proclaimed the ruler of Port Loko under the nominal overlordship of the Bai Sebor. As the ruler of the territory's chief port, which position gave him the control of its trade, the Alikali of Port Loko was by far the most important sub-chief in the country. (As King Tom of the Watering Place had

1. Hodgson, op.cit., p.42. Hodgson places the scene of Konkori's decapitation at Rokon, but this is not supported by my own recordings. (Oral Tradition; Bompoto).

2. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.24.

been under King Naimbana of Koya in the late eighteenth century, or Bai Suba of Magbeli under the Bai Koblo of Marampa and Lamina Bamoi of Kambia under King Farma in the Scarcies in the nineteenth century). Alikali Moruba Kindo Bangura's position, however, was more than that of a sub-chief, for he ruled Port Loko virtually as a principal. He clearly overshadowed the Bai Sehora, his overlord. Moruba Kindo Bangura appointed Yakubu Sanko (a descendent of the expelled Susu) as the headman for the Sendugu section of Port Loko. No similar appointment was made in respect of the Loko - the original inhabitants of the area - in their section of the town, Bake Loko.

The Port Loko, over which Moruba Kindo Bangura became ruler in 1816, was, without doubt, the most cosmopolitan and the most sophisticated Temne town of the period. Brian O'Beirne noted in 1821 that "Port Loko is very Populous and is much the resort of strangers, many of whom settle there. The Huts in general are tolerably commodious and substantially built; the inhabitants are remarkably civil, and begin to copy the European dress".¹ Although the Loko were still numerically the stronger, the Temne always gave the casual visitor the impression that they were the dominant group. With the Alikaliship in their control they had now superseded the Loko with whom they had shared the control of Port Loko before the Susu came. Major Laing in 1822 referred to the Loko as "a tribe of Timannees".²

1. C.O. 267/53., Grant to Bathurst, 1821.

2. Major A.G. Laing, Travels in the Timanee, Kooranko and Soolimana Countries in West Africa, 1822, p.72.

To compensate them for the part they played in the rising against the Susu, the new Alikali allowed the Bunduka Mori-men to settle permanently in Port Loko, and they were further granted some special privileges.¹ They were, for example, exempted from court actions, and from menial duties in the town, like cleaning the streets, or working for the chiefs. He set aside six towns in Sendugu area and, with the approval of the Temne chiefs, confirmed the ownership of the Sanko descendants over them.²

By the end of his war-free ten year rule over Port Loko, Moruba Kindo Bangura had firmly laid the foundation of Temne greatness in the area. And the next twenty-five or so years were to see this greatness blossom, making Port Loko appear to an outsider as the capital of all the Temne country, and its Alikali the ruler of all the Temne people. But the battle for supremacy was not over yet. The growing power of the Temne roused the jealousy and apprehension of the Loko, the original inhabitants of the area. And from 1828 to 1841 the two communities were to fight (though not continuously) perhaps the bloodiest war in the nineteenth century Temne country.

Also contemporaneously with this rise in Temne power was the growing importance of the Colony in Freetown. Koya threat to the Colony had been contained in 1802. Another threat from

1. Oral Tradition: Bompoto.

2. Treaty No.16, Dec. 14, 1826 (Montagu, The Ordinances of Sierra Leone, 1857-1881). These towns were: Marong, Quia, Bombay, Goree, Kaykanka, and Old Bake Loko (apart from Sendugu and Robat where they were already established).

the neighbouring chiefs following the abolition of the slave trade failed to materialize. Attempts by Colony authorities to encourage the caravan trade with the interior were occasionally hampered by the series of conflicts that engulfed Port Loko area, the most important tide-water trading centre that linked the Colony with the hinterland. So from the late 1820s onwards the Colony was to interfere actively in the politics of Port Loko.

In 1825 when Alikali Moruba Kindo Bangura was on the point of death, he sent for his second in command during the revolt against Susu domination, Fatima Brimah Kamara, handed over to him the gold ring on his finger, and charged him, saying "You and I have agreed to fight for the rights of our country and to secure it from the hands of those who would dispossess us of it, and, God being our helper, we have succeeded in doing so. I am dying now, I leave the sword of defence in your hands, and the title of Alikali which I introduced into this country, which is to be handed to our children successively".¹

Fatima Brima Kamara was the son of Pa Ansumana Kamara, a "stranger" from Sankara.² His father married a woman from the important Port Loko family of Bai Thagbonko, and it was this woman, Fatima, that became Fatima Brimah's mother. Fatima Brimah had been a renowned warrior right from his early age, and this was why the Temne nominated him Moruba Kindo Bangura's second in command during the uprising. But Moruba Kindo Bangura

1. Lawson and Parkes, *op.cit.*, p.24.

2. N.G. Frere, "Notes on the History of Port Loko and its Neighbourhood", *S/L Stud. o.s.* April, 1926 (pp.63-70) p.65.

seems to have assumed too much by appointing him his successor, for the majority of the Temne inhabitants strenuously opposed his nomination. They preferred a wealthy middle-man resident at Magbeli (but of Port Loko origin) Pa Runia Bana, that is Pa Runia the Great, by name (otherwise known as Jack Cobby).

As soon as it became known that Alikali Moruba Bangura had died, but before it was ceremoniously thus proclaimed, Pa Runia Bana's supporters installed him as the new Alikali. Fatima Brimah, a shrewd and clever politician, was quite aware of his unpopularity, and appealed to Freetown for support.¹ In return for this he undertook to carry into execution every arrangement which might be prescribed to him by the governor of "Sierra Leone".² He was prepared to receive troops from the Colony if their presence in his country became necessary in the interest of commerce. He would be willing to allot ground for a school, to receive missionaries, and to afford "perfect freedom" to traders wishing to pass through or reside in Port Loko so long as they conformed to the laws of the country, and conducted themselves with becoming obedience and respect to the chief and to the headmen whose duty it would be at all times to keep up good order and justice. He would build a country house for the governor in Port Loko area.

1. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.24.

2. C.O. 267/³¹Letter No.108. Campbell to Bathurst, Mar. 9, 1827. The name "Sierra Leone" was restricted to the Colony area until the establishment of the Protectorate in 1896 when it became applicable to the whole country.

So in December, 1825, Governor Turner, with a force of one hundred white soldiers¹ - a detachment of the Royal African Corps - and accompanied by Kenneth Macaulay, who had a great deal of influence over the Colony Administration, second cousin of Zachary Macaulay, and representative of the "Macaulay and Babington" trading company, William Ross, an army officer, John McCormack, the man who started the Timber trade in 1816, and Alimami Dala Modu, the head of the powerful Susu family at Medina (now Lungi) Bulom Shore, proceeded to Port Loko in the Royal Colonial steamer, "African". On December 11 the party arrived at Port Loko.² Turner quietly made it known to Pa Runia and his chief supporters that Fatima Brimah would get every kind of support, including the use of force if necessary, from him.

On the following day Pa Runia handed over his royal insignia in a calabash to Dala Modu whom Turner had sent for that purpose. Then in accordance with the "wishes of the people" the governor placed the "crown" (Turban) upon Fatima Brimah's head, and proclaimed him the rightful successor to Moruba Kindo Bangura as the Alikali of Port Loko. On the same day, Governor Turner concluded a treaty with the new Alikali, by which he and the principal chiefs and representatives of the various groups, agreed

1. C.O. 267/66. Turner to Bathurst, Dec. 20, 1825.

2. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.24.

to cede Port Loko country to the British crown.¹ The Bai Seborá (? Karimu) and Santigi his younger brother signed the treaty on behalf of the Temne community. Namina Lahai and Brahima Kayelle, heads of the Sanko descendants, signed for Sendugu section. No representative from Loko community signed the Treaty.

However, the Foreign Office, which had not authorised Turner to make such large territorial acquisition, rejected the governor's treaty. But Turner was spared the agony of this humiliation by his timely removal, through death, from office shortly after his arrival from Port Loko. His successor, Neil Campbell, travelled to Port Loko the following December, primarily to witness the second coronation² of a good chief, Fatima Brimah, who had started to build a country house for him in Port Loko, confirmed his appointment as Alikali, and handed a copy of Turner's treaty - which he had been expressly instructed

1. Treaty No.13, Dec. 12, 1825. Montagu, op.cit.

Turner set out his reasons for concluding the treaty as follows:

- i. To put an end to slave trade and internal war
- ii. To ensure security and stability to persons and property
- iii. Will make chiefs, etc. become more industrious
- iv. Will lead to civilization, morality and desire for education and respectful knowledge.
- v. To spread "our language and religion"
- vi. To extend the "sphere of our mercantile transactions"
- vii. To increase Geographical knowledge so essential for enlarging outlet for manufactured goods, and the supply of raw materials
- viii. Will spread knowledge of "our wealth, influence and greatness"

[See C.O.267/66, Turner to Bathurst, Dec. 20, 1825]

2. This is the installation-from-Kantha ceremony. After the chief has been elected he goes into the Kantha (i.e. confinement) for any time up to a year during which period he goes through the necessary rituals in preparation for his high office.

to repudiate - to him.¹

Fatima Brimah's coronation took place on December 22, 1826, in the presence of a very large gathering attracted by Campbell's own presence. And this coronation marked the beginning of the reign of a man who for fourteen years dominated the politics of both Port Loko and the Rokel regions. Shrewd, militant, unassuming, but ambitious and "progressive", Fatima Brimah was by far the most important Temne ruler of his time. Regarded locally as the personal friend of the governor of Sierra Leone, he exploited the situation, and soon turned the people's anger and hatred towards him to one of admiration and respect. His prestige and influence towered far above those of any other Temne chiefs during his reign. The Colony relied heavily upon him for keeping the routes to the interior via Port Loko open and safe. He was treated as the chief of all the Temne people, and his chief town, booming Port Loko, with its six thousand (6,000) inhabitants,² as the capital of all Temne country.

After his coronation Fatima Brimah's immediate efforts were directed at gaining the full support of his people, particularly the Temne. The Sanko descendants in Sendugu refused to accept his rule, and he had to deal with a minor rising among them. Then he went into considerable trouble and expense to remove the curse placed upon the traditional chieftaincy of the territory, Bai Sebor, by the Susu since the later part of the eighteenth century.

1. Treaty No.16, Dec. 14, 1826.

2. C.O. 267/163, Jeremie to Russell, Mar. 4, 1841.

He sent to Ro Mendi country, where the Kanu (Gbara) holders of the chieftaincy came from originally, and brought a proper member of the Ro Mendi ruling house to be installed in Port Loko.¹

This was the time that the title of the chieftaincy was changed from Bai Seborá to Bai Forki (forki in Temne means to loosen or to free), and the territory under the rule of the Bai Forki became known as Maforki.² (Hitherto the territory had been loosely referred to as Bake Loko).

The second assignment that Fatima Brimah gave himself was the rebuilding of his capital,³ Port Loko, most likely at the suggestion of the many large mercantile establishments in Port Loko at this time. The area involved was Bake Loko (the Loko section), where the wharf was, and where the traders mostly settled and built their factories. There are no details of the rebuilding, but it seems to have been undertaken primarily to please the trading community in his capital, and to win their co-operation. The Alikali's own wealth came mainly from trade, by way of rents and taxes.

Nominally a Muslim, Alikali Fatima Brimah did not seem to have adhered rigidly to the teachings of that faith. Harrison Rankin⁴ who visited his country in the 1830s, observed that the

1. Frere, op.cit., p.66.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. F.H. Rankin, The White Man's Grave: A Visit to Sierra Leone in 1834, Lond., 1836, Vol. II, pp.233-251.

Alikali had eighty wives - as against the maximum of four sanctioned by Islam - the youngest bride being " a gentle, bashful girl of eleven years of age" of Loko origin. (At his death in 1840 John McCormack reported 20 of his wives still alive). He did not seem to have had any qualms about receiving missionaries¹ into Port Loko in 1840, either, even though some of his more fanatical subjects objected vociferously. However, their objection was not entirely on religious grounds. Namina Lahai, a leader of the Sanko descendants in Sendugu observed when the missionaries arrived that "this was always the way with white men, they first sent quiet people to do them [local inhabitants] good, then merchants, then as their number increased they built forts and brought guns, and at last took away your country".²

Port Loko people seem^d quite aware of what happened to the Koya Temne vis-a-vis the Colony in Freetown; and even more recently, Turner's activities in the election of Fatima Brimah himself, and the treaty of cession. This remark, however, was in the very near future to cost Namina Lahai and his people the implacable hatred of the Colony authorities, whose support for the Temne (considered more receptive to the christian ideas) rendered ineffectual their attempts at regaining the control of Port Loko.

1. D.L. Sumner, Education in Sierra Leone, Freetown, 1963, p.59. The Port Loko Mission started in December, 1840, with Rev. C.F. Schlenker, Messrs. N. Denton, W.C. Thompson, and two schoolmasters. The Mission closed ten years later owing to Muslim opposition, but had been re-opened by the 1870s.

2. C.O. 267/163. Jeremie to Russell, Mar. 4, 1841.

Alikali Fatima Brimah was receptive to the "progressive" Colony ideas in other ways. He welcomed the establishment in Port Loko of an organisation for the promotion of the country's agriculture.¹ But like the missionary idea, this did not come to an immediate fruition. Local antipathy (particularly towards the missionary enterprise) and the general disturbed state of the country rendered such projects unworkable at that time.

At the height of his fame Alikali Fatima Brimah's authority extended over large areas of the Temne country, particularly in the Rokel region, and his influence extended even farther. For this "Napoleon" of the Temne people had "by conquest or diplomacy ... acquired fame and enlarged his dominion".² On the Rokel, the important tide-water trading town of Magbeli was almost entirely under his control. Here he had three of his sons; Sogo, Mamadu, and Kamara (the eldest, though only 24), and many of his relatives including Dabu, his nephew, whom Rankin described as a remarkable man. "His intellectual ascendancy" continued Rankin of Dabu "and influence are everywhere acknowledged; distant nations, even the Foulahs, respect his decisions. Pa Suba [the traditional ruler of Magbeli] I discovered to be a mere instrument of his guiding".

If Alikali Fatima Brimah's rule of Port Loko saw the territory at the height of its power and prestige in the nineteenth century, it also witnessed the most prolonged and bitterest

1. Ibid.

2. Rankin, op.cit.

war Port Loko Temne, supported by their many allies had to fight in that century; the Temne/Loko war which lasted (though not on a continuous basis) from 1828 till the early years of the 1840s. In fact the contest was still unresolved when Fatima Brimah himself died in 1840.

The Loko, the original owners of Port Loko, had never been very favourably disposed towards their more aggressive Temne countrymen. Although still numerically the stronger of the two groups, they seem to have been overshadowed by the Temne by early nineteenth century. However, when about 1810 a Limba warrior chief - Pa Molai Limba - started harassing the Temne/Loko chiefdoms of Mafonda, Dibya, and Safroko - to the north of Port Loko area - the two peoples co-operated to destroy the power of Molai Limba, with the help of the Bunduka Mori-men.¹

But the negotiation for the reward for the Bundukas for the assistance they rendered seems to have been done by the Temne only. And Gbinti town, the capital of Mafonda chiefdom, which the Temne handed over to the Bundukas in payment for their assistance, for them and their children to keep for ever, seems to have been originally a Loko town.² In the uprising of 1816, which resulted in the overthrow of the Susu domination, the Loko did not seem to have participated at all. After the uprising political (and so, economic) control of the territory fell to the

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1. A. Wurie, "The Bundukas of Sierra Leone", S/L Stud. n.s.i. Dec. 1953, (pp.14-25).
 2. E. Hirst, "An Attempt at Reconstructing the History of the Loko People from about 1790 to the present day" S/L Stud. n.s. ix, Dec. 1957, pp.26-39, points out (p.31) that the leading men who gave their daughters to the Bundukas to marry were Loko.

Temne, who appointed no headman for the Loko section of Port Loko, and so apparently ruled it directly. When in 1825 Turner concluded his treaty of cession with Port Loko rulers, no Loko representative signed the treaty.

No doubt the Loko resented this downward trend in their "national" prestige vis-a-vis the growing power and importance of their Temne countrymen. Frightened and suspicious they became petty and cantankerous. But this only made them more of an easy target for slave raiders, who captured and enslaved many of them. This was the situation that decided Pa Serry,¹ the Mandinka king of the Loko, to commission his brother, Bai Bureh Serry, to establish in Malal, on or near the present town of Malolum, a training centre for Loko warriors.

One of the earliest "graduates" of this training centre was Tegbehun, Pa Serry's own son. Tegbehun was reported, soon after Fatima Brimah became the Alikali of Port Loko, to be making trouble in Loko country, to the north of Port Loko, on the trade route to Timbo the capital of the Fula country. Freetown asked Fatima Brimah to intervene. But Tegbehun's chief, Gbanka Koba-wa would not hand him over. So the Alikali had to make war against him, conquered him, and pursued his followers beyond Batkanu.²

But it was the situation on the Rokel River that provided the immediate cause of the Temne/Loko war. In 1828,³ three years

1. Ibid.

2. Frere, op.cit., p.60.

3. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.28.

after Fatima Brimah became the Alikali of Port Loko, trouble arose between the Temne of Masimera and their Loko countrymen - the family of Gumbu Smart - centred around Rokon. The two sides appealed to the new Alikali to arbitrate between them. The Alikali found in favour of the Temne. The Loko accused him of partiality, insulted him, and refused to abide by his decision. The Alikali felt offended, and the Temne in the region rallied round him and decided to expel the Loko from the Rokel altogether.

The Loko fought bravely "for several days" under their leader, Pa Gumbu Yaron, and his principal warrior, Kala Modu. But they proved no match for their Temne opponents. Their warriors were scattered. Pa Gumbu and his principal warrior tried to escape to Taiama, but were caught and beheaded alongside "several of his brothers and sisters".¹ Many of the Loko inhabitants took refuge in several places, in Koya and in Loko country proper.

Pa Gumbu's eldest sister, Yenken Magbachee, after seeing her own group of Loko refugees comfortably settled in Freetown, headed for Taiama, from where the Gumbu family got their chieftaincy, and got a large number of Taiama warriors. These accompanied her to Masimera where they "caused great havoc and devastation".² They also ravaged other parts of Temne country. It was during the rainy season and many of the Masimera people

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

got drowned trying to cross the river (Rokel) to safety.

It was feared the Colony might be attacked.

Alikali Fatima Brimah quickly mounted a counter attack. William Henry Savage,¹ a flourishing businessman, lavishly provided the Alikali with arms and ammunition, acting, he claimed, on behalf of the Governor (Ricketts) who was mad and in confinement in Freetown. (Walter Lewis, the Colonial Secretary, later condemned Savage's action). However, with the arms provided by Savage, and a keg of the dreaded "Koya powder"² Fatima Brimah routed the Loko and their Mende allies. The scattered Mende (often referred to by the Colony as Kossob) caused depredation in some parts of Koya near the borders of the Colony. Walter Lewis sent Ensign Forsyth to intercede, and he succeeded in getting the Mende to return to their country "after much trouble".³

Loko warriors who had been forced to surrender became the slaves of their conqueror, Alikali Fatima Brimah, according to the custom of the land. But the Alikali felt that before disposing of them (about 900 in number) it would be proper to seek the opinion of the Governor.⁴ (After all the Governor had provided the major part of the arms). And he accordingly sent to invite the Governor, or his representative, to a general peace

1. C.O. 267/⁹⁹(1829). Lewis to Hay, Dec. 8, 1829.

2. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.31.

3. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.29.

4. C.O. 267/¹¹⁸(1831), Findlay to Hay, Nov. 10, 1831.

meeting at Magbeli.

The meeting was held at Magbeli between August and September, 1831.¹ Governor Findlay, who had now succeeded Ricketts, was represented by Henry Rishton, the Colonial Secretary; John McCormack and Benjamin Campbell, members of the Council; Henry William Macaulay and William Henry Savage, commissioners. The Loko were represented by Chiefs Gbanka and Bundi. On the Temne side, Alikali Fatima Brimah, Bai Koblo of Marampa, Bai Fonti of Ro Mendi, and Alimami Kaba of Rokel, spoke for their people.

The assembly agreed² that the captured Loko warriors be spared from enslavement. But they could no longer remain in Masimera country; instead they were given permission to settle in the Robaga section of Bombali District (in the present Makari Gbanti chiefdom) well removed from any of the major trade routes to the interior. Here they were allowed, under their leader, Surakati, to take possession of eleven towns and villages.³ They would, however, be allowed "to pass and repass" with their produce to Magbeli, or any other trading centre.

However, some Loko were allowed to remain in Rokon. Among these was Pa Gumbu's son, Sebeti (Cessi Betty), whose own village was Myappa. Sebeti, like many of his Loko kinsmen, was far from

1. Ibid.

2. Treaty No.21, Sept. 23, 1831 (Montagu, op.cit.)

3. The towns and villages were: Rokamp, Romarinta, Rotongbi, Robari, Ropolon, Robanti, Roponga, Roma, Bana and Simbeha. (Ibid.)

satisfied with the settlement arrived at in Magbeli. On his return to Rokon (where he assumed the leadership of the remaining Loko in the area) he started making plans for avenging his father's death.¹ He sought assistance from the Bai Kurr of Mabang. But at this time the Bai Kurr was engaged in a war with En Kerry, a powerful Yoni chief from Foindu. Sebeti then recruited some warriors in Masimera, mainly among his own people, but including some Temme adventurers as well, and took them to Mabang to assist his ally, with the hope of being able to get help from him at the end of the En Kerry affair.

But customarily,² Sebeti was not permitted to take any war men out of Masimera without the permission of his principal chief, the Bai Simera, which permission in this case he had not, and of course could not have sought. En Kerry, an ally of Fatima Brimah, routed Bai Kurr's army and drove Sebeti and his warriors back into Masimera. Bai Simera, offended by Sebeti's action decided to punish him, and, supported by the Bai Koblo of Marampa, he appealed to Fatima Brimah to help him drive Sebeti away from Masimera altogether. The war that followed is the one known as the Alikali/Sebeti war. It raged intermittently for eighteen months, and it was the cause of Governor H.D. Campbell's visit to the Rokel in 1836.

Fatima Brimah successfully destroyed Sebeti's power, and

1. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.29.

2. Treaty No.23, April 16, 1836; Mar. 28, 1837 (Montagu, op.cit.)

with it the chance of any future Loko resistance on the Rokel. The few remaining Loko were so depleted that they could not even find someone among them capable of controlling their affairs. So Governor Campbell nominated Dala Modu of Medina, Bulom Shore, to look after their interests for them.¹ After the Sebeti affair had been successfully taken care of, Fatima Brimah seems to have made up his mind that the Loko affair as a whole should be dealt with once and for all time.

The Loko themselves had been building up a considerable force of their own mainly from their military training camp at Malal. Many of the Loko trained in this camp had fought against the Alikali's warriors in the previous encounters on the Rokel, on the side of their kinsmen. The Loko, therefore, decided to continue the struggle.²

But Alikali Fatima Brimah pushed them steadily northwards, until they finally entrenched themselves in the Loko stronghold of Katonga (Kasona) on the River Maboale, between Sanda Magbolonto and Mafonda chiefdoms. Fatima Brimah encamped at Ro Rakabana, in Sanda Magbolonto, on the left bank of Maboale River. His war camp was reputed to have covered an area as large as Freetown. Beside his regular Temne force, his army included Fulas, Sankaras, Bundus, Tambakas, Susus and Sherbros,³ all lured on to his side, no doubt, by the expectation of plunder.

1. Treaty No.24, April 11, 1837 - Memorandum (Montagu, op.cit.)

2. For an account of the Temne/Loko war in its final stages see E. Hirst, op.cit., pp.33-36.

3. C.O. 267/164, McCormack to Macdonald, Jun. 7, 1841. Enclosed in Carr to Russell, July 20, 1841

Under Fatima Brimah the Temne and their allies made repeated assaults on the Loko stronghold, but were unable to dislodge them. And the situation remained unresolved when the Alikali died in July, 1840. No one among the Temne seemed willing to step into the late Alikali's shoes - the responsibility involved was frightening.

However, on the advice¹ of a "wise old man called Pa Sankoh", the Bundukas accepted the responsibility, for they believed that the "sacrifice ... would make their claim to Temne citizenship stronger [having] seen in them [Temne] straightforwardness, tact, and promise". The new army leader was Abdu Rahman Bundu. He planned a mammoth attack on the Loko stronghold for one evening. The encounter was fierce and bloody. During one of the assaults Abdu Rahman Bundu himself got fatally wounded, but the Temne fought on bravely, and in the end succeeded in destroying this hitherto impregnable stockade. "There was a wholesale massacre of fleeing Loko hordes. Thousands of captives were taken and sold as slaves".

The capture of Katonga marked the effective end of Loko resistance. The scattered Loko refugees sought shelter in various parts of the country. Some settled in Massama, Bulom Shore, assisted by a Bunduka, Ali Bundu, reputedly one of the wealthiest Bundukas of his day, son of Bakar Bundu, one of the original seven Bundukas from St. Louis, Senegal, by a Loko woman.

1. A. Wurie, op.cit.

He redeemed many of the captured Loko warriors, and invited many of the fleeing refugees to settle in Massama with him. This was the time that the word Loko was added to the original name of the territory, giving it the name by which it is known today - Loko Massama.

Some Loko came south and settled in the Colony area; and the present Russel Town is said to have been founded originally by them, and was in fact known in those days also as Loko Town. There were also pockets of Loko settlements in various parts of Temne land. Part of the Smart family remained at Rokon (in Masimera) and at Mahera (in Koya). Elizabeth Hirst says there are forty-six Loko villages in Koya country.

It was also during these troubled years that the Kesebe family of Rotifunk settled in the Bumpe/Ribi area. They had been allowed to stay in the country, according to T.G. Lawson,¹ "through the assistance [they] gave ... chief CanrebaCaulker in fighting the various wars which came upon that country" (i.e. the Caulker wars). Sori Kesebe, the leader of this Loko group, was to become, during the second half of the nineteenth century, one of the most important chiefs of this area, and was to play a leading role in its muddled politics.

After the Temne/Loko war, many of the Loko, says Hirst,² adopted the Temne language and nationality, partly for their own safety, and partly (and perhaps more important) because of the

1. G.I.L. memo. by Lawson, April 7, 1884.

2. Hirst, op.cit., p.39.

prestige attached to being called Temne. However, for some Loko (women in particular) it was not easy to get adjusted to the new situation. Some, like Songo (alias Kegbana Bureh) who settled in Songo Town (renamed, but later dropped, Prince Alfred's Town, after the Prince's visit to the Colony in 1860), often deliberately provoked the Temne, who would pursue them sometimes into the Colony, injuring or destroying British subjects or property. A similar provocation was the immediate cause of the Koya war of 1862. The Loko of Koya contributed immensely to the confused state in that country between 1872 and 1881.

The rout of the Loko in Katonga in 1841 marked the end of the longest and bloodiest war in the nineteenth century history of Port Loko. It also ushered in the period of complete Temne mastery, particularly on the Rokel. But if the war destroyed effective Loko challenge to Temne rule, it also marked the beginning of the decline of Port Loko itself as the leading Temne town.

Port Loko had risen from, and owed its importance to, trade - particularly the trade in slaves. This trade had been threatened in 1807 by the abolition and the consequent closure, to it, of the Sierra Leone estuary by Britain. But the northern rivers provided an alternative market, and large numbers of slaves found their way to the Rio Nunez and the Rio Pongas,¹ via the important collecting centre of Mange Bure on the Little Scarcies River. Port Loko also benefited from the development of

1. P.P. 1842, Vol. xi, p.286.

legitimate commerce. There were many timber merchants on the Port Loko Creek (although the area had been denuded by the 1830s), and many large mercantile establishments in Port Loko town itself, trading "legitimately".

So legitimate and illegitimate commerce went on side by side, to the great benefit of the local people. The Loko wars supplied the slaves needed for the northern markets as well as met the increased demand for domestic consumption, required to produce the "legitimate" commodities for the growing Freetown market. But Colony interest was not so much in Port Loko itself as in the countries beyond it - Fula country in particular. From the 1820s the caravan trade between the Colony and the hinterland had been gathering momentum, and in this trade Port Loko had also benefited immensely, by way of levies, rents and taxes.

Since the growth of Port Loko had been so closely associated with trade, then, its no wonder that its decline was also so intimately connected with it. This development, however, seems largely the result of events outside Port Loko itself. From the late 1820s, events in the Scarcies country between the Susu and the Temne of that area had placed a considerable strain on the trade with the northern rivers. Later, particularly after 1841, the Susu/Limba war (which also involved the Temne) to the north-east of Port Loko (that is on the main caravan route linking Port Loko with the interior) disrupted the Fula trade. Also after 1841 Susu machinations and intrigues in Port Loko

itself threw its politics into chaos. Trade slumped. So traders began to move out of Port Loko to the quieter and more secure Magbeli on the Rokel River. The caravans followed suit and began to divert their goods via the Magbeli and Kambia routes. Colony attention also began to shift from Port Loko to Magbeli. By the 1860s Magbeli had clearly superseded Port Loko as the most important tide-water trading town in Temne country.

Perhaps the one most important contributory factor towards the decline of Port Loko was the Susu wars. The Susu of the Scarcies (particularly those in and around the important tide-water trading town of Kambia) had settled in that area since the eighteenth century.¹ But the Temne, the original inhabitants of the territory, seem to have succeeded in keeping them at bay, and so retained the control of the country and its trade. Many of the Susu expelled from Port Loko in the 1816 uprising settled here among their kinsmen.

By the 1820s, however, the Susu had started making attempts to seize the control of the Scarcies country, Kambia area in particular, prompted, it would appear, by the Sanko immigrants among them. Their leader, Satan Lahai, was probably one of the followers of Brimah Konkori, the Alimami of Port Loko whose head the Temne cut off in 1816. Trading, primarily in slaves, he soon became wealthy and very powerful. Between 1827 and 1830 he seems to have made several attacks on many of the Temne towns

1. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.11.

which he destroyed,¹ and took many Temne captives. His primary objective was to seize the control of Kambia, the tide-water trading centre and capital of Magbema chiefdom.

In 1830, however, the Temne succeeded in driving him out of the country. He then built the town of Layah near Kukuna, in Tonko Limba country. And from this stronghold he made several attempts again to capture Kambia, but was repulsed by the Temne. At his death, his son, also known as Satan Lahai, and of part-Temne descent, stepped into his father's shoes, and became powerful too. He kept up his father's town Layah, but built his own which he called Rowula. Here he was made chief and became known as Alimami Satan Lahai.

Wealthy, powerful, and influential, Alimami Satan Lahai successfully manouvered the aged and weak Bai Farma of Magbema, and got himself appointed chief of Kambia.² Also through lavish gifts and presents he succeeded in winning the support of many of the Temne chiefs of the area. But many of the Temne people opposed his ascendancy over Kambia, and were making plans to drive him out of it. The leader of this anti-Susu campaign in Kambia was Lamina Bamoi, the ousted Temne chief of the town.

Satan Lahai sent messages to all the Susu in the area, and also to those in Melikuri, Forekaria, and Sanda countries appealing to them to unite with him in his effort to make Kambia

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

Susu, and to make Susu power the supreme authority in the whole area.¹ He also asked the Susu descendants of Port Loko for assistance, for after his capture of Kambia it was his intention to come to their aid in order to reverse the tragedy of 1816, and to take revenge for the humiliation surrounding the killing of Brimah Konkori. Satan Lahai's schemes were to throw the Scarcies, and the Sanda and Forekaria countries, into violent warfare for many years, and in the course to wreck the Fula trade via Port Loko, by diverting it to Kambia and Magbeli.

Susu chance to regain the control of Port Loko came in 1841, at the election² of a successor to Alikali Fatima Brimah. The Sanko put forth Namina Lahai and asked that he be made the Alikali, for they would accept no-one else. The Temne were all opposed to a Sanko becoming the Alikali, but were divided among themselves as to the rightful successor. The family of Fatima Brimah wished to render the office hereditary, and put forward a member of their own family. The family of Moruba Kindo Bangura, the first Alikali, nominated Namina Modu, Moruba Kindo Bangura's own son and nephew of Fatima Brimah. The debate went on for a long time with no side wishing to step down. There was threat of civil war.

The only time the Colony could really effectively influence the politics of the area was during the election of a new Alikali.

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/163. Jeremie to Russell, Mar. 4, 1841.

The assent of the Governor, as the representative and head of the Colony strangers on Temne soil, "was expected by all".¹ Customarily, however, he was supposed to be formally informed whenever there was a new election. But with Turner's treaty unratified, the rents and stipends in Governor Campbell's treaty of 1836 unpaid,² the local chiefs had by 1841 begun to lose confidence in their strangers at Ro Camp (i.e. Freetown), and had come "to look upon this government, its promises and its influence, with the coolest indifference".³

So when Governor Doherty heard that the chiefs were deliberating on the election of a new Alikali, he waited patiently for a deputation from them to that effect. But the chiefs did not send any. Then he sent his own deputation requesting to know the minds of the chiefs with regards to the new election. But no chief bothered to reply to him. Governor Jeremie succeeded Doherty before the election issue had been settled, sent his own enquiry about the election, but this remained "entirely unnoticed" also by the chiefs.⁴

So Jeremie decided to pay a visit to Port Loko himself to try and win back the confidence of the chiefs in his government. Sensibly, he sent John McCormack two days ahead of his own party

1. P.P. 1842, Vol. xi, p.286.

2. Governor Doherty, an opponent of the whole policy of treaty making and of the payment of stipends, on the ground (among others) that it did not solve any problem, had suspended payment since 1837. See C.O. 267/159, Doherty to Russell, April 22, 1840.

3. Ibid.

4. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, pp.286-7.

to explain his intentions to the chiefs. McCormack, newly appointed Police Magistrate in Freetown (having been ruined in his timber trade), was the oldest European merchant in the Sierra Leone hinterland, and was well known to the chiefs and universally respected.¹

But even with this precautionary measure, the people fled and left Port Loko deserted at the news of Governor Jeremie's arrival. However, he finally succeeded in inducing them (with lavish presents and so on) to return to the town. On January 28, 1842,² the chiefs assembled, but only consented to listen to him on his assuring them that he was not going to interfere in their elections in any way. Then Jeremie went into a lengthy explanation of the reasons why the administration had been unable to meet its obligations towards the chiefs. The non-payment of the rents and stipends agreed on in Governor Campbell's treaty, and the non-ratification of the Turner treaty, should not be taken as a reflection of bad faith on the part of the administration, or as a mark of disrespect and disregard for the chiefs. The whole unhappy situation arose from the inclusion in those treaties of certain provisions which, though acceptable to the chiefs, were felt inadmissible under the laws of England, under which the Colony was being governed.

Governor Jeremie did not elaborate this point to the chiefs. John McCormack had warned him of the furore he would cause by

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

mentioning, for example, that one of the repugnant clauses in the treaty Campbell concluded with the chiefs in 1836 was the ninth, which stipulated that the chiefs would be able to recover their runaway domestic servants from the Colony. The British law recognised no distinction between slavery and domestic servitude; but their domestic servants meant a lot to the chiefs, they constituted their main source of wealth. Jeremie, however, expressed the hope that "they would elect some quiet pacific chief, who would be prepared to enter into a treaty with Her Majesty's Government". And to make this last point palatable, he offered to pay up the arrears standing on their stipends.

Bai Forki replied¹ on behalf of his other chiefs. He thanked the Governor for the presents he had given to the chiefs, which presents they accepted. (This acceptance meant that the chiefs were prepared to negotiate with the Governor, rejection meant the opposite). The chiefs were moved by the proof of confidence Jeremie had shown in them by coming among them with his family. Now that he had given them his word that he would not in any way interfere in their proceedings, the chiefs would then go ahead with the election of a new Alikali. The governor, however, would have to be patient for some important chiefs were still awaited, in particular their good friend Dala Modu of the Bulom Shore.

1. Ibid.

Dala Modu¹ arrived on February 3, and the chiefs proceeded with the election. The long and complicated negotiations took five days, at the end of which the Temne chiefs announced the election of Namina Modu as the rightful successor to Fatima Brimah. Fatima Brimah's family accepted the decision. Jeremie, without consulting the Sanko family (he had been secretly opposed to Namina Lahai because of his known unfriendly attitude towards the Colony) openly declared support for the choice "the majority had spontaneously made".² But Namina Lahai refused to accept the chiefs' decision, and the debate went on for another three days. During this time he became aware that he could not force the Temne to reverse the decision because the Governor of Sierra Leone was behind them. And at the end he was forced to capitulate.

On the 13th of February, the new Alikali was installed,³ and on the same day Governor Jeremie concluded another treaty of peace and friendship with the new ruler of Port Loko - the first treaty ever negotiated in Sierra Leone under Colonial Office instructions.⁴ But the treaty contained very little that was new except the abolition clause which was intended to ensure the

1. For an account of the history of the Modu family see J. de Hart, "Notes on the Susu Settlement at Lungeh, Bulom Shore," S/L Stud. o.s. April 1926, pp.40-62.

2. P.P. 1842, Vol. xi, p.287.

3. C.O. 267/163. Jeremie to Russell, Feb. 20, 1841.

4. Treaty No.26, Feb. 13, 1841 (Montagu, op.cit.), also C.O. 267/163, Jeremie to Russell, Mar. 4, 1841.

co-operation of the chiefs in the abolition efforts.

With their Susu relatives engrossed in bitter wars in the Scarcies, and in Tonko Limba countries, and so unable to afford them any assistance, the Sanko descendants remained peaceful. Alikali Namina Modu appointed Momoh Sanko, a great grandson of the first Alimami of Port Loko, also known as Namina Modu, to represent Sanko interests in the governance of the territory. Like his predecessor, Alikali Namina Modu also co-operated with Colony authorities and on several occasions intervened in the series of conflicts that broke out between the Koya Temne and the liberated Africans who settled on their lands.¹ But following his death in 1852, disputed succession between the Temne and the Sanko descendants once again threw Port Loko politics into chaos.

The Sanko had learnt that it was much more to their interest to be on the governor's side. As soon as the Alikali's death was announced, they sent a letter to Governor Kennedy informing him that a new ruler was about to be elected, and asking for his approval of their own nominee, Momoh Sanko, whom they wished to be known as Alimami Namina Modu. But the Temne also wrote the governor, asking for his consent in the election of the son of Fatima Brimah, Modu Kamara, as the new Alikali of Port Loko.²

1. C.O. 267/164. Alikali to Macdonald (Col. Sec.) May 8, 1841.

Enclosed in letter to Russell, June 27, 1841

2. For an account of the dispute, and of Port Loko in 1853, see the report of the two commissioners (McCormack and Dillet) in C.O. 267/232, Kennedy to Newcastle, May 9, 1853.

So early in May, 1853, Kennedy commissioned John McCormack and J.E. Dillet, a civil servant, to proceed to Port Loko and ascertain the chiefs' minds, and act on his behalf in the election of the new Alikali. The commissioners left Freetown on May 1, 1853, for Port Loko, where they were received by the Bai Forki and his other chiefs. At a large gathering of the chiefs (which included Bai Forki, Bai Kama of Makama - "a straightforward man ... willing to do what was right",¹ - Bai Farma of Magbema, Bai Banta of Ro Buwea, and other important Port Loko chiefs like Dabo, Ebiru and Kindo) on the following day, John McCormack addressed the chiefs.

He informed them that the Governor had sent him to ascertain from the chiefs "without in any way interfering with their views",² whom they had chosen as the new ruler of Port Loko. Temne chiefs said they were united behind Modu Kamara. Sanko representatives, Brimah Kayelle, Pa Kargbo and Ansumana Kabia said they could acknowledge no other ruler of Port Loko but Namina Sanko. As usual at such disputed elections the atmosphere was full of excitement, with supporters of each side pacing up and down the streets, some carrying arms, and abusing and threatening each other.

The Temne knew about the arrangement between the Sanko descendants, and their Susu relatives, so apart from Temne warriors that were kept in readiness in Port Loko itself, many more had been put on the alert in the surrounding villages.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

Maligi Bundu of the Bundu family at Foredugu, Koya (though he was himself resident on the Rossolo Creek at that time engaged in the timber trade) arrived at Port Loko on May 4 with a large body of warriors in support of the Temne. Once more the Sanko were forced to capitulate in face of a superior Temne military strength. They sent to inform Maligi Bundu of their decision and asked him to pass it on to the commissioners from the Sierra Leone Government. They also handed over the turban (crown) they had made for the man they appointed Alimami over Port Loko, and sent in representatives whom they empowered to sign any treaties there might be on their behalf.

But the Port Loko territory over which Alikali Modu Kamara became ruler in 1853 was a far cry from that over which his father, Fatima Brimah, ruled, from 1825 to 1840. The termination of the Temne/Loko war in 1841 had removed the most important uniting force among the Temne of Port Loko. The caravan trade, which began in the 1820s, had cracked through diversion under the impact of the Susu wars, and traders had started removing to the more prosperous Magbeli. The timber trade had dwindled off since the 1830s. Lack of major wars meant lack of slaves both for the markets and for use on the farms, to supply the necessary local produce for Freetown market. But even then Port Loko produced little else beside rice, and Freetown got a much finer quality from the Bulom Shore.¹

1. P.P. 1842, Vol. xi, p.560. H.D. Campbell's evidence.

The prosperity of the earlier decades was tapering off. The various chiefs in their various splinter principalities, for lack of anything more constructive to do, nursed petty jealousies and hatreds against one another. The Port Loko of 1853 was a very disunited country indeed. The situation was further exacerbated by the large body of strangers among them. These came from different parts of the interior, located themselves in various parts of the country, and married the daughters of the local inhabitants. In some areas these strangers had become so powerful and so influential that they were allowed to have their own headmen, and even their own laws. The local chiefs were in no position to control these strangers any longer. The only thing that united them all - particularly the Temne - was their desire to keep the Sanko away from the governance of Port Loko, and this, only during the election of a new Alikali.

Bai Forki, the "Ground and Head King"¹ of the country, was a weak, old man. In theory, all authority in the land, including that of the Alikali, derived from him as the principal chief of the whole of Maforki chiefdom. But in reality he was powerless over his many turbulent chiefs, who used his name for everything they did, but allowed him no share in the revenue of the country, or even observe the customary annual present from a sub-chief to his principal. The Bai Forki was to remain in this unenviable position throughout the nineteenth century, and was later, in the

1. C.O. 267/232. McCormack to Kennedy, May 4, 1853. Enclosed in Kennedy to Newcastle, May 9, 1853

twentieth century, to be superseded altogether by his one-time sub-chief, the Alikali of Port Loko, who is now the Paramount chief of the whole chiefdom.

The closest chief to Bai Forki in 1853 was chief Ebiru,¹ who, it appears, came to Port Loko with him from Ro Mendi country at his installation during the Alikaliship of Fatima Brimah. He was the rightful ruler in Ro Mendi but dared not show his face there because of the hatred the people had for his family. A hard, and "dry eyed" person, he was much feared by the other chiefs in Port Loko. He was said to be very much opposed to the growing power and influence of the Colony in Temne territory, and would on no account willingly co-operate with its agents.

The Sanko, under their leader, Momoh Sanko, were described by McCormack, who himself was no lover of Islam or Muslims, as generally more polite than the Temne. Momoh Sanko, he discovered, was a "clever, intelligent man possessing considerable information, much more than most of the other chiefs".² When the Temne overthrew Sanko domination in 1816, Momoh Sanko was away - perhaps to the Fula country - for his education. Temne objection to his candidacy was not on personal grounds, for they liked him, but mainly on the ground that his family were still of "one mind" with Susu generally, including the family of Dala Modu (at one time very friendly with the Temne) on the Bulom Shore, now headed by Alimami Kala Modu, whom the Temne feared and hated.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

The new Alikali of Port Loko, Namina Modu, after his installation on May 10, 1853, adopted the title of Alikali Fatima Brimah II. Namina Modu was also a man well learned in Islamic education, for which his father, Fatima Brimah, sent him to the Sankara country. From here he returned to Port Loko about 1838. However he was no match for Momoh Sanko in general experience and understanding. And to demonstrate this general lack of experience, a week after his installation, he rode out of Port Loko at the head of a large body of men in pursuit of some Temne chiefs alleged to have enslaved certain Colony children whom they refused to give up.

The commissioners returned to Freetown reporting Port Loko peaceful and tranquil. But this peace and tranquility was not destined to last long. For Alikali Fatima Brimah II died in 1854, less than three years after his installation, and Port Loko was once again plunged into a succession dispute, which proved much more prolonged, much more bitter, and much more destructive than any that the town had seen before. In the event, however, it was to prove the last serious effort that the Sanko, backed by their Susu relatives, were to make to stage a come back in the Port Loko rulership; and fail.

Two years of hard bargaining between the two groups, the Temne and the Sanko descendants, proved fruitless. Momoh Sanko, with the strong military support of Kala Modu and the Susu of the

Scarcies refused to accept a Temne Alikali. The Temne equally vociferously, were opposed to a Sanko ruler of Port Loko. There was real threat of civil war by the end of 1856.¹ Bellicose Hill, an old soldier with thirty years service, who took up the governorship of the Colony in 1855, and who was striving to obtain the royal recognition unmerited by his military career, sent T.G. Lawson, the Government interpreter, with letters to the various Port Loko chiefs to try and persuade the chiefs to settle the election dispute peacefully.

Lawson, whom Hill described as "imperfectly educated" but with "great tact and good sense",² set out on his mission (his first) on November 7, 1856.³ Momoh Sanko and his supporters refused to attend the first meeting summoned by Lawson on the ground that he (Lawson) had been lodged by Kurr Bamp, a Temne chief and Bai Forki's representative, and had not sent to inform him (Momoh Sanko) of his arrival in Port Loko. So a second meeting had to be called. But Lawson could do nothing but appeal to the chiefs, on behalf of his governor, not to allow the disputed succession lead to civil war. The chiefs in return gave him a letter to deliver to the Governor promising to do all they could to prevent civil war. But no Sanko representative signed the letter.

1. C.O. 267/255. Hill to Labouchere, Dec. 15, 1856. (Lawson's report enclosed).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

It seemed a civil war was inevitable. The Temne of Port Loko with the backing of their kins on the Rokel, were fully determined to instal no one but a Temne man as the Alikali of Port Loko. Lawson noticed, however, (as McCormack did four years before) that not a single Temne he met had any personal ill feeling towards Momoh Sanko "but to the contrary are willing to respect him, but not one is agreed that he should be crowned as the Alikierlie".¹

Early in 1857 the Temne proceeded without the consent of the Sanko to instal a new Alikali² - Yan Kuba Bangura. In February, Governor Hill travelled to Port Loko to give his assent to the election, and to see through the installation ceremonies. He was accompanied by John McCormack and Charles Heddle, an important Sierra Leone merchant, and member of the Governor's Council. After the ceremonies Governor Hill concluded a treaty of peace and friendship with Temne chiefs.³ Then he wrote the Colonial Office congratulating himself for having put an end to the intestine wars in Temne country.

But there was no peace in Port Loko for the next three years. It seems the Temne, after the installation of Yan Kuba Bangura, had made up their minds to drive the Sanko descendants away from Port Loko altogether. The information had also reached them of Satan Lahai's determination to avenge the death of Brimah Konkori,

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/257. Hill to Labouchere, Mar. 12, 1857.

3. Treaty No.57, Feb. 27, 1857, Montagu, op.cit.

and to help reinstate the ousted Susu to the rulership of Port Loko. At the same time Satan Lahai's wars in the Scarcies were spreading rapidly, and there was considerable alarm in Port Loko when Bai Inga of the Small Scarcies arrived in the town on the run from these wars which had destroyed his country.¹

Port Loko Temne acted quickly. Saidu Kamara, one of Fatima Brimah's sons (he became the Alikali of Port Loko in 1863) gathered a strong Temne force, and drove Momoh Sanko and his supporters away from Port Loko before assistance could reach them from Satan Lahai. The scattered Sanko exiles sought refuge first in Loko Massama and later on the Bulom Shore, with Kala Modu their ally. From here Momoh Sanko, accompanied by Kala Modu, went to Freetown to report the situation to Governor Hill.

Hill treated the Susu chiefs kindly, and sent to Port Loko to ask why the Temne chiefs violated the treaty of peace and friendship signed in February, 1857. He advanced Momoh Sanko four times his yearly stipend of £15 a year to enable him to rehabilitate his people. But Momoh Sanko spent the money on arms, returned to the Bulom Shore, gathered a large number of warriors and attacked Port Loko. Saidu Kamara and his men were away in the Scarcies helping Lamina Bamoi to drive Satan Lahai from Kambia; so Port Loko was left virtually undefended, and was badly destroyed by Momoh Sanko's war party.²

1. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., pp.12-13.

2. C.O. 267/263. Hill to Lytton. Feb. 10, 1859.

The Temne accused the Governor of treachery. Hill, furious, and anxious to avenge the Maligia disaster¹ of 1854 in which Lahai's men had humiliatingly defeated an expedition sent against them by Acting Governor Dougan, saw in all this a widespread Susu conspiracy not only to destroy the trade of the country, but also to attack even the Colony. Nothing could save the situation except a total destruction of the Susu power. But the two expeditions he sent against them failed to dislodge the Susu, or even weaken their power in Kambia area. For the Susu cleverly withdrew to their inland stockades at the approach of the Colony forces, to re-appear after the expedition had left, and drive away the Temne.

Lawson, and McCormack, his mentor, both strongly opposed to the spread of Islamic influence among the Temne, and to the Muslim Susu who represented that influence, successfully turned the Colony administration against the Modu family on the Bulom Shore for the alleged part Kala Modu played in the destruction of Port Loko. With arms supplied by the Colony, the Temne attacked Medina (Lungi) and drove Kala Modu away. Then McCormack went to mediate, got the people to depose Kala Modu, and had Fenda Sanusi Modu, another member of the family, long friendly with himself and Lawson, installed. The peace treaty of April, 1860, negotiated by McCormack on behalf of the Governor, however, re-affirmed the supremacy of the Modu family on the Bulom Shore.

1. For an account of the Maligia disaster see C. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, Lond. 1962, pp.276-7 and p.284.

In 1861 Satan Lahai asked for a mediator to end the Scarcies war. And John McCormack, now aged seventy, headed once again for the Scarcies. After long arguments¹ he got the Susu to give up their claim to Kambia, which was formally placed under the Governorship of Lamina Bamoi. Satan Lahai returned to Rowula as the ruler of that part of the Scarcies. John McCormack had achieved, through negotiations and diplomacy, what Governor Hill failed to settle by gunboat tactics. With the 1861 settlement also came to an end the Susu bid to regain the rulership of Port Loko, and perhaps the end of a chapter in the history of the Temne of that area.

It was perhaps no accident that Temne revival in the early nineteenth century should have begun in Port Loko rather than anywhere else. As an old, flourishing, commercial town, strategically placed on the most important route to the interior - to Futa Jalon in particular - it was the meeting point of many cultures, a centre for the interchange and formulation of ideas, and, in the rough and tumble, cut-throat competitiveness of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, must have provided a haven for pedlars of intrigues and machinations.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century contemporary opinion represented the Temne of Port Loko as a most weak and disunited people. This disunity, it would appear, had been of long standing. But it was not a peculiar characteristic of the Temne of Port Loko alone. Trade in slaves, which had become the

1. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.13.

main preoccupation of most West African rulers by the late eighteenth century, fed and prospered on the weakness and disunity of a section against the strength and solidarity of another.

Perhaps the only united group in Port Loko area from the later years of the eighteenth century were the Susu, the Sanko family in particular. But theirs was a unity so often characteristic of "strangers" (and prosperous ones for that matter) of the same ethnic group in a "foreign" land. This unity, it would seem, was rudely shattered by the usurpation of the Alimamiship by Brimah Konkori in the early nineteenth century. Added to this was Brimah Konkori's own intemperate handling of the indigenous peoples of the area - the Temne in particular. It is rather ironic that the overthrow of Susu hegemony in Port Loko should have been planned, organised, and directed by another Susu. But it is an indication of the extent to which Susu solidarity of the earlier decades had cracked under Brimah Konkori's rule.

Susu colonisation of Port Loko represents an interesting example of "African" imperialism before its European counterpart. It also bears some striking resemblances to it. Like the European colonisation of Africa, its motive force was economic exploitation. The Islamic religion and culture, which many Susu had acquired before coming to Port Loko, gave them an air of superiority over the "pagan" indigenous inhabitants. It was

not surprising, therefore, that the Susu rulers recognised the dangers (to their own position) inherent in the establishment of the Colony in Freetown, were the loudest in its condemnation, and the foremost in the abortive plans to destroy it.

After the 1816 revolt, the Temne emerged as the most important single united group in Port Loko area. But they seemed to dislike the alien character of the Alikaliship, even though its holder identified himself with them. Their attempt to substitute an indigenous Temne man in 1825, however, failed because of Colony intervention. And in the subsequent elections the Temne rallied round the two ruling houses, the Banguras and the Kamaras,¹ with the support of the Colony which also disliked the Sankos, in order to keep the Susu out. The Susu were prevented from regaining the control of Port Loko, but their activities on the major route linking Port Loko with the interior ruined its trade.

After the 1861 arrangements, Port Loko settled down to a quiet, much reduced, role in the affairs of Temne country. Apart from the atmosphere of war weariness that seemed to have set in from the beginning of the 1860s, the old order itself was changing; Bai Farma of Magbema chiefdom died in 1860, Lamina Bamoi in 1864, Saidu Kamara (who became the Alikali of Port Loko in 1863) in 1867, and Satan Lahai in 1872. In Temne country the centre of activity shifted from Port Loko area to the Rokel region whose complicated politics were to dominate the scene for the next two or three decades.

1. This rotational principle, which became established with the installation of Fatima Brimah in 1825, helped Colony authorities as a guide line in the election of the new Alikalis.

CHAPTER IVKOYA TEMNE AND THE COLONY, 1838-1862

Since 1802 Koya people had been made sharply aware of their inability to cope with the formidable "strangers" - the colonists - whom they had allowed to settle in their country since the last quarter of the eighteenth century. By the peace treaty of 1807, which fixed the Colony boundary at Robis (a site near the present Colony town of Hastings), they had acknowledged the fact that the land, now considerably enlarged through conquest, which they had granted the colonists on arrival had been, inadvertently, alienated for ever. Embittered by this humiliation, and enraged by the betrayal by their chiefs, the people placed a curse on the chieftaincy as a punishment for the loss of the peninsula,¹ and remained peaceful (towards the Colony) in what was left of their country.

After 1807, Koya chiefs adopted a policy aimed at avoiding, at all cost, anything that might bring friction between them and the Colony authorities. In the attack on the Colony planned by some neighbouring chiefs in revenge for the British abolition of the slave trade, Koya chiefs quickly dissociated themselves and sent a delegation led by King Tom, the deposed ruler of the Watering Place, to pledge Koya loyalty to the administration.²

1. C. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, London, 1962, p.297.

2. C.O. 267/24. Thompson to Castlereagh, Nov. 2, 1808. Colony officials, however, seem rather dubious over the sincerity of the chiefs; King Tom had paid a similar visit just before the attack on the Colony in 1801.


Koya territory after 1807, reckoned at about 1,300 square miles in area,¹ stretched from the Bunce Creek to Mabiri stream (a tributary of the Rokel) to the east. It was an extremely fertile land - good alluvial soil - productive in rice, yams, maize, and many other local products. The boundaries were well marked by natural phenomena;² bounded on the west by the Bunce Creek and the Colony, on the east by the Mabiri stream, on the north by the Rokel River, and on the south by the Ribí River. However, to the south-east of the country, that is on the Yoni border, lack of a natural dividing feature, made a clear-cut boundary line difficult, and conflicts often arose from boundary disputes. The Yoni, the stronger of the two groups, seized control of many towns in that region, which Koya people claimed belonged to them originally. A final boundary line was imposed on the region (in favour of the Koya) after the Yoni Expedition of 1887.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Koya country seemed extremely sparsely populated; and the small population was in turn extremely mixed. Koya owners of the land formed a very small proportion of the total population, and were described by Lawson as weak and unwarlike.³ In some areas they were over-

1. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, p.261.

2. Lawson and Parkes ... p.31.

3. Lawson and Parkes ... p.38.



shadowed by the strangers among them. These included many other Temne groups (who apparently did not identify themselves with the injured Koya),¹ Mandinkas, Susu, Mende and Loko. The various strangers, however, accorded their Koya landlords the recognition and respect due to them.

The whole country was divided into four major districts,² each directly under a sub-chief who was responsible to the principal chief of the country. The sub-chiefs collected the rents and other customary payments from the strangers residing in their particular areas of jurisdiction, and were customarily to give an account of these to the principal chief. From these rents and so on, the necessary means were procured for the defence of the particular district. Robaga/Rogbane area remained separate as the sacred, ceremonial centre for Koya country as a whole, where the principal chief had his own residence.

One of these districts included all the lands from the eastern boundary westwards to Madimsi, and as far south as the Songo Creek.³ This division was formerly under the control of the chief of Magbeni (on the Rokel River). But this chief got deposed in 1825 for tampering with the timber trade, no doubt at the instigation of the timber traders in the area, and in his place Mohammadu Bundu, of the Bundu family at Foredugu, was made

1. An indication of the general lack of unity among the Temne as a whole.

2. G.I.L. Memo by Lawson. Jan. 22, 1886.

3. Ibid.

an Alimami to rule over the territory. Another district covered the area from Mayet on the Koya Creek to the Gbabai Creek. This division was ruled, during the second half of the nineteenth century, by an important chief called Alimami Sori. His son also ruled as Alimami during the 1880s.

The territory immediately to the north of the Ribí River constituted another district. Its ruler in the middle of the nineteenth century was Pa Koya, reported (in 1861) "old, sick, and infirm and unable to do anything";¹ just before the Koya War. The fourth district was made up of all the lands on the north and south banks of the Bunce Creek. In the early nineteenth century this division was under the control of Pa Kakonko, otherwise known as Pa London. It was this chief that ceded the land around Mapoto and Robomp (native names for the present Colony towns of Hastings and Waterloo respectively), to Governor MacCarthy in 1819 in return for a yearly rent of fifty bars.²

Bai Farma and his ceremonial chiefs had been discredited since 1807, but since a Temne ceremonial chief cannot, customarily, be deposed the people had no choice but to suffer them until they were removed by death. Bai Farma died shortly after 1807. And in accordance with Koya tradition, his Naimbana assumed the control of Koya affairs. The Naimbana ruled until his death in 1825,³ when Tom Kanttineh, no doubt another of Bai Farma's

1. C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle. Oct. 14, 1861. encl. Lawson's Report.

2. Fyfe, A History ... p.136. also P.P. 1842, vol. xi, p.245.

3. Lawson and Parkes ... p.32.

ceremonial chiefs, became the head chief, as Regent, of Koya. Tom Kanttineh ruled until his death in 1832, and was succeeded by the third ceremonial chief, Bai Bure by name. Bai Bure also ruled, as Regent, until his death in 1838.

Bai Bure's death in 1838 marked an important turning point in the history of Koya Temne. It marked the beginning of a long, hectic period (21 years) of interregnum in Koya country. Because of the disgrace (through the loss of the peninsula) brought upon the country by the last set of ceremonial chiefs, Koya people refused to instal a new set. The "district" chiefs, lacking the aura surrounding ceremonial chiefs, proved unable to control effectively some of their turbulent strangers.

Trouble started between the Koya and the Liberated Africans, of Mende origin (usually referred to as Kossohs), whom Koya people had allowed to settle in their country to make farms. Koya chiefs reported them to the administration in Freetown. One Governor told them to "flog" the intruders off their lands. They did. Many were killed, many were captured and enslaved, on both sides.

Then another Governor, furious, sent to demand reparations and immediate surrender of all Liberated Africans held by Koya people; or he would use force to obtain satisfaction. Koya chiefs were flabbergasted. This was the sort of clash they had striven so hard to avoid over the years. And it could not have come at a worse time, when they had no chief to speak for them with authority, and were involved in a war in the interior.

However, looking at the whole situation now from our vantage point in time, it seems that this sort of clash was destined to come sooner or later. When T.P. Thompson assumed the governorship of the "Colony of Sierra Leone" in April, 1808, he had in his keeping a memorandum setting out the policy of His Majesty's Government over the newly established Colony.¹ Paragraphs seven and eight dealt exclusively with the policy as applicable to the natives in the neighbourhood of the Colony. They read:-

"7. To make it understood that His Majesty's Government are anxious to carry into full effect those views of policy which have led to the abolition of the slave trade; and that it is their wish that the Colony of Sierra Leone should afford to the surrounding natives an example of mild but firm and well ordered government, and of secure and productive industry; and that the influence which its growing strength and its growing commercial importance may give it over the neighbouring chiefs should be exerted in composing their differences, and inducing them to pursue plans of peaceful industry.

"8. In conformity with the general principles to instruct the government of Sierra Leone to encourage and patronize every rational scheme for improving the condition of Africa; to favour the introduction of persons into that country who may be disposed to instruct the inhabitants in the useful arts, or to set them an example of profitable cultivation; to direct the attention of the British slave traders who now reside on the coast, to the pursuit of agriculture and of a trade in the natural production of Africa; to take every proper opportunity of pointing out to the African chiefs the various channels into which the industry of their people may be advantageously directed; to extend and improve as much as possible the British influence in Africa, by making treaties with the native powers which, where it shall prove practicable, may comprise a recognition of the abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain, and an engagement mutually to discourage and prevent the revival of the trade by any other Nation, and which may secure privileges

1. C.O. 267/24. Memo for T.P. Thompson. April 11, 1808 (based on an earlier memo submitted by Zachary Macaulay to Lord Castlereagh).

and immunities in favour of British planters or traders who may settle among the Natives to adopt every practicable expedient for opening fresh channels of trade between Africa and Great Britain, to promote all eligible plans for exploring the interior, and particularly to endeavour to open a direct communication between the highest navigable point of the Sierra Leone River and the Fula country, and also with the Niger; to encourage the acquisition of the native languages by the servants of the Government and others in the Colony, and to consider a proficiency in these as forming a ground of preference in designating persons to particular situations; and to use their best endeavours to excite industry, to repress immoral practices, and to maintain and encourage Religion and virtue, both within the Colony and as far as their influence may extend among the Natives."

The above quotation embodies the idea, in all its ramifications, behind the founding of the Freetown settlement in 1787. It sets out what, in the opinion of its promoters, constituted the "blessings of industry and civilization", and the mode of spreading these among the "barbarous" peoples of Africa. Based upon the feeble foundation of the superiority of one culture (British) over another (African), the experiment was doomed right from the start to clash with the indigenous tradition, sometimes with disastrous consequences.

However, sparsely populated Koya, with its inhabitants "in a situation beneath contempt ... incapable of negotiation for anything above a few gallons of rum, or of elevating their politics to a higher object than the attainment of a cast-off suit",¹ never attracted much of Colony attention as a fruitful field for the propagation of these "blessings". But after 1807, as a result of the activities of the Freetown-based British anti-slave trade squadron, the Colony population increased considerably.

The peninsula, generally less fertile than the neighbouring Koya

1. C.O. 267/25. Thompson to Castlereagh. n.d. (1808).

territory, failed to meet the growing demand for farmlands, and the colonists turned towards Koya for the satisfaction of this increased need.

In 1808 Colony population, centred mainly around Freetown, was reckoned at about 2,000;¹ by the late 1830s it had risen, by the addition of "recaptives", to over 40,000. The recaptives, Africans captured in their own homelands and put on board ships as slaves bound for the new world, but recaptured and set free in Freetown by the British squadron, were officially referred to as Liberated Africans. Those of the same ethnic origin were often allowed to stay together in their own particular settlement.

A group of these Liberated Africans of Mende origin (known generally in Freetown as Kossohs), alongside many others, settled in Waterloo area, on the land ceded to Governor MacCarthy by Pa Kakonko (London) in 1819. Here they lived as British subjects, governed under British law, and subjected to British justice and protection. They had a manager appointed to supervise their affairs, to protect their interests, and to settle minor disputes among them. By the late 1830s the number of the Kossoh Liberated Africans alone had risen to about 1,500.²

Some of them took to trading either on their own, or as agents of more important Colony traders, particularly in timber. The timber trade had begun since 1816, and many Colony traders had settled in Koya country, particularly in Rossolo Creek area,

1. Fyfe, A. Hist. ... p.98.

2. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell. July 20, 1841.

to participate in this trade. Rossolo Creek alone produced 19,000 logs in 1836.¹ But most of the Kossoh Liberated Africans continued the only occupation they knew, shifting agriculture - planting one patch of ground one year and moving to another of virgin soil the next. This system of cultivation needs a great deal of land; a great deal of rich and fertile land.

This need increased with the increase in their numbers. Some of them moved across the Colony boundary, "tempted by a more fertile soil, by the hope, probably, of greater independence of action, and perhaps by the desire of approaching nearer to a branch [i.e. the Kpa Mende] of their own Nation".² They had asked for and had been given permission by Koya owners of the country to settle and to make farms in Koya territory. They had given the customary "cola" which Koya chiefs had accepted. They had undertaken to observe and respect the customs of Koya people, and to give annually a small portion of the yield on their farms to their landlords in accordance with Koya customs.

More and more of these Liberated Africans had moved into Koya country as their numbers increased. They formed their own farming villages scattered in various parts of Koya country. But they did not renounce their British connection; they were rather proud of it, and regarded themselves a cut above the

1. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, p.593.

2. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, p.259.

ordinary Koya Temne, whom they rather indiscreetly and contemptuously referred to as Banta.¹ Many other peoples also joined them in their various settlements in Koya Country. Among these were Loko refugees from Masimera who had been dislodged by the Temne/Loko wars which began in 1828. Many runaway slaves from the interior, and even from other parts of Koya also settled among them for protection, and they refused to give them up when demanded by their masters. The law of England under which they were governed did not permit slavery or slave trade.

Minor disputes and misunderstandings arose from time to time among these Kossoh Liberated Africans and their Koya landlords. But these had been peacefully and satisfactorily settled. However dissatisfaction seemed to be mounting against them as time went on, particularly over the issue of runaway slaves.

Then came the war between Bai Kurr of Mabang, in Kolifa country, and the Mende of Taiama (the Kpa Mende) led by En Kerry,² the powerful Yoni professional warrior from Foindu. En Kerry, dissatisfied with Governor Campbell's peace settlement of 1836,

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1. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell. June 23, 1841. encl. McCormack's report. The term "Banta" is often used in a derogatory sense against the Temne as a whole by other "tribes". See Dalby, op.cit., S/L L.R. No.2, 1963, p.25.
 2. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell. May 10, 1841. encl. Statement by Pa Kappa. See also Lawson and Parkes ... p.39.

had raided into the eastern district of the Koya country in 1837. And Mohammadu Bundu of Foredugu, the ruler of this division had, with difficulty, pushed him out of Koya country. It was after this that En Kerry went and joined himself with the Kpa Mende in their war against Bai Kurr. Bundu, apprehensive that En Kerry might return to Koya if he and the Mende were successful in subduing Kolifa Mabang, took war men to assist Bai Kurr.

En Kerry, as part of his war strategy,¹ sent emissaries into Koya to incite the Kossoh Liberated Africans resident there against Koya people; hoping thereby to be able to draw Mohammadu Bundu, or at least part of his forces, away from the war front. Then the Kossohs started destroying Koya farms, burning Koya villages, and capturing Koya people. It is stated that when information reached En Kerry that, in compliance with his instruction, Mende Liberated Africans had started harassing Koya people, he got on his war fence and announced to Mohammadu Bundu that the Colony of Sierra Leone was on his side, and that the Governor had sent soldiers to destroy Koya.²

Koya chiefs; Pa Simbara, Pa Kappra, Bokari Sila (brother of Mohammadu Bundu), and others sent to inform Governor Doherty of what his people were doing in their country, and implored him to remove them. Doherty, who felt nothing but contempt for Koya people, instructed the manager at Waterloo, G.W. Nicol, to warn

1. Ibid. (Statement by Pa Kappra).

2. C.O. 267/165. Carr to Russell, August 10, 1841.

the Liberated Africans involved that the Colony would be unable to afford them any protection if they interfered in the affairs of the barbarous natives outside the Colony jurisdiction. Nicol did as he was instructed, but to no avail; for instead of moving out of Koya country, many more Mende Liberated Africans in fact moved in, and increased their terrorist activities against the Koya people.¹

Koya chiefs, encountering considerable difficulty in restraining their subjects, and having been warned by Mohammadu Bundu (still at the war front) not to allow the Kossoh affair to lead to a clash with the Colony authorities,² sent once again to Governor Doherty imploring him to order the Liberated Africans out of their country.

Doherty, irritated by this "source of constant embarrassment and annoyance",³ ordered his Colonial Secretary, N.W. Macdonald, to issue a public proclamation pointing to the Liberated Africans involved that "no protection can be afforded them by the Colony so long as they choose to reside where they are at present, or in any other territory beyond the limits of the Sierra Leone Peninsula; and that the fault is solely their own"⁴ if they were to suffer or fall into difficulties. The two

1. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell, July 20, 1841.

2. C.O. 267/165. Carr to Russell, August 10, 1841.
encl. McCormack's report.

3. C.O. 267/159. Doherty to Russell, July 29, 1840.

4. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell, July 20, 1841. encl. Minutes of Council meeting (June 29, 1841).

officers, C.B. Jones and Lieutenant Smales, sent to explain the proclamation to the Koya chiefs, added that "if any of the Kossoh people came to trouble them in their country, they were to drive them away, that if they beat them or kill them in doing so the Governor would have nothing to do with it, it was their own fault."¹

This was the guarantee that Koya chiefs needed - an assurance that they would not be treading on the Colony's toes if they took up arms against the Mende Liberated Africans among them. The prospect of a conflict between the Koya and the "prosperous" Colony people among them had attracted many warriors into the country, including "several colonists who have adopted the religion of the Mahomadans".² There were also many defectors from the Temme/Loko war (then raging in Port Loko area), and many volunteers from the surrounding countries who had come partly to seize an opportunity to recover their runaway slaves, and partly (and perhaps more important) to enrich themselves by plundering the well-to-do Colony traders both in Koya and Waterloo areas.

Opportunity for Koya revenge came in the middle of 1840. The circumstances surrounding the outbreak of hostilities,³ centred round the ownership and sale of a small, crooked piece of log,

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/159. Doherty to Russell. July 29, 1840.
encl. Letter from Nicol to Macdonald (June 27, 1840).

3. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell. encl. McCormack's report, under date June 23, 1841. Also C.O. 267/159. Doherty to Russell. encl. Nicol to Macdonald, June 27, 1840.

about twenty feet in length, and fourteen inches square, were extremely confused. It seems a Temne man in Gbabai area, cut down and squared the log of timber in question, and left it in the forest to dry. A Mende Liberated African called Thomas Williams, came across this log and sold it, on May 23, to a Colony timber trader, Thomas Bucknor, who had it partly hauled out of the woods.

Two days later, the real owner of the log found it where it had been hauled by Bucknor's people, cut out Bucknor's marks, and sold it to Peter Smith, a factor of Samuel Kelly, another Colony timber trader. Then, Lamina, who was either the Temne owner or his deputy, went to Peter Smith's house to collect the money for the log. Coincidentally, Bucknor called at the same time, learnt about the transaction, and had Lamina seized and carried to his own place. There he tied him up and flogged him.

On the following day, May 26, James Myers, son of a Mende Liberated African resident in Koya, clerk and timber measurer of Thomas Bucknor, went to mark the log. A group of about twenty Temne men from Bankori, Lamina's town, seized him and carried him to their town. Here they tied him up, beat him severely, and put him in stocks. On June 24, his father sent a party of Mende Liberated Africans, about 200 strong, some of them armed, to go and rescue his son. But a party of Temne men hurried to meet them as they approached the town, demanded their object, and refused to allow them to pass to the town. When they persisted the Temne opened fire, killed two of them and wounded another.

The Kossah withdrew, reported the incident to the manager at Waterloo and requested a Coroner's Inquest on the bodies. But no inquest was held because the action had taken place outside the Colony boundary. So the Kossah sent some of their men to go and recover the dead bodies. But the Temme fired upon them again killing two more. After this things developed quickly, and as it turned out, disastrously for the Mende Liberated Africans.

But in spite of the assurance from Governor Doherty, and the explanation of the two officers, it seems some Koya chiefs were still very uneasy about the whole situation. Pa Simbara, hoping that the conflict could still be contained peacefully, "sent a considerable present to the Kussos to beg them".¹ When a section of the Mende Liberated Africans were still busy considering whether or not to accept the presents, and so negotiate for a peaceful settlement, Temne warriors and their allies rose against the Kossahs among them. In one fierce and sweeping attack they routed the Liberated Africans from four of their farm settlements, which they looted and burnt down. One of these settlements was Giro, the village where some Kossah elders had gathered to consider Pa Simbara's peace proposals.

The Kossahs, it would appear, had thought that Koya people would be too scared of a possible clash with the Colony to risk an attack on them. They had expected also that, in spite of the public proclamation issued by Doherty, the Colony would, in actual

1. Ibid. (McCormack's report).

fact, come to their assistance if it became necessary. They were sadly mistaken. And because the nature of their settlements (scattered over large areas of Koya country) made co-ordinated and concerted action very difficult, they fell an easy prey to the large and organised Koya force under Bokari Sila.

However, they put up a spirited fight to begin with under their leader Memunuck Thompson (alias Benjahman)¹ and, assisted by the Loko, and some other Liberated Africans (Kono, Kissi, Mandinka, Angola etc.) among them, they burnt down some major Koya towns and killed and captured many Koya people. But Koya warriors quickly rounded them up and sent them fleeing in various directions. Many were killed and many were captured and enslaved. Many more were sold into slavery. Brimah Fallah, En Kerry's brother, resident on the northern bank of the Ribi River bought some. A Bumpel chief called Gbanka also bought some, so did Musu Bundu, Mohammadu Bundu's sister, also resident in Bumpel country. Some of the captives were carried to Port Loko, and from there to Mange Bure, which had become a flourishing slave market since the outbreak of the Temne/Loko war. Here they were bought by slave traders from the Rio Pongas. About three hundred of the Kossohs themselves, who escaped capture, returned to their own country in Mende land. Only about four or five hundred managed to get back to the Colony, that is, to Waterloo area where they had been settled originally, to tell the tales of the woe and sorrow that had befallen their people.

1. Lawson and Parkes ... p.36.

On the first Koya attack G.W. Nicol, the manager at Waterloo, had sent a report to Governor Doherty.¹ He had warned, as was so often the case in the nineteenth century when Colony officials wanted intervention, that the aim of the Koya attackers was to invade the Colony itself. But Doherty, who was not aware of the gravity of the situation or the extent of the human suffering involved, was not unduly worried. He simply reiterated the action he had taken over the matter; his warning to the Liberated Africans involved, not to interfere in the affairs of the Koya people, and the appeals he had issued asking them to remove from Koya country. He felt that Koya people were quite justified in expelling them from their country by the use of force.

Doherty had other reasons for welcoming this Koya action too.² Among the Liberated Africans in that country were many deserters from the tiny Colony militia, and he feared that these might, in the very near future, become formidable enough to attack the Colony if not driven back to it. However, he sent a party of the Royal African Corps to Waterloo as a precautionary measure against possible attack. His solution to the problem was the "purchase of the sovereignty"³ of some portion of Koya territory. This would satisfy the farming demands of the Liberated Africans in Waterloo area, and would remove a source

1. C.O. 267/159. Nicol to Macdonald, June 27, 1840. Enclosed in Doherty to Russell, July 29, 1840.

2. C.O. 267/159. Doherty to Russell, July 29, 1840.

3. Ibid.

of possible future danger to the Colony. The acquisition would keep open "an important path to the interior",¹ it would make easier the control over the timber trade.

Governor Doherty communicated these ideas to the Colonial Office for approval and sent commissioners to Koya chiefs to ascertain their attitude towards this purchase of sovereignty idea. The chiefs "expressed themselves as unwilling to give away any more of their country".² Colonial Office referred the whole Koya problem to the sole commissioner,³ Dr. Robert Madden, who would be setting out on his West African mission shortly, primarily to report on the situation on the Gold Coast (now Ghana).

In the meantime Doherty, appointed Colonel of the Third West Indian Regiment, had been posted to Jamaica. John Jeremie, the first civilian Governor, knighted on appointment, arrived in January, 1841. He travelled up to Port Loko to participate in the election of a new Alikali, and died the following month. John Carr, the Queen's Advocate, young and inexperienced, acted as Governor.⁴

On May 2⁵ some of the Kossoh Liberated Africans who had been expelled from their settlements in Koya country, went back to get (the Temne say, steal) some cassada from their abandoned

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/159. Smales to Macdonald, July, 23, 1840. Enclosed in Doherty to Russell, July 29, 1840.

3. C.O. 267/159. Doherty to Russell, July, 29, 1840. Minute on dispatch.

4. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.220.

5. C.O. 267/164. Young to Barnett, May 3, 1841. Enclosed in Carr to Russell, June 23, 1841

farms. A party of Temne warriors attacked and captured six of them, and wounded one, Bange, who died later. The Kossohs attacked back, killing two of the Temne. Carr¹ sent John McCormack, the pioneer of the timber trade, and a very experienced European in native matters, accompanied by G.W. Nicol, the manager at Waterloo, to report on the situation and to demand the release of the captives.

The emissaries arrived at Koya at night.² Pa Sanke, the chief of the Koya town where the incident took place, suspicious at first, refused to allow them into his town. After a long argument he opened the gate for them, but would not allow them to sleep in his house overnight. On the following day the chief arranged a "palaver" with the commissioners, told them that the latest incident in his town was merely a continuation of the war that had started a year previous between his people and the Kossohs, it was not an isolated event at all, and should not be treated separately. If the Colony now wanted to restore peace between the combatants, their best course would be to investigate the whole matter. As far as the demands of the emissaries were concerned, he would only consider them as part of a total peace settlement, which would include adequate reparations for the loss his own people suffered in the whole war. He implored the commissioners to appeal to the Liberated Africans not to return to

1. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell, May 27, 1841.

2. C.O. 267/164. McCormack and Nicol - report of May 13, 1841. Enclosed in Carr to Russell, June 23, 1841

Koya country for anything for the time being, because feelings were still inflamed against them.

Carr was not satisfied. His first reaction was to send a strong military force to compell Koya chiefs to surrender the Liberated Africans in their keeping. He sought the opinion of Dr. Madden who was then in Freetown on his West African assignment.¹ Madden, who spent only two weeks in Freetown, and was ill most of that time, based his judgement almost entirely on what people told him. In his opinion "the liberated Africans were the aggressors in this case, ... their violation of the Quai territory had exposed them to the resentment of the natives, whose notions of justice were wild and sanguinary".² A small military force, continued Madden, could be sent to Waterloo (and no farther) where the knowledge of their presence would serve as a deterrent to further acts of aggression. And a peaceful mission should be sent to Koya country to enquire into the whole matter.

So Carr sent a detachment of forty men to Waterloo, and McCormack and Nicol back again into Koya country for a full investigation.³ The commissioners were to go first to Pa Sanke and remonstrate with him over the release of the colonists in captivity in his town. If he proved unco-operative, they were to move on to Foredugu and get Mohammadu Bundu to intervene.

1. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, pp.262-3.

2. Ibid.

3. C.O. 267/164. Macdonald to McCormack, May 19, 1841. Enclosed in Carr to Russell, June 23, 1841

And if still unable to obtain satisfaction, to approach the Alikali of Port Loko and ask for his assistance. If everything went well the commissioners were to "ascertain from the chiefs their views as to the ceding the sovereignty of Quia country, viz, that portion lying between the Rivers Rokel, Bunce and Kates, and the Creeks Rosollo and Calmont, to this government".¹ They were to distribute twenty pounds to the chiefs if they acceded to these demands.

The chiefs delivered four of the captured six Liberated Africans; the remaining two were irretrievably lost, having been sold into slavery.² They also promised to punish the parties concerned in the outrage. But they were very surprised at the government's new line of action, for it was the Governor of the Colony that had given them the authority to "flog" the Kossos off their territory in the first place. What they had wanted all along was peace, and they were now glad that the Governor had decided to effect it.

It was these two missions to Koya country that revealed to the administration in Freetown the extent of the tragedy that had surrounded the expulsion of the Kossos Liberated Africans - British subjects - from Koya country. The commissioners' report horrified Carr. He summoned a hurried Council meeting for an

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/164. Minutes of Council Meeting, June 29, 1841. Enclosed in Carr to Russell, July 20, 1841

advice on the best means of securing the immediate liberation of the colonists still held by Koya people. He observed that "it was a most unfortunate circumstance that these matters had not been investigated and stopped at the commencement".¹ It was the duty of his Government to protect its people wherever they might be, and to demand reparation on their behalf "when unjustly oppressed by foreign powers".² Koya chiefs had no right "to kill, drive out or enslave" any Liberated African "on account of a quarrel between two or three individuals".

The Council endorsed his suggestion for military action if the Liberated Africans still in Koya hands were not delivered "within a reasonable time". At McCormack's suggestion,³ Carr undertook to write to all the chiefs that were party to Governor Jeremie's treaty of February, 1841 (a treaty still unratified by the Colonial Office) that the Government of Sierra Leone required their co-operation in effecting the "immediate and unconditional liberation of all Her Majesty's subjects now detained in the Quia and neighbouring countries on pain of having the custom promised them in the treaty immediately stopped".⁴ The Governor, however, wisely realized the

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. (see also C.O. 267/164. Circular Letter, July 2, 1841).

4. Ibid.

impracticability of military operations at that period of the year, and promised to do everything possible to prevent having to resort to the use of force.

In the meantime Carr had forbidden the execution of the "country law" against British subjects offending within the jurisdiction of any Temne chief; promising that such offenders would be punished in the Courts of Sierra Leone.¹ Governor Doherty had entered into a similar convention with Koya chiefs in November, 1839.² In October of that year, a Colony man, John Smith Jarret (a Maroon) had been murdered by his servant, Martin (an Ibo recaptive), at Mabaifu in Koya. The local chiefs, at the instigation of Jarret's Maroon relations, seized the servant, tied him to the stake and burnt him to death. Ibos in the Colony took revenge on the Maroons. The Colony authorities were alarmed, and Doherty met the chiefs of Koya at Foreduku and got them to agree to hand over Colony offenders in their country for legal action in the Colony courts. But Colonial Office disallowed that convention.³

Governor Jeremie's Treaty of 1841⁴ also included a clause (Art. 8) stipulating that British offenders in Temne country shall be extradited, and shall be "tried according to the English

1. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell, July 20, 1841.

2. C.O. 267/154. Doherty to Russell, Nov. 29, 1839.
encl. Report by Macaulay and Macdonald.

3. Ibid. (minute by C.O.).

4. Treaty No.26. Montagu, Ordinances ...

law, and shall be punished if found guilty". But only Mohammadu Bundu of Foredugu signed that treaty among the Koya chiefs. And in any case that treaty was still awaiting ratification by the British Government.

The Colonial Office appear rather dubious about the legality of these extradition treaties. In their opinion Governor Carr was clearly "in error in stating that the Courts of Sierra Leone can punish British subjects for offences committed in the Timmanee Country".¹ Parliament alone was the competent body to make such laws binding on British subjects beyond the Realm. (As it had done with regards to the courts in Canada, Honduras, N.S. Wales - Australia, and the Cape of Good Hope - South Africa).²

The Colonial Office was also very unenthusiastic about Carr's "menace of war". The Acting Governor of Sierra Leone was duty bound to protect Her Majesty's subjects in the Colony, and to re-claim any of them held in slavery. But this could not arise "in a case where British subjects are captives of War in a Foreign Country where they have been fighting, and where such captivity induces slavery as an established and legal consequence".³ Carr's militaristic proposals which would

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1. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell. July 20, 1841. C.O. minute on the dispatch.
 2. A similar Act was passed for Sierra Leone in 1861. See Fyfe: A Hist... p.299.
 3. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell. July 20, 1841. C.O. minute on the dispatch.

definitely involve a great deal of expenditure, was "to be regretted, and if avoidable to be most anxiously avoided".¹

Carr's voluminous report, which included the Council's proceedings, and an account of McCormack's activities in Koya country was dispatched from Freetown on July 20. Three days later, he directed his Colonial Secretary, N.W. Macdonald, to send instructions to McCormack for another mission to Koya chiefs,² to acquaint them with the present position of the Administration with regard to the Kossoh wars.

Assisted by Ali Bundu, representing the Alikali of Port Loko, and Fenda Sanusi Modu representing Alimami Dala Modu (then very ill) of Bulom Shore, McCormack proceeded on his mission in August, 1841. His instructions³ were first, to proceed to Foredugu via Medina (now known as Lungi, Dala Modu's town) for an interview with Mohammadu Bundu. And from there to move on to the other parts of Koya country, to make the Acting Governor's decision and proposed line of action known to the chiefs. He was to raise the issue, which local antipathy prevented him from raising during his second mission, of the cession of a portion of Koya country to the Colony. He was to inform the chiefs that the Governor would be willing to meet them at Robaga to treat with them over the issue. And if everything

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/165. McCormack's report, August 10, 1841. Enclosed in Carr to Russell, Sept. 1, 1841

3. C.O. 267/165. Macdonald to McCormack & Co., August 16, 1841. 1648

went satisfactorily McCormack was to add the names of all important Koya chiefs to the Treaty of 1841, and allow them yearly stipends.

McCormack arrived at Gbabai (on Gbabai Creek, Koya) on August 7, for the projected palaver with Koya chiefs. Bokari Sila, "a man of considerable importance and influence"¹ in the country, represented Mohammadu Bundu, his brother, who was still fighting En Kerry. The chiefs debated among themselves for fourteen days before it was finally agreed that Gbabai town be used as the meeting place.

When the meeting convened on August 21,² McCormack gave the customary "shake-hand", which was accepted by the chiefs. Then he delivered his message. He preambled the Governor's proposals by a short history of events so far between them (the chiefs) and the Liberated Africans. He told them of the good intentions of the good and godly English people in founding the Colony of Sierra Leone, and the good things that Colony was intended to bring to all the peoples of Africa, including the Koya people. These good Englishmen had gone through a great deal of trouble to rescue the unfortunate Liberated Africans from slavery, and it would be too much to expect that the government of the Colony of Sierra Leone would allow them to be enslaved again.

The Acting Governor, McCormack continued, had sent him to demand from the chiefs "the immediate and unconditional delivery

1. C.O. 267/165. McCormack's report, August 10, 1841. *Ibid*

2. *Ibid*.

of all British subjects held in slavery by the Quia people".¹ No payment would be made by way of redemption, for these people had been unjustly held. He had been instructed further to say that should the Koya people refuse to comply with these demands, the Acting Governor would "be under the necessity of using force"² to obtain satisfaction, and the chiefs would have themselves entirely to blame for any consequences that might follow.

Koya chiefs were dumbfounded. It was quite evident that they did not expect such tough line of action from the Governor. The threat of the use of force left them bewildered and gave them a feeling of betrayal. Pa Simbara, and Pa Kappra who did most of the talking sounded repetitive and incoherent, an attribute most unusual in Temne chiefs. Their agitation and sense of humiliation was almost indescribable. The chiefs went through,³ in great detail, the story of how the Kossoh "strangers" had come into their country, how they had welcomed them with open arms, and how everything had gone on fine for the first few years; how, when the Liberated Africans began to misbehave they had repeatedly informed the Governor about it, and had implored him to recall them from their territory in order to avoid a clash between them (the chiefs) and the Colony.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

The Governor had informed them that the Kossohs were disobeying his orders by remaining in their country, and that if they "flogged" them out of it, the Kossohs would have themselves to blame for the consequences. (The chiefs then produced a copy of the proclamation issued by Governor Doherty in 1840). In the series of conflicts that ensued between them and the Kossob Liberated Africans, many of their people had been killed and captured, and many of their villages and towns had been destroyed. They did not deny that many Kossohs had been killed and captured too, but that was the natural consequence of war.

The chiefs thought when they saw McCormack that he had come to make peace; did people make peace by threatening force? McCormack knew them, he knew their customs, he knew that peace could not be made without the customary "Kassy";¹ where was it? Peace could not be made satisfactorily behind the Kossohs, for they were the people who started the whole trouble; why hadn't they come forward? It was preposterous for the Sierra Leone government to demand the release of the Kossob captives before peace could be made; what about their own people who were captured and enslaved by the Kossohs? - "Children are equally dear to their fathers, why do you ask for your children, and not return ours to us?"² Sierra Leone people were strangers of Koya; had the landlords sank so low in the eyes of their strangers to be treated with such utter contempt?

1. This is the customary present that precedes any peace negotiation.

2. Ibid. (McCormack's Report)

The meeting went on almost continuously for four days with the chiefs seeming nowhere near the end of their own address. By the close of the fourth day McCormack was completely exhausted, and so requested that the meeting be suspended to allow him two days rest. The meeting opened again on the 27th of August with an impressive military display by some 20 Koya war men in a heavy thunderstorm. Their performance, in spite of the weather, left McCormack in no doubt as to their capabilities within the limits of their own mode of warfare.

When the assembly finally settled down to business, the chiefs asked McCormack to inform the Governor that he had surprised them. They did not believe he really wanted peace, and did not understand what he meant by the use of the word "force". It seemed to them that, in fact, the Sierra Leone government had all along instigated the Kossohs to make trouble in their country, while giving them the impression that they (the Kossohs) had remained in Koya against Colony orders. They recalled that En Kerry had declared openly that the Sierra Leone government was on his side. Many Kossob Liberated Africans had boasted loudly that the Colony was behind them, that they had been sent, in fact, to drive away the people of Koya from their land because it was needed by the Colony. Whenever Colony authorities came to investigate complaints against the people of the Colony, they said very little about the complaints but spoke most of the time on the timber trade and those engaged in it.

If the Governor was bent on taking their country away from them by force, he was welcome to try, but they were "determined it should be only with their lives".¹ They still hoped, however, that they had not understood what he really meant, and trusted that "he will meet them in friendship, and in peace, and not in war".²

McCormack was deeply moved, and was inclined to be sympathetic. He told³ Carr that the only way he felt the Government should act towards the people of Koya was to meet them on friendly terms and give them sufficient proof that the Colony was determined to act with justice. This would do more to strengthen the hands of the Colony towards these natives than any force the government could send against them. And the force that Koya people could mount should not be taken too lightly either. Further, any militaristic policy against them would only cause them to hate and fear rather than love and respect the Colony. The question of the cession of a portion of Koya country McCormack found a too delicate an issue to raise, although he found from his private conversations that, if properly put,⁴ it would be favourably received by the chiefs.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. McCormack had asked the few chiefs he spoke to what they felt about becoming one and the same with the Colony, having the same laws and the same privileges under the same government. The chiefs were favourably (though cautiously) disposed to the idea, their only misgiving being their anxiety over what would happen to their slaves.

This "purchase of sovereignty" idea felt necessary in order to provide room for the growing Colony population, as well as protect the timber trade in Koya, was extremely unpopular with the Colonial Office. "If we could acquire the dominion of the whole of that continent", James Stephen, the Under-Secretary of State commenting on the acquisition of more territories in Africa with particular reference to Sierra Leone, once minuted, "it would be a worthless possession".¹ Carr's proposal, he felt, might be a wise measure, but "certainly a questionable one [which] has never yet been sanctioned".²

Dr. Madden's report,³ on the issue (which again he based largely on the opinions of others, and on his own prejudices) tried to set forth the arguments for and against the acquisition. Out of a total Colony population of about 42,000 in 1841 nearly three quarters were recaptives. Because trade had not prospered, most of these recaptives had had to rely on subsistence agriculture. And because the Colony peninsula was markedly poorer than the adjoining Koya territory, and no attempt had been made to encourage scientific agriculture, the recaptives had hitherto had no alternative but to seek farmlands in Koya country.

1. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.217.

2. C.O. 267/164. Carr to Russell, July 20, 1841. Minute by C.O.

3. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, pp.259-263. Doherty exploded (pp.359-361, appendix 17) some of the inaccuracies in Dr. Madden's report. He pointed out, quite rightly, that Madden had exaggerated the unsuitability of the Colony peninsula for Tropical agriculture.

But any acquisition of territory must be viewed against the likely future needs of the Colony. Colony population, he reckoned accurately, was not likely to increase drastically in the near future. It would be unwise, he felt, to allow any further great "influx of barbarism" into the Colony, for that would hinder the "chance of advancing in civilization".¹ Although the prospects of emigration to the West Indies did not seem very bright, the Niger Expedition, which had sailed to West Africa in June, 1841, and which was intended for the establishment of a civilizing mission on the Niger,² had opened the possibilities of a new settlement which could relieve the pressure on the Colony in Sierra Leone.

However, if, after taking all these into consideration, it was still felt that the well-being of the Colony demanded the acquisition, and it could be established that the returns would justify the outlay, then the acquisition should be effected. But purchase of sovereignty alone was not enough, acquisition must secure property in the land as well. All the chiefs in the country must be invited to participate in the negotiations for the cession, and their principal allowed a yearly stipend for the loss. Natives in the ceded area should be entitled to

1. Ibid.

2. The expedition collapsed disastrously soon after arrival on the Niger. But the movement, began in the late 1830s - of recaptives, particularly those of Nigerian origin, to return to their own homelands where the prospects for trade and missionary work were much brighter - continued apace after 1841.

the protection of the British law and made amenable to the British authority. Their rights over their farms and settlements must be granted; and a stipendiary magistrate appointed to oversee the affairs of the newly acquired area. But Colonial Office remained indifferent.

In September, 1841, Dr. William Fergusson, an Afro-West-Indian army doctor, took over from Carr as Acting Governor. McCormack was sent back to Koya to meet the chiefs again, and he successfully negotiated a peace settlement.¹ Koya people handed over those Colony prisoners still in their keeping. In return the Colony promised not to allow any more of their people to settle in Koya country in future.

In the meantime, in the Koya country itself, new but disturbing developments were taking place. Mohammadu Bundu of Foreduku had returned to Koya after his successful campaign (in support of Bai Kurr) to crush En Kerry and his Mende followers. But back in Koya, he fell out with his war chief, Maligi Bundu.² The latter was supported by many of the Temne of the Rokel region, including Koya, who were becoming jealous of the growing importance of the Bundu family. They sent a large force of Temne warriors, numbering about three thousand, to go to the assistance of Maligi Bundu. Mohammadu Bundu also raised a large army comprised mainly of Loko warriors. Hostilities broke out

1. Lawson and Parkes ... p.36. also Fyfe, A. Hist ... p.221.

2. Lawson and Parkes ... p.29.

in 1843 and raged for three years. Trade became badly disrupted. The principal Colony merchants engaged in the trade appealed to Freetown to help in liberating Foreduku, now besieged by Maligi Bundu's forces.

In September, 1843,¹ John Dawson, a Colony merchant on the Rokel River, and a few others, were commissioned by Governor Macdonald to proceed up that river in the "S.S. Soudan", a fine iron-built steamer, to try and restore peace among the contending factions. The party went up the river as far as Petfu, a distance of about 15 miles from Freetown. Here, instead of trying to contact the Temne chiefs involved in the conflict, they secretly got in touch with Foreh Bundu, a younger brother of Mohammadu Bundu, residing in his trading town of Madimsi, a few miles from Petfu. And Foreh Bundu quickly organised a relief party which he dispatched to Foreduku. Foreduku was saved. Dawson and his party moved up to Magbeli to find it in ruins, having been attacked by Foreh Bundu's forces.²

His secret support for Mohammadu Bundu had become known to the Temne, and the chiefs refused to attend his peace meeting. He waited for some time at Magbeli, attempting fruitlessly to get the chiefs together for peace talks. And by the time he decided to send the steamer back to Freetown, the Rokel River had gone down to a dangerous level, and this fine boat got wrecked

1. Ibid.

2. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.27.

on the sunken rocks near Mabaifu. When the local Temne heard about the disaster, they attributed it to the doing of the great spirit residing in the big cotton tree near those rocks, and rejoiced and gave praise to their gods. "This tradition is firmly believed by them" writes Lawson, "and was calmly and quietly told by [even] Chief Mohammadu Bundu himself ... on several occasions".¹

Now convinced of the rightness of their own cause, and conscious of the treachery of the Colony administration, which had been demonstrated over and over again, Koya people remained unpacified. But they also suffered immensely from the depredations of the wars, which prevented their valued Colony luxury goods from reaching them.

In 1845, Koya accepted mediation by John McCormack. And, assisted by the Alikali of Port Loko, and Alimami Amara (who succeeded Dala Modu in 1841) of Bulom Shore, McCormack succeeded, after many months of complicated negotiations, in adjusting "the numerous and endless Quarrels and Disputes"² that had bedevilled Koya country for so long. Ros³plo Creek, now the only timber-producing region in Koya, was severed from the eastern district, which had been placed under the control of the Bundu family at Fore⁴dugu since 1825, and placed under Sori Sise, a Koya man. It

1. Lawson and Parkes ... p.30.

2. C.O. 267/193. Government Notice, January 19, 1846.

was this chief (Sori Sise) who placed "a Purrah" (that is a prohibition) on the timber trade, involving timber worth £26,000, in 1852, and had to be deposed, with the assistance of Bai Simera, before the prohibition could be removed.¹

After the peace settlement of 1846, Koya remained peaceful and trade flourished. By the 1850s Magbeli was becoming the leading commercial and political centre on the Rokel River. Koya people benefited directly from its booming trade, but had no one to speak for them in the increasing number of palavers being held in the town. Both Pa Simbara and Pa Kappra had died, and local antipathy towards the Bundu family at Foredugu, fanned by McCormack who hated them because they were devout Muslims, made them unacceptable. So by the second half of the 1850s Koya people, encouraged by McCormack, began to feel that the time had come to instal a new principal ruler, who would look after the affairs of the whole country, and be able to speak for them with the authority of a ceremonial chief. With McCormack's help, (financial, no doubt) they removed the curse placed upon the Koya chieftaincy since 1807.

In May 1859,² the then leading Koya dignitaries; Pa Dick, Pa Bubu and Pa Satan Sori (but excluding Bokari Sila, who had succeeded Mohammadu Bundu as the head of the alien Bundu family) sent to inform Acting Governor Alexander Fitzjames of their

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1. C.O. 267/229. Kennedy to Parkinson, Bart., Dec. 3, 1852. Sori Sise wasn't a ceremonial chief.
 2. C.O. 267/264. Fitzjames to Newcastle, July 29, 1859. encl. Chiefs letter under date, Robaga, May 3, 1859.

intention to instal a new principal chief for Koya country; and asked for the customary Colony assistance on such occasions. The new chief-elect was Pa Dick Wula, the only surviving son of the discredited Bai Farma III who died in 1807.

Fitzjames delegated McCormack¹ to represent him at the installation ceremonies, with presents for the new chief and his wives. And as a mark of his government's support for the new chief, ^{Fitzjames} desired him to adopt his first name - Alexander. The coronation took place at Robaga - the sacred and ceremonial centre for Koya. The new chief adopted the title of Alexander Bai Kanta. The "Bai Kanta" part of the title, McCormack explained, was indicative of his policy - that of preserver of his country.² After his coronation, the new chief, accompanied by several of his headmen, including Bokari Sila (who was made to acknowledge him King in the presence of the Acting Governor), paid a courtesy visit to his "good friend" and name-sake in Freetown.³

Alexander Bai Kanta's first few years of reign were peaceful ones, and he remained on very friendly terms with the Colony government. Although timber supply at Rossolo Creek soon became denuded, Koya remained an important centre of trade, supplying rice and other food products to the Colony. As Magbeli developed commercially, so did the number of traders passing through Koya

1. C.O. 267/264. McCormack to Smith [Colonial Secretary, Freetown] May 17, 1859. Enclosed in Fitzjames to Newcastle, July 29, 1859

2. Ibid.

3. C.O. 267/264. Fitzjames to Newcastle, July 29, 1859.

territory increase, to the benefit of Koya people.

As the supply of timber on the Ros̄plo Creek became denuded, and the trade in that particular commodity declined, timber traders in the area moved south to the Ribí region. Thomas Theophilus Caulker, chief of the territory to the south of the Ribí River, disputed the ownership of some portion of the timber producing area with Bokari Sila of Foredugu.¹ The dispute hampered the trade. Fitzjames appealed to Bai Kanta to use his good offices in restoring peace. And in August, 1859, three months after his installation, the new chief successfully pacified the two sides and a peace treaty was signed.²

But the Bai Kanta soon fell out with the Colony authorities. On March 9,³ 1861, Thomas Lefevre, a factor of Captain T.A. Townsend, a merchant on Tombo Island (ceded to the Crown in 1824 by Bai Mauro of Loko Mas̄ama), went to Foredugu, Koya, to purchase rice. There he abducted the wife of a Koya man called Pa Fosengbe. The following day Lefevre sent up a canoe to bring the rice to Tombo Island. Pa Fosengbe sent men to seize the canoe and the hands employed in it, selling one of them into slavery. And on the 13th he sent two war canoes belonging to one of the new ceremonial sub-chiefs, Naimbana, full of war men, to go and recover his wife and to punish Lefevre.

1. C.O. 267/264. Fitzjames to Newcastle, August, 20, 1859.

2. Ibid.

3. C.O. 267/270. Hill to Newcastle, Mar. 19, 1861. encl. Lefevre's letter (see also Lawson and Parkes ... pp.32-4).

The war men, on arrival on the Island, broke into the factory in charge of Lefevre and seized everything in it. Lefevre himself had to run into the bush to save his skin; and the war men returned to Koya with the seized articles. On March 16, Governor Hill wrote Bai Kanta ordering him to come to Freetown immediately, and to bring with him the principal parties "engaged in this wanton act of outrage and plunder";¹ that if the Bai failed to comply with his request he would "take such steps as yourself and people will deeply deplore".²

Bai Kanta hurriedly summoned a meeting of his chiefs to deliberate on the matter. This meeting was still on when emissaries from Hill, Captain A.T. Jones of the Second West Indian Regiment, and T.G. Lawson, the Government Interpreter, arrived at Magbeni (the meeting place) on March 17.³ Governor Hill had sent them, said Jones, to the Bai Kanta to complain about the outrage on British territory, and to demand redress. He would allow Bai Kanta and his chiefs no more than one hour within which to prepare their reply.⁴ Then he rowed up to Foredugu, a few miles up the Rokel River, to pay a courtesy call on Bokari Sila (who had not been invited to the Magbeni meeting) and while away the time.

1. Ibid. (encl. Letter to Bai Kanta).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. (encl. Jones' report).

4. Lawson and Parkes ... p.33.

In the meantime Bai Kanta had sent for Pa Fosengbe, who lived at Foredugu, and the warriors who took part in the attack on Tombo Island. Bokari Sila, acting on behalf of the Bai, invited Pa Fosengbe to his house to have him attend to the chief's call. Pa Fosengbe arrived at Bokari Sila's house while Jones was there, and behaved rudely towards them. Jones, offended, returned to Magbeni, demanded the chief's answer to his message; and when he was told they were not ready with the answer yet, he got into his boat and began to row back to Freetown. Some of the Temne warriors who had gathered at the Bai's request tried to stop the boat, but held back when Jones pulled out his revolver.

Jones' fury excited Hill's. And, now empowered to take military action on his own initiative,¹ he resolved to send an expedition against Koya people. The expedition² would proceed from Freetown on the 20th of March to Foredugu. It would comprise one captain, two subalterns, five sergeants, one bugler, and 124 rank and file of the Second West Indian Regiment. The garrison at Waterloo was to be reinforced immediately. The main object of the expedition would be to blockade the Rokel River "until the natives are taught to respect their treaties, and induced to deliver up the guilty parties".³

1. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.310.

2. C.O. 267/270. Hill to Newcastle, Mar. 19, 1861.

3. Ibid.

Hill sent to all the British subjects in Koya to remove their properties from that country. He also sent to warn the King and his people to remove their women and children from their towns (he did not say where to), "as I would certainly attack them".¹ He asked for and was assured of assistance from the four naval gunboats in harbour at that time.

On the 19th² of March, Bai Kanta, accompanied by two of his attendants who carried part of the property seized on Tombo Island, arrived in Freetown. He delivered the goods to the Governor, promised that the remainder would be returned as soon as they were recovered, and assured Hill that the war men involved in the outrage were on their way to be delivered to him as his prisoners. He pleaded that the matter be amicably settled. Hill accepted his apology, but imposed a fine of £500 on the chief and his people to cover the expenses to the Colony "consequent on the declaration of war."³

But Bai Kanta and his chiefs were in no position to raise such a large sum of money. So Hill suggested they leased a portion of Koya country in return for an annual rent of 2,000 bars (an equivalent of £100). Bai Kanta and his chiefs had no alternative but to agree, and once again another chunk of Koya territory was taken away from them.⁴ Hill made Bai Kanta and

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/270. Hill to Newcastle, Mar. 21, 1861.

3. C.O. 267/270. Hill to Newcastle, April 16, 1861.

4. See Treaty No.63, Art. I, Montagu, Ordinances ... for the extent of the territory involved.

his chiefs understand that they were merely leasing the land, but the treaty (signed on April 2, 1861) to which they were made to put their marks, made them "cede, surrender, give over, and transfer from henceforth forever"¹ their ownership over it.

Afterwards Hill wrote to the Colonial Office saying:² "The acquisition of this territory is most important as regards the interests of the Colony". It would put an end to the conflict between the Koya people and the settlers. The extended frontier would give a margin of safety to Waterloo. It would now be easier to control the trade on the Ribí River, and help in the suppression of the slave trade in that region. "In every point of view" Hill concluded, "I cannot but consider the Colony most fortunate in obtaining this territory on such easy terms".

But Koya people and their chiefs felt differently. For them it was a national disaster; and for Bai Kanta, installed under two years as the preserver of his country, and whose father had been disgraced 52 years before for the loss of the peninsula, it was a shattering and ignominious defeat. Koya people had become convinced long before 1861 that the real intention of the Colony was to take their country away from them, and they had done everything possible not to provide an excuse for its authorities. To them the Colony must have represented an embodiment of treachery and blackmail. They were bound to fight back.

1. Treaty No.63.

2. C.O. 267/270. Hill to Newcastle, April 16, 1861.

By June, 1861, Hill was already reporting that Bai Kanta and his chiefs were "playing false with this government and endeavouring ... to throw every obstacle in the way of peaceable possession being given of the portion of Quia ceded to the Queen".¹ He issued a stern warning to the principal chief, and withdrew the reinforcement he had sent to Waterloo during the preparations for the war, to assure him and his chiefs that the Colony meant to remain at peace with the natives.² Bai Kanta himself remained peaceful, but did not, and probably could not, do anything to arrest the worsening relations between his people and Colony traders among them.

Bokari Bomboli, one of his principal chiefs, led the dissident group. He attacked, captured, and plundered British subjects in Koya indiscriminately.³ He took some war men to Maquah, on the Ribí River (on the Koya side) attacked a factory belonging to a British trader, W.B. Jolly (from Dominica, West Indies) and plundered merchandise worth over £1,000. Hill sent to Bai Kanta asking him to restrain Bomboli, and to get him to return the plundered articles. But before Bai Kanta could contact him, he and his followers had attacked and ravaged other Colony merchants including those in the ceded portion, captured and sold several of them into slavery. He would lure British subjects into native Koya territory under the pretext of trade arrangements, then suddenly pounce on them and enslave them.

1. C.O. 267/270. Hill to Newcastle, June 11, 1861.

2. C.O. 267/270. Hill to Newcastle, July 16, 1861.

3. Lawson and Parkes ... p.34.

Towards the end of 1861 it became apparent that a showdown between the Colony and the Koya people would be inevitable, in the very near future. Colony authorities had become exasperated by persistent local outrages against their traders and residents both in the "native" and in the "ceded" Koya. The situation had been further exacerbated by the Colony's protective attitude towards the Loko refugees in the country.

A group of these Loko people, under their leader, Kegbana Bure (alias Songo), had settled in Songo Town area since the disruption of the Temme/Loko war. But there had never been any love lost between them and the Temme of Koya. The Loko had given assistance to the Kossos in the 1840/41 conflict. They had fought for the hated Bundu family during the disturbances of 1843 to 1845. And there had been several outbreaks of hostilities between the two groups. After the treaty of cession in April, 1861, which included Songo area in the Colony, Hill, noticing the general antipathy towards the Loko, gave Kegbana Bure a Union Jack to hoist and warned his Koya neighbours against molesting him and his followers.¹

But this preferential treatment only served to further embitter local feelings against the Loko, who, conscious of Colony concern about their well being, became arrogant and contemptuous towards their Koya neighbours, against whom a few of them adopted

1. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.310.

a deliberate provocative attitude. Native Koya people in the ceded portion of the country had been allowed by the treaty of April, 1861, "the full, entire, and free possession of the lands"¹ they held, but denied British citizenship or protection. So their hatred of the Loko fed on this British partiality. Many of Bokari Bomboli's captives were persons of Loko origin resident in the ceded portion of the country.² Each side watched the other for an opportunity to pick up a quarrel, and so justify an attack for plunder and enslavement.

Sori Romboe of Makoya,³ on the Ribi River, sent to collect an outstanding debt owed him by Kegbana Kangrag of Chokolo, near Songo Town. The Loko debtor picked up a quarrel over it. Romboe collected some men and attacked Chokolo on the morning of October 7, 1861,⁴ destroyed the village, and carried away fourteen of its inhabitants. But Chokolo was a British territory, and the captive Lokomen, unlike their Koya counterparts, were British subjects.

Hill, anxious for a royal medal, sent Lawson, the government interpreter, to Songo Town to investigate.⁵ He also sent a policeman to Pa Keni,⁶ the Ribi chief to whom Romboe gave the fourteen Loko captives, to demand the immediate release of those

1. Treaty No.63.

2. Lawson and Parkes ... p.34.

3. C.O. 267/271. Statement by Temba, Oct. 14, 1861. Enclosed in
Hill to Newcastle, Oct 17, 1861

4. Ibid. (Lawson's report).

5. C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle, Oct. 17, 1861.

6. Ibid.

British subjects. Captain Algernon Heneage, the commandant of a vessel of war - the "Falcon" - then in the Freetown harbour, offered to contact Thomas Theophilus Caulker, the principal ruler of Bompe/Ribi country, to get him to intervene on behalf of the Colony.¹ The "Falcon" sailed up the Ribi River, found Caulker weak and powerless; its commandant attempted to capture Pa Keni, but he bolted.² Some of the captives in the chief's stockade, however, managed to effect their escape,³ and Heneage satisfied himself by burning three of Pa Keni's villages and sailed away.

The Governor, apprehensive of greater danger, sent a company of troops to occupy and protect the newly acquired territory,⁴ which he had earlier informed the Colonial Office would serve to safeguard British subjects and interests. Koya people, seeing the Colony troops, took it to mean a declaration of war and attacked.⁵

The attack, which had been well planned, was swift and fierce, and seemed to have been aimed for a quick victory. Two columns of Koya warriors attacked two vulnerable fronts at the same time. One concentrated on the northern part of the ceded territory, that is, the Rokel River bank including some of the

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle. encl. Heneage's report, Nov. 4, 1861.

3. C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle. Nov. 12, 1861.

4. C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle. Nov. 21, 1861.

5. C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle. Dec. 13, 1861.

Islands, and within a few days had destroyed almost all the towns bordering on that river, and on the Islands involved, plundered all the Colony factories they came across and enslaved most of their inhabitants.¹

The other column attacked from the south,² that is, the Waterloo/Songo Town area, ravaged the area, destroying four of its important villages, including Songo Town. Hill called out the troops of the Second West Indian Regiment,³ and some of the Sierra Leone militia, about three hundred in number. These were joined by about two hundred native warriors in British Koya - Loko mainly - and about an equal number of armed inhabitants of Waterloo "of doubtful courage".⁴ Chief Gbanya of Senehun, a Kpa Mende sub-ruler in Bompe/Ribi district, also sent in war men to help the Colony. Hill gave instructions for a proper road to be cut linking Waterloo with Songo Town.⁵

Because Colony troops were concentrated in the south - first stationed at Madonkia, and later, at Waterloo, under Captain Jones of the West Indian Regiment - Koya attacks to the north went virtually unchallenged. But Hill quickly organised a naval counter attack,⁶ which he commanded himself. Koya warriors

1. G.I.L. memo by Lawson. Feb. 23, 1874.

2. Lawson and Parkes ... p.34. also C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle, Dec. 13, 1861.

3. C.O. 267/271. Hill to Newcastle, Dec. 13, 1861.

4. Ibid.

5. Lawson and Parkes ... p.35.

6. Lawson and Parkes ... p.34.

withdrew in the face of Hill's rockets, and the Governor retaliated by destroying all the Koya towns and villages between Rogbaneh and Foredugu. The only town where Hill met any resistance was Robaga, the sacred and ceremonial Koya town, which the people defended spiritedly, killing four marines and wounding many more, including the pilot. But the defenders lost ground gradually, and were eventually scattered, and this ancient and most revered town was razed to the ground.

Koya warriors, driven from the north, moved south to join their compatriots. An attack planned on Songo Town was foiled by Kegbana Bure who quickly sent to Captain Jones (still at Madonkia) for help.¹ Jones arrived to find that the invading Koya warriors had withdrawn. Disappointed, he pursued them as far as the Ribí River, 25 miles away, without sighting a single one of them. On his return march Pa Keni ambushed his men, killed one and wounded another. Some of his men, however, told Jones they killed 30 of the enemy.

Then the Koya built a strongly fortified war fence at Masogo on the north bank of Waterloo (formerly Bunce) Creek,² to cut off the most important line of communication between the Colony troops and Freetown. A combined naval and military assault from Freetown arrived to find the war fence deserted, and burnt it down. The Koya gave up vulnerable Masogo and built a stronger

1. The full report on the Koya Expedition is contained in C.O. 267/273. see report under date Dec. 7, 1861.

2. Koya Expedition. report under date Dec. 14, 1861.

war fence at Madonkia,¹ on the ruins of the abandoned Colony camp (which had now been removed to healthier and easily defensible Waterloo) right in the centre of the ceded portion of the country, and on the newly completed military road linking Waterloo and Songo Town. Kgbana Bure had, with the assistance of about 300 Mende warriors, tried to storm that war fence, but had been driven back by the Koya.

This Koya concentration was so formidable that Major William Hill, the commander of the Second West Indian Regiment, decided to lead the assault himself.² He marched on this war fence on December 18, 1861, with 200 men of the West Indian Regiment, 20 of the Sierra Leone militia, and 100 Mende irregulars from Waterloo. The Koya put up a fierce fight but proved no match for Colony shells and rockets. They withdrew carrying their dead and injured with them as usual. Mende irregulars pulled the fence down and set it on fire. Colony loss was put at one killed, Major Hill seriously wounded, and five others wounded. Koya casualties it was impossible to estimate.

But the Koya were still far from giving up. On December 21,³ about 300 of them launched a devastating assault on Songo Town, very early in the morning. The irregular troops put on guard had not noticed their approach. They forced open the town gates and had entered the town before the alarm was raised.

1. Koya Expedition. report under date Dec. 20, 1861.

2. Ibid.

3. Koya Expedition. report under date Jan. 15, 1862.

Lieutenant Brett, the officer in charge of the small detachment in Songo Town, quickly organised its defence, and sent to Waterloo for reinforcement (which arrived too late). The attack lasted two hours and casualties were heavy on both sides. The Koya withdrew before reinforcements could arrive from Waterloo.

In the meantime a section of them had returned to Madonkia¹ to rebuild the stockade there, but this time without the war fence. The aim seems to be mainly strategic - to divert the attention of the Colony troops. The few Mende irregulars, who were left to report on Koya movements in that area, sent to inform Captain Jones in Waterloo. Jones, itching for action, marched against the stockade on December 28. But there were no Koya warriors in sight, they had withdrawn to Masanki, he was informed. He burnt the stockade down, and hurried after them, to find that there were no Koya warriors anywhere near Masanki at all. Someone informed him they might be hiding at Mafil, a few miles off; and so Jones ordered his men in that direction. At Mafil they found "great preparations for stockading"² but no enemy in sight. Disappointed, he marched his troops on Ribitown, on Ribit River, where they found the inhabitants busily engaged about their domestic work. To keep his troops happy, Jones ordered them to fire some of their rockets into the town, which was soon "enveloped in flames".³

1. Koya Expedition. report under date Dec. 29, 1861.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

The only buildings left unburnt were the two sacred, ceremonial houses in the centre of the town, which were sufficiently isolated to be unaffected. But even these Jones had burnt and totally destroyed before leaving the town. As the soldiers were marching out of the town, the town's people, who had taken shelter in their sacred bush, fired, killed one Sierra Leone militia and wounded two others. This attack provided an opportunity for the soldiers to get rid of more of the heavy rockets they had not been able to use, and large numbers were fired into the bush. Major Hill in his report to the Governor, commented on the gallantry and the outstanding bravery of his men in the face of the mighty odds that confronted them!

Early in January, 1862,¹ information reached Captain Jones at Waterloo that the Koya were building a stockade on the ruins of Jolly's factory at Maquah, on the Ribbi River, which Bokari Bomboli had plundered and destroyed in the early part of 1861. Jones passed the information on to his commander at Freetown, Major Hill, who, having sufficiently recovered from the wounds he received from the expedition against Madonkia, and eager for more action, hurriedly organised a naval expedition, only to discover that no stockade was being built at Maquah at all.

The expedition then sailed about ten miles further up the river to a factory belonging to another Colony trader, Charles Heddle, to ensure that everything was alright. Here they were informed that there were two strongly fortified towns, Mafengbe

1. Koya Expedition. report under date Jan. 20, 1862.

and Majohn, further up the river, both belonging to the Bundu family at Foredugu "a chief engaged in hostility against us."¹ Major Hill instructed Captain Jones, who accompanied the expedition, to have those two towns destroyed. Jones, accompanied by William Heneage, the commandant in charge of the gunboats, took a few gunboats and razed the two towns to the ground without meeting any resistance; the inhabitants having fled into the nearby bushes for shelter.

But on their return journey the gunboats were suddenly fired upon from both sides of the river bank. Three men were killed, and fourteen wounded, including Heneage. Major Hill, however, decided that the natives had been given sufficient punishment, and ordered the expedition to continue on their journey without retaliating. Back in Freetown he once again sent a glowing report to the Governor on the gallant conduct of his officers and men.

After the destruction of Mafengbe and Majohn, Koya people seem to have decided that it was futile to continue the struggle. On the 18th of January, 1862, they sued for peace.² And on the 22nd they assembled in Freetown for a peace treaty.³ On the 24th, Governor Hill presented them with the terms on which he proposed to base the peace treaty.⁴ All the war fences and

1. Ibid. It was not true that the Bundu family were engaged in hostility against the Colony. In fact the family were very friendly towards the Colony, for they needed Colony support to counter local hostility.

2. C.O. 267/273. Hill to Newcastle. Jan. 18, 1862.

3. Ibid.

4. Treaty No. 69. Montagu op. cit.

stockades in Koya country must be pulled down immediately. Those Koya people still resident on the ceded territory must undertake to render themselves amenable to British authority, or quit at once. It was to be realized that any unfriendliness towards the Loko people in the ceded portion of the country would be regarded as unfriendliness towards the Queen's government. Alexander Bai Kanta must quit his royal town of Robaga for it now belonged, through conquest, to the Colony of Sierra Leone. All country customs and sacrifices must cease "for ever" in British Koya. And the principal chief, Bai Kanta, would forfeit his stipend "until the expenses of the War are made good".¹

The peace treaty was signed on February 1, 1862. Koya chiefs promised faithfully to abstain from any hostile action against the Colony, and to hand over any of their own people who might commit an offence on British territory to be punished according to the laws of the Colony. They would protect British persons and properties in their country, and hand over to the Colony authorities any British subject who broke any country law for trial. This peace treaty, ratified in April, 1862, marked the beginning of the end of Koya as an independent, sovereign state.

It is perhaps not surprising, but certainly paradoxical, that the Koya Temme, the group of native Africans most closely

1. Ibid. Total expenditure on the war amounted to £3,724.15s.8d. see C.O. 267/273. Hill to Newcastle, Mar. 20, 1862.

connected with the Colony of Sierra Leone should have been the most disastrously affected by its establishment. Intoxicated by their own sense of moral superiority, Colony authorities and officials, on the whole, right from the start, felt nothing but utter contempt for Koya people in particular, and the Temne in general.

From the 1820s, when caravans from the interior - from the Islamic State of Futa Jalon in particular - began to arrive in Freetown, the idea had gradually come to gain credence - mainly from the flashy appearance and the impressive erudition of the Muslim traders that came to the Colony - that the farther inland, the more civilized the people became. Laing, in 1822,¹ described the Temne as "depraved, licentious, indolent and avaricious." "The character of a Timannee man" he went on, "is almost proverbial in West Africa for knavery and indisposition to honest labour; and of a Timannee woman for dishonesty". He blamed this state of affairs on "the long prevalence in their country, of that detestable trade [i.e. slave trade] which strikes at the root of industry, destroys the bonds of social order, and even extinguishes the most powerful natural feelings."

Official arrogance and disdain set the pattern of behaviour for the generality of settlers including the Liberated Africans, and made sympathetic understanding of Koya problems virtually impossible. The unyieldingly legalistic attitude of the distant

1. A.G. Laing, Travels ... p.85.

Colonial Office further confused the situation. And Koya people must have found Colony inconsistencies most puzzling. They seem to have regarded it as a mark of disrespect, which they resented immensely.

But Koya attitude towards the Colony itself was often not very easy to reconcile. They had lamented the loss of the peninsula in 1807, but blamed their chiefs for it. The abolition of the slave trade had hit them directly, and, no doubt disastrously, but they refrained from taking any reprisals against the Colony for fear it might provide an excuse for further encroachment on their lands. Yet Pa Kakonko (London) was prepared to cede more of Koya territory to the Colony in 1819 in return for an annual rent of only 50 bars.

They resented the pride and pomposity of the Colony traders and residents among them, yet the last thing they wished was for them to leave their country, for they welcomed the highly prized European luxuries like rum, tobacco, and other manufactured goods which they obtained only through them, since the slave traders, who brought these things in the earlier years, could no longer operate in their country. They resented Colony encroachments and were apprehensive of the Colony's growing power, yet they were secretly proud of being the landlords of such powerful and important strangers.

They very jealously guarded their own independence and sovereignty, but at the same time envied Colony residents among them for the higher social status their connection with the white-man's world conferred on them. Their dislike of the Kossob

Liberated Africans fed partly on this envy. In fact it seems that, given the chance, many Koya chiefs and people would have willingly surrendered their country altogether to become part of the Colony if only they could be assured of retaining their domestic servants.

The one Colony official whom Koya people loved, admired and trusted was John McCormack. McCormack had lived and worked among the Temne for many years. He spoke their language and understood and respected their customs. And unlike most Colony officials of his time, he found the people industrious, hard-working and reliable. But, as a devout christian, he deplored their idolatry, and fondly hoped that they would be receptive to christian ideas. This was why he was so antipathetic towards Muslim influences among the people, particularly as represented by the Sanko family of Port Loko, the Modu family of the Bulom Shore, and the Bundu family at Foredugu.

McCormack's understanding of Temne problems and politics was unsurpassed throughout the nineteenth century; not even by that of T.G. Lawson, his one-time ward, and Government Interpreter during the second half of the century. For, unlike Lawson, who married the daughter of Bai Farma III and so was personally involved in the Koya (Temne) politics, McCormack had no axe to grind. Further, he was not as committed to the administration in Freetown as Lawson was.

But McCormack was the only friend Koya people had during the

period under review - and a friend in a very minor official capacity at that. Weak, poor, and made to feel insignificant, they watched the Colony take away or destroy most of the things they cherished - things that were dear and sacred to them. And, powerless to resist effectively, their feeling of defeat and frustration must have been great. It is no wonder that they eventually rejected most of the vaunted ideas the Colony claimed to have stood for.

CHAPTER VTRADE AND POLITICS ON THE ROKEL RIVER, 1828-1884PART I

Controlling as it is the lower and navigable reaches of the Scarries, the Port Loko Creek, and the Rokel River, the territory of the northern and western Temne was of immense importance in the development of inland trade in Sierra Leone. All the major routes to the interior took a north-eastern direction which, though hilly, was only partially forested and so afforded a relatively easy access to the interior.¹ From Timbuctu, Bamako, Segu, Kankan, through the nodal points of Siguri and Faranah, via the principal inland centres like Timbo, Musaia, Bumban, and Samaia, caravans brought local produce, collecting more on the way, with which to trade and barter at the tide-water coastal Temne towns and trading centres like Kambia, Mange, Port Loko, and Magbeli.

Caravans had used some of these routes long before the 19th century, possibly as far back as before the period of the Atlantic Slave Trade. And the coastal tribes; Temne (the dominant one) Bulom and Sherbro, had become entrenched in their position as middlemen long before the period under review. These coastal peoples would collect from the European firms and trading depots on the coast their manufactured goods like knives, looking

1. P.K. Mitchell, "Trade Routes of the early Sierra Leone Protectorate", S/L Stud. n.s. xvi, June 1962, pp.204-217.

glasses, firearms, cotton goods and other goods of popular demand like tobacco and rum, and barter these for the gold, ivory, pepper, camwood, slaves and so on, brought to the tide-water coastal towns by the peoples of the interior. These middlemen very jealously guarded their privileged position, and did all they could to prevent direct contact between the European traders on the coast and the various peoples in the hinterland.

This arrangement suited the early European traders, the slave traders in particular, for it saved them the trouble of having to go into the less healthy and dangerous interior. Besides, they were not prepared to risk offending the coastal middlemen on whom they depended so heavily for the success of their trade. By the last quarter of the 18th century, however, things began to assume a different outlook. This last quarter of the 18th century witnessed the beginning of a revolutionary movement in Western Europe. It was an age which saw a new trend, a new philosophic radicalism, in men's outlook on social, political, and economic matters. The year (1776) that Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" was published was the year of the American Declaration of Independence. The age of Democracy had dawned, an age that spoke of "citizens" rather than "subjects". And the French Revolution of 1789 gave an added pungency to that new spirit.

There arose a wide section of people impossible to define precisely "who felt for the world around them a curiosity that at its most pointed could be reckoned scholarly".¹ It was from

1. Robin Hallett, Records of the African Association, 1788-1831.
Edin. 1964, p.8.

this group that later emerged the overlapping group loosely referred to as the "humanitarian" - abolitionists, evangelists, philanthropists - "the source of that movement of liberal interest" in the "dark continent" whose prescription for the solution of Africa's ills consisted in the introduction of the three Cs - Christianity, Commerce (legitimate) and Civilization - into that distracted continent. The new spirit of Evangelicalism that broke forth, with its self-regarding doctrine which taught that the first duty of man was to concentrate upon his own salvation, harmonised well with the habits and motives of the new age of Industrialism.¹

The African Continent about which very little was as yet known apart from tales gathered mostly from Arab traders who spoke about some wealthy African kingdoms in the Sudan, and of a great river (the Niger) on which stood an ancient university city called Timbuctu, began to excite European interest. Romance was in the air; these tales began to rouse European enthusiasm and exploration, and to excite considerable speculation about the commercial possibilities such an exploration might yield. European traders on the coast began to find ways of establishing contact with the hinterland. This in a way was in response to the desire of the peoples of the interior. But it was strenuously opposed by the African middlemen on the coast who saw nothing but ruin for them in such a development.

1.R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, London, 1926, p.172.

The Colony in Freetown, founded in 1787, and intended as a base for spreading what its founders called the "blessings of industry and civilization" to the other parts of West Africa, necessarily interested itself in the encouragement of contact with the peoples of the interior. The river trade routes were envisaged as a venue for the spread of these blessings. Also, right from the time it was established, the Colony relied heavily on the peoples of the hinterland for the supply of its essential needs. They, as well as the European traders on the coast, also heard stories about the fabulous riches of the Sudanic States and all these increased the desire to establish direct contact with those regions.

As the 18th century progressed, so did the competition increase among the various African groups near the coast for the political and commercial control of the tide-water trading centres. The Susu had dominated Port Loko region since the latter part of the 18th century. The Temne first turned against them and expelled them from Port Loko in 1816. They then drove the Loko away from the Rokel and elsewhere. Later on they became jealous of the growing importance of the Bundu family in Foredugu and attempted to expel them from the Rokel trade. The various Temne groups also fought among themselves for many years for the control of, or share in, the prosperous trade on the Rokel. Also as the 19th century wore on, the Colony in Freetown became more and more dependent upon the trade on the Rokel river; and any disturbance

on this river was bound to affect the Colony. Many creole traders settled among the Temne for trading purposes, and they looked to the authorities in Freetown for protection against the hostility (for which, in most cases, they were to blame) of some of their hosts.

Most of the 19th century wars in the northern and western Temne territories, therefore, assumed not only political, but also a deep economic significance. And throughout the hectic years of the 19th century, the most troubled Temne region was the Rokel River area. From 1828 to 1884, this region knew very little peace.

Basic to the popularity (or notoriety?) of this route, as Mitchell¹ pointed out, is the unique navigability of its middle reaches. From Benkia, a distance of about 135 miles from Freetown the river becomes navigable, first to small canoes, and further down from Magbeli, a distance of about 40 miles from Freetown, to larger vessels. So that the route provided a very convenient outlet for the groundnuts, palm-kernels, rice, palm-oil, camwood, and so on, of the Temne of Marampa-Masimera, Malal, Kolifa, Bombali, Kuniike and Yoni (to a lesser extent); and also of the Kono further to the east, of the Kpa Mende to the south-east, and of the Koranko to the north-east. So, therefore, the success of the Rokel trade depended not only on the peace and security of the navigable portion of the river, but also on the peace and security of the areas of supply.

1. Mitchell, op.cit., p.213.

Trade on the Rokel in the 19th century centred mainly on three major towns on the lower navigable reaches of the river - Rokon, Rokel and Magbeli. And these towns owed their rise and importance to trade. Rokon, founded in the later half of the eighteenth century by Gumbu Smart,⁺ the Loko slave, later factor, of the English slave traders on the Bunce Island, had grown rapidly from trade (particularly in slaves) over the years. By the beginning of the nineteenth century this town had become the leading commercial centre of Masimera country. Success in trade gave it a dominating influence over the politics of the area; but roused the jealousy of the indigenous inhabitants (the Temne) against Smart and his followers (Loko by origin), who controlled the trade. This jealousy was to flare up into open hostility in the third decade of the nineteenth century, and to result in the attempted and virtually successful total expulsion of the Loko from Masimera.

Both Rokel and Magbeli owed their foundations to enterprising Marampa adventurers in search of trade.¹ Since the arrival of Gumbu Smart at Rokon in the later part of the eighteenth century, trade in that region had prospered immensely. Officials of the newly established Colony in Freetown maintained close contact with Smart, whom they hoped would assist in spreading the "blessings of industry and civilization" in that part of Africa. And prominent among these blessings was the development of what the founders of the Colony called "legitimate commerce" (i.e. trade

1. Oral Tradition: Peki, S.B. + See chap. 2 . pp. 46-54; chap. 3 . pp. 95, 97-9.

in the natural produce of the country). So Smart traded "legitimately" with the Colony, but continued his "illegitimate" trade (i.e. trade in slaves) with the slave traders on the coast.

This connection with the Colony introduced new dimensions into the commercial life of the region, and increased opportunities for trade in other commodities. It also induced greater desire for local participation. The group of Marampa settlers who became the founders of these two towns had been sent by their chiefs¹ to establish a centre similar to that of the river-head town of Rokon, where they could organise, and share in, the trade of their own particular part of the region.

The group that set out from Marampa town included Pa Kelboi, an outstanding hunter, as leader, Pa Kegbele, an ambitious young man who had had his eyes on the Bai Rampa chieftaincy (the name by which "Bai Koblo" was known originally) for some time, but whose age and position in the ruling house (to which he belonged) made his chances of ever succeeding to that title very remote, and Bai Rank, another important member of one of the Kabia clan (the owners of Marampa). Pa Kelboi, accompanied by two of his eight sons, who acted as his attendants, followed, roughly, the course of the Rokel River on the Marampa side.

According to Temne customary practice,² one of three conditions usually prevailed before a settlement could be established on any particular site. One was that, on the last stage of an

1. Ibid.

2. Oral Tradition: Bangura, B.Y., Peki, S.B.

emigration (which was usually completed overnight), emigrants must carry a white cock with them. Wherever this cock first crew, there the settlement must be established. However, as occasionally happened, if emigrants shot an elephant or a leopard on the way, the spot where this animal was finally overpowered and killed, was the destined site for a settlement. On very rare occasions, too, emigrants came across a Devil (as the spirits of the Sierra Leone Secret Societies are called), and such Devil often gave them instructions as to the exact location of a settlement.

For Marampa adventurers it was the killing of an elephant¹ that determined the present site of Rokel and, indirectly, of Magbeli. Pa Kelboi shot an elephant a few miles from the present site of Magbeli, and the party pursued the wounded animal to a point where it was forced to cross the river (which tradition says was much narrower then than it is today) to Masimera country. Here it was eventually overpowered and killed at the present site of Rokel town.

The settlement, named Rokel in honour of its leader-founder, Pa Kelboi,² grew rapidly, and prospered from trade. The settlers

1. Oral Tradition: Peki, S.B.

2. Ibid. However, according to Lawson and Parkes (op.cit., p.28) "Rokel" means a place of fish scales; so named because of the large amount of fish scales left on the bank of the river where the town now stands by a Marampa fisherman. My own recordings support this large scale fishing theory. In fact it is possible that the name "Rokel River", which has now superceded the old name "Seli", derives from this widespread fishing up and down the river.

also did a lot of fishing.¹ But it failed to satisfy the hopes and ambitions of its Kabia founders, who had anticipated a tide-water trading centre of their own, where they and the other peoples of the northern bank of the river could bring their produce for sale; and collect rents from strangers who might settle in their country for trading purposes.

The Kabia settlers, unhappy about the situation, sought help from a Devil.² The Devil instructed that the people cross over to the other side of the river, directly opposite the settlement at Rokel, for on that spot lay the prosperity of Marampa people. So a number of the settlers at Rokel moved to the other side of the river to found the town now known as Magbeli. The new settlement was named after Pa Kegbele, Pa Kelboi's second in command; although by this time Pa Kegbele himself had returned to Marampa on the instructions of a Devil (Koblo by name) which had promised to help him become the ruler of Marampa in future provided he would change the chieftaincy title from Bai Rampa to Bai Koblo, after himself.³

The settlement at Magbeli grew rapidly by the addition of many more settlers from Marampa itself, and various other parts of the northern Temne territory. But Rokel was never totally abandoned, for there the elephant had been slain. Many people

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Oral Tradition: Peki, S.B., Kabia, C. There had been nine (9) Bai Rampas in the chieftdom before Kegbele became chief perhaps early in the 19th century. The present Bai Koblo is said to be the 32nd bearer of that title.

joined the settlement, attracted mainly by trade. Important among these later settlers was Pa Ansumana Fonike, a Mori-man from Sankara, who had been invited by the Bai Simera to make charms for him. After the completion of the work, the Bai made him an Alimami and gave him Rokel to rule. Pa Alimami Fonike became the founder of a line of Alimamis that has ruled Rokel until today.¹

At Magbeli, after the death of Pa Kelboi, the settlers sent to Marampa, to the ruler of the chiefdom, to ask that they be given their own chieftain who would rule that section of the chiefdom as a sub-chief under the Bai Rampa.² At that time the Bai Suba chieftaincy, held originally by the Sankos of Masuba (in Marampa chiefdom) was in abeyance, having been withdrawn from its holders for insubordination. So it was given to Magbeli settlers; and Pa Kewende, the eldest son of Pa Kelboi, became the first Bai Suba of Magbeli. Kewende ruled for 19 years, and by the time he died (perhaps early 1820s), the Bai Suba, the controller of the chiefdom's port, and so trade, had become very powerful indeed. Trade in legitimate produce (which had received tremendous boost since the abolition of the slave trade in 1807) - particularly in camwood - had become well established by this time. Many strangers had settled in Magbeli for trading purposes. Rokel

1. Oral Tradition: Sise, A.L.

2. Oral Tradition: Peki, S.B.

region by 1824 was already producing, on the average, 100 tons of camwood per year.¹ Caravans from the interior, bringing ivory, gold, and cattle, had started arriving at Magbeli to the great benefit of the local rulers who collected the rents and taxes.

Because of the importance now attached to the Bai Suba, when Kewende died, the new ruler of the chiefdom, Pa Kegbele - now Bai Koblo - secretly installed one of his own brothers, Tikla Modu, as the new Bai Suba.² But Magbeli people, particularly the family of Pa Kelboi, rejected him and refused to co-operate with him; but they could not depose him because he had already gone through the installation ceremonies. However, with the co-operation of his people withheld from him, he remained neither as well-to-do nor as powerful as his predecessor. As a punishment for Magbeli people he took the sacred things of the chieftaincy to Freetown (Ro Camp), and hid them there, so that when he died it was impossible to instal a new Bai Suba.³ However, a daughter of Pa Runiabana's (one of Pa Kelboi's sons), who was then staying in Freetown, succeeded in recovering those sacred objects; and Pa Sori Nekon, who had helped in the recovery of these objects was, in appreciation of his efforts, made the Bai Suba under the title of Bai Suba Tapakon. This man reigned for a very long time and died in the early 1880s.

1. C.O. 267/60. Henry Williams (Bunce Island) to Actg. Gov. Hamilton. July 13, 1824.

2. Oral Tradition: Peki, S.B.

3. Ibid.

Magbeli was by far the most important trading centre on the Rokel River throughout the period under review. As the meeting point for coastal and inland traders, it was the most flourishing market on the Rokel. Inland traders brought their produce to this trading centre where the middlemen, mostly Temne, bought them cheaply, and sold or bartered them highly for European manufactured goods, which, in turn, these inland traders bought highly from the middlemen. So the middlemen enjoyed the best of both worlds. They tried hard to discourage the inland peoples from having direct contact with the European and Colony traders on the coast, for such contact would ruin their business. Also, Magbeli was the farthest point European traders were allowed freely to go, on similar grounds.

Because of its attractive commercial situation Magbeli drew the attention of all the powerful rulers in the region, and they competed with one another for the control of this prosperous trading centre. Nominally under the rule of the Bai Suba who was the most important chief in Marampa country after the Bai Koblo, by the early 19th century both Bai Suba and Bai Koblo were under the control of rival powers outside the country. Major Laing¹ reported in 1822 that the then Bai Koblo, old and well-beloved by his people, "exercised his authority under the direction of two clever Mandingoes [Susos, most likely] named Tiakade Nodoo and Fatima Brimah; the latter a relative of Brimah Konkorie" who was

1. A.G. Laing, Travels in the Timannee, Kooranko and Soolimana Countries in West Africa, London, 1822, p.76.

killed in 1816 by Alikali Moruba Kindo of Port Loko in the Temne/Susu war.

Rankin¹ reported in 1834 that "the town of Magbeli is one of Alikalie's acquisitions [i.e. Alikali Fatima Brima], and his usurped authority is maintained by the residences of his most warlike and influential relations". The restriction placed on European traders wishing to go beyond Magbeli was rigidly enforced upon all "lest a knowledge of the resources of the country, particularly of its camwood forests should attempt to conquest or fraud".² Magbeli itself was a fortified town hidden from sight at a distance of only "a few yards."

Rankin had an interview with Bai Suba Tapakon, who simply asked for news from Ro-Camp (i.e. Freetown) and the price of camwood. The chief was a little uneasy and wanted to know why Rankin was desiring to go to the interior. "I assured him I was no merchant" says Rankin, "and found that the assurance gained for me respect and confidence, as relieving me from suspicion of roguery".³ Later in the 19th century, the Temne were to fight for many years among themselves for the control of, or share in, the prosperous trade of this most important commercial and strategic point.

Rankin also visited the ruler of Rokel town on the opposite bank of the river, Pa Alimami Kaba, son and successor of Pa Alimami

1. F.H. Rankin, The White Man's Grave ... 2 vols. London, 1836, vol. 11, pp.235-251.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Fonike, and cousin of the Alikali of Port Loko, Fatima Brimah. Pa Alimami Kaba, "a gentle old man", spoke five languages - Temne, Susu, Fula, English and French - fluently, even though "he had not been in the whiteman's settlement for forty years", and "held his accomplishments lightly".¹ No doubt there would have been many like him who could speak those languages equally fluently, for these (French to a lesser extent) were the languages of the major trading nations on the Rokel, which a successful middleman would have had to understand for his business transactions. Alimami Kaba got involved in the Sebeti/Alikali war of the 1830s, and had to fly from his town, which was ruled by Kunto Moru during his period of exile.²

As the nineteenth century progressed, so did the trade on the Rokel River flourish, and so did local competition and jealousies intensify. Political rivalries set in, and open hostilities flared up much to the detriment of the trade in the area. From the 1820s the Administration in Freetown, realising the importance of the growing trade on this river (and Magbeli in particular) became very anxious that the trade be undisturbed.

The first serious upheaval on the Rokel in the nineteenth century, began with the outbreak of the Temne/Loko war in 1828. The Temne of Masimera, jealous of, and dissatisfied with, the family of Gumbu Smart at Rokon, rose against them, with the support

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

of the Alikali of Port Loko, and decided to drive them out of the Rokel altogether. This war lasted intermittently until 1836.

By the beginning of 1830 the conflict was already producing very serious effects on the timber trade.¹ In January, 1830, 6,000 tons of shipping was held up by the war. Acting Governor Fraser sent Messrs. Campbell and Gabbidon, merchants and members of Council, to intervene, restore peace, and get trade going again. But the war continued.

In September, 1831,² Alexander Findlay, now Governor, sent commissioners to meet the chiefs involved at Magbeli for a peace treaty. The treaty,³ concluded on September 23, 1831, among other provisions, bound the chiefs "not to commence hostilities one against the other, upon any pretence whatsoever". The Sierra Leone government on its part undertook to provide the necessary arms and ammunition should the territory of any of the chiefs be invaded by enemies from outside. Because Magbeli was now such "a great mart of trade" its ruler, the Bai Suba, "shall be considered under the special protection" of the contracting parties, whose consent (including that of the Governor of Sierra Leone), must be obtained in any new elections. Caravans and other traders passing through or residing in the Rokel shall also be given full protection. In return for the observance of these stipulations the

1. C.O. 267/102. Fraser to Murray. Jan, 23, 1830.

2. C.O. 267/110. Findlay to Hay. Nov. 10, 1831.

3. Treaty No.21. Sept. 23, 1831. Montagu, op.cit.

chiefs ~~shall~~ be entitled to yearly stipends to be paid in June every year.

But the peace treaty failed to secure lasting peace on the Rokel; for the Alikali/Sebeti war - a continuation of the Temne/Loko war which began on the Rokel in 1828 - broke out in 1834, and once again threw the Rokel into chaos. The war lasted until 1836, and was the immediate cause of Governor H.D. Campbell's visit to the Rokel (Magheli) that year.

Campbell, a retired army officer, had become the Governor of Sierra Leone ~~since~~ⁱⁿ February, 1835. Petty, vindictive, and extremely naive, he "sought pre-eminence in every department",¹ and was passionately imbued with a desire to be what he called "the humble instrument of introducing civilization and extirpating slavery"² in this part of Africa. Having antagonised many of his subordinate officials in the administration with his vindictive vituperations, Campbell turned to the African chiefs for succour and for the adoration his pettiness failed to secure for him in the Colony. So he welcomed enthusiastically the representations of the Colony traders for his intervention in the Temne/Loko war on the Rokel.

True to the Colony tradition which regarded the Mandinka Muslims as "a polished, sensible and acute race of men",³ the chief he chose for ally and close friend was Alimami Dala Modu,⁺ of the powerful Muslim Susu family of Bulom Shore. The founder

1. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.198.

2. C.O. 267/149. Campbell to Glenelg. May 19, 1838.

3. C.O. 267/25. Thompson to Castlereagh. Feb. 17, 1809.

+ See Chap. 3. pp. 108, 115.

of this family, Fenda Modu, the head of a powerful Mandinka family at Wonkafong (Susu country), had visited Freetown in 1794, and had been favourably impressed by what he saw.¹ His son, Dala Modu, a successful trader resident on the Isles de Los, came with about fifty followers to settle in the Colony. Tradition says he joined the Colony army and earned a pension.² He fought for the Colony when it was attacked by the Koya Temne in 1801/2. But in 1806 he was accused of slave trading and turned out of the Colony. He took his people over to Lungi (Medina), Kaffu Bulom, as "strangers" of the Bai Sherbro, its ruler.

On the Bulom Shore, Dala Modu entrenched himself and soon superseded even his overlord, the Bai Sherbro. His wide connections further enhanced his influence;³ as a chief of the Isles de Los, he was party to its cession to Britain in 1818, and acted as agent for the payment of the annual rent on behalf of the other chiefs of the ceded territory. As a chief of the Sumbia Susu country, he also took part in the cession of Matakong Island to Britain in 1826. He sent some of his followers to go and settle in Loko Masama, to maintain his influence in that country. And when its chief, Bai Mauro, died in 1832, he got himself appointed custodian of the dead chief's children and property; and overseer of the chiefdom itself until a new chief could be

1. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.89.

2. J. de Hart, "Notes on the Susu Settlement at Lungeh, Bullom Shore", S/L Stud. o.s. April, 1926, (pp.40-62) p.42.

3. de Hart, op.cit., p.43.

installed.¹ He competed successfully in the timber trade (as agent of the Macaulay and Babington) against other Colony agents, employing his many slaves in the felling and preparation of the logs.² He also traded extensively with the Colony, particularly in rice - the best the Colony obtained.³

But Dala Modu, a great slave trader, was not popular at all with Colony authorities, among whom he was regarded, in spite of (or because of) his great success, as a worthless character. However Campbell, looking for an African ally and admirer, decided to pay him a visit. And accompanied by Captain Popham of the Royal Navy,⁴ he went to the Bulom Shore to find that "instead of the Blood Thirsty Monster" Dala Modu had been made out to be in the Colony, he was, in actual fact, "a remarkably fine middle aged man of good address and splendidly attired ... extremely intelligent and shrewd". His general information surprised Campbell, and his knowledge of the Colony, and of the character of some of the individuals in it "proved astonishing".⁵

Campbell found Dala Modu "perfectly up to the whole system at Sierra Leone", and his attitude towards the Colony itself one of "great contempt."⁶ Together, the two of them planned to bring the Temne/Loko war on the Rokel to an end. Dala Modu undertook

1. Ibid.

2. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.153.

3. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, p.560. (Campbell's Evidence).

4. Ibid.

5. C.O. 267/132. Campbell to Glenelg. July 11, 1836.

6. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, p.560.

to precede the Governor to Magbeli to help gather the local chiefs for a peace settlement. Campbell formally recognised him as the regent of Loko Masama (where the chieftaincy was still in abeyance), which position gave him virtual control of the whole of Bulom Shore; and restored the stipend paid to the late Bai Mauro, which was suspended a year before the chief died, on the ground that the chief had tampered with the trade of his country by placing "a Poro" on it, and Dala Modu collected it as regent.¹

Dala Modu undertook to continue the practice he had been following for some time of retaining his domestic servants on his farms to grow the "legitimate" produce for Freetown market, rather than sell them into slavery. He also allied himself with the Colony traders helping them collect their debts.² Campbell set out on his mission to the Rokel on March 21, 1836, arriving at Magbeli on the 23rd. Magbeli had recently been burnt by Loko attackers and the Governor had to manage in a house without a door.³

Apart from the Loko rehabilitation problem, the local chiefs and headmen who assembled at Magbeli with Governor Campbell tried to work out some positive practical solution to the perpetual strife on the Rokel. These various chiefs and headmen accepted full responsibility for maintaining peace and order in the areas

1. Treaty No.22, April 8, 1836. Montagu, op.cit.

2. C.O. 267/149. Campbell to Glenelg, May 19, 1838.

3. C.O. 267/132. Campbell to Glenelg, May 2, 1836.

under their immediate jurisdiction, and these areas were set out quite unmistakably on paper.¹

Bai Koblo of Marampa, Bai Fonti of Ro-Mendi, Alikali of Port Loko, Chief Lanselly and Masa Packy, both of Bombali, and the King of Malal, all undertook to keep the road and river routes to Fula country by way of Mendi, Bombali and Woosey (in Limba Country) open. Bai Suba of Magbeli was entrusted with the road from Magbeli to Mendi and Port Loko. Alimami Kaba of Rokel was to keep open his own portion of the river and also the road from Rokel to Mahera and Masimera. Alimami Dala Modu was to ensure that the road from Rokon, of which he was now appointed chief by Campbell, to Masimera and Mahera was safe and secure.

Mohammadu Bundu of Foredugu was entrusted with the road from Foredugu to Mahera and from there to Waterloo in the Colony; and also the Creeks and rivers in his district. Bai Simera of Masimera was charged with the safety of the roads and rivers in his country. Bai Komp of Kolifa, to ensure that the roads and river routes in his territory were safe and free.

All the chiefs agreed to co-operate to enforce these arrangements. Also, they sent messengers to Alimami Bokari, King of Futa Jalon, to acquaint him with what they had decided to do in order to ensure the peace and security and the easy flow of commercial produce through and from their territories. They

1. Treaty No.25, April 18, 1837. (wrongly dated 1836).
Montagu, op.cit.

requested him to endeavour to keep the roads free and safe down to the town of Tomeso where the authority of the Alikali of Port Loko ended and that of himself commenced.¹

Governor Campbell, who had enjoyed every minute he spent on the Rokel among the chiefs, particularly the great deference they had shown him - thanks to Dala Modu's efforts - remained on the River for nearly two months. When he returned to the Colony on May 13, he left Dala Modu as his personal representative² with powers that gave him a dominating influence among the local chiefs, and planned a second meeting for early 1837.

Campbell set out on his second mission on January 19, 1837, confident of success "having by moral influence gained the devoted affection of the natives, and possessing over them an influence and power never before obtained by any white man".³ The rapturous enthusiasm with which he was welcomed back into the Rokel, he informed his boss in the Colonial Office, was "beyond my power of description".⁴

While at Magbeli, he was informed that some slave traders were holding a large number of slaves in the Scarcies in readiness for shipment to the New World. Considering it an opportunity to further enhance his prestige among the local rulers, Campbell sent troops to intervene and free those "poor creatures".⁵ But the officers in charge behaved improperly towards the chiefs involved and so turned them against the Governor. Campbell invited them

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 267/134. Campbell to Glenelg. Dec. 28, 1836.

3. C.O. 267/149. Campbell to Glenelg. May 19, 1838.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

all to Magbeli and got them on to his side once again with large presents and substantial increases in their stipends.

He reported that in appreciation of his efforts the local dignitaries conferred upon him the Order of the Palm and Alligator - the highest honour of the territory - "in the presence of many thousands".¹ A week later, they held another great assembly and invested him with the Turban, declaring him the Abbas of Sudan - to the people the highest rank a mortal man can achieve. But Campbell's policy towards Sierra Leone hinterland proved unpopular in England. His treaty with the local chiefs were not ratified because, among other things, it bound the government to give up runaway slaves, and granted to the local chiefs jurisdiction over British subjects. Early in 1837, while he was still peace-making at Magbeli, Campbell was recalled from the Colony. He got the chiefs to petition King William IV on his behalf, but to no purpose.

En Kerry, the Temne chief of Foindu in Yoni, kept a copy of the 1836 treaty which he "imagined would like Aladin's Lamp be the source of much wealth to him."² When he arrived back in his town he carefully placed his copy in a large wooden box which he ordered to be made especially for that. Then he waited patiently for six months when he opened the box to see what treasure the great Abbas' magic had conjured for him. Finding nothing, he closed the box and waited for another six months. But when he

1. F.B.C. "Sierra Leone", Address from the Native Kings and Chiefs ... Ind. p.49. Also C.O. 267/149. Campbell to Glenelg, May 19, 1838.

2. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.39.

found at the end of a year that the "magic" had produced nothing, he felt so disappointed and annoyed that he immediately took up his swords saying to his men "let us take up our swords again, and go and get wealth, for if we follow whiteman's word we will be poor men".¹

En Kerry and his men ravaged Masimera and parts of Koya countries. Mohammadu Bundu of Foredugu raised a Temne force and drove him to Mende country. There he was killed in 1838, in the war between the Mende and Bai Kurr of Mabang. En Kerry was one of the earliest examples of the professional warrior, which became such a prominent feature of the late 19th century history of the Temne (and indeed of all of Sierra Leone).

Campbell's effort failed to bring lasting peace to the Rokel, and two years after his departure, in spite of the elaborate arrangements he got the chiefs to enter into for assuring the peace of the territory, war broke out again on the River. The war which was between Mohammadu Bundu of Foredugu, and his war chief Maligi Bundu, spread to other parts of the Rokel, including Magbeli, which was destroyed again in 1843. However, through the efforts of John McCormack peace was restored on the Rokel in 1846, and for the next ten years trade flowed in an increasing volume to the Coast.

Trade on the Rokel River, however, had its many ups and downs

1. Fenda Modu, the then King of Yoni, was forced into exile because he was opposed to En Kerry and his wars. See G.I.L. memo by Lawson, Aug. 23, 1886.

during the period under review.¹ As an important centre for the Slave Trade, its abolition (in 1807) and the subsequent anti-Slave Trade activities of the British Squadron based in Freetown, produced a disastrous effect on the commerce of the area. So the abolition of the Slave Trade was, economically, a disaster for the traders of the Rokel River, whose trade had consisted mainly in this single "commodity". However, by 1816, John McCormack, the Irishman from Lurgan, County Armagh, had started the trade in timber.⁺ The timber trade developed quickly to replace the trade in slaves. John McCormack built his factory (including a sawpit and a mill) on Tombo Island and did most of his felling along the banks of the Port Loko Creek which abounded in that hard durable African oak (*Oldfieldia Africana*). Henry Williams, an Englishman, established on the Bunce Island as agent of the Andersons (John and Alexander), who had established on that Island since 1785 as slave dealers.

Other timber traders settled on Tasso Island. Prominent among these was the "Macaulay and Babington" trading company which opened an establishment there in 1820. In 1818 the Navy Board began taking Sierra Leone timber for the dockyards, and the Board of Trade reduced the heavy duties levied on African timber and other produce. In October, 1824, Bai Mauro of Loko Masfama ceded the Colony a strip a mile deep along the north shore of Bulom with the Islands off it, including Bunce, Tasso and Tombo. This

1. This account of the development of "legitimate" commerce in Sierra Leone, the Rokel in particular, is based on two main sources; Fyfe, A Hist. ... passim and Mitchell, op.cit., pp.205-6.

+ See chap. 3. pp 103, 113; chap 4. pp 131-2, 142, 160-1

brought the timber merchants within the Colony. The rent payable to Bai Mauro was recovered by making the merchants pay the government rent for their factories. Henry Savage (a mulato), "the most flourishing settled businessman",¹ and the first Sierra Leonean to obtain an English legal qualification (he became notary Public for Sierra Leone at the Faculty Office in 1821), lived for a while in Temne country, learnt to speak the language and seemed to have been initiated into the Poro Society. He built a timber factory on Tasso Island. Dala Modu, the powerful Muslim Susu chief on the Bulom Shore (Lungi) traded in timber, as agent for Macaulay and Babington, employing his many slaves to fell the trees, and receiving a large commission. There were also many Timber traders in Koya, Rosolo Creek in particular, but the Rokel on the whole was not very popular for timber trading.

By 1831 Port Loko was no longer a valuable centre for timber supply. McCormack moved to the mouth of the Melikuri and built a factory at Gbinti. But indiscriminate felling denuded one area after another. By early 1850s, however, timber was still being exported on a large scale, though much less than the 1830s and 1840s. For example in 1852, £116,000 worth of timber lay idle in the Rosolo Creek (the last remaining supply centre up the Rokel River), where the chief was said to have "put a Poro"² on it. However, by the 1860s timber was no longer profitable. Iron ships had now replaced wooden ones.

1. Fyfe, A-Hist. ... p. 142.

2. C.O. 267/229. Kennedy to Pakington, Bart. Dec. 3, 1852.

Timber which had represented over 69% (in 1829) of the total Sierra Leone exports came down to only 6% in 1860. By the late 1870s timber export had ceased altogether. By 1844 camwood supply too had become exhausted and prices fallen.¹

But trade in other commodities like groundnuts, palm-oil and kernels, gum, rubber, and the caravan trade in hides, ivory, and gold, provided an alternative. Charles William Maxwell Heddle (a mulatto like Savage, born in 1812, the year his father killed himself) pioneered the trade in groundnuts in Sierra Leone. He began exporting this produce in 1837. (Forster and Smith, a London firm, had begun receiving them from the Gambia in 1835). The cultivation of the groundnuts centred mainly along the coast northwards. On the Rokel groundnuts production centred round Malal.² Heddle bought McCormack's timber factories on Kikonke Island in the Scarries mouth, and at Gbinti in the Melikuri River (McCormack himself was by now ruined commercially). By the mid-1840s he had about half a dozen ships of his own carrying groundnuts and timber to Freetown where he bought Macaulay and Babington's premises in Water Street, succeeding them as the largest merchant in the Colony.

Groundnuts were chiefly exported to France where the oil extracted from them was used to lubricate trains. It was also marketed as olive oil for cooking. And as groundnuts gradually replaced the former staple of French export - Senegal gum - French

1. C.O. 267/185. Fergusson to Stanley. Oct. 30, 1844.

2. Oral Tradition: Konte, A., Bella, A., Bia, S.

traders moved increasingly southwards. In May, 1845, Heddle heard of the presence of a French naval cruiser in the Melikuri. He became alarmed, and tried successfully to persuade Governor Fergusson to send himself with two government officials to make trade treaties with the local rulers in the region. In return for annual stipends Alimami Ali of Forekaria and the other chiefs of the area promised to protect British trade, and not to grant any other European power privileges not granted the British. The treaties also included an anti-slave trade clause.

R.A.K. Oldfield, the explorer who went on Laird's 1831 Niger Expedition as surgeon and later settled in Freetown to trade, set up a screw press in Freetown in the early 1840s, worked by 20 Krumen, to extract groundnut oil. His was the first factory in Sierra Leone. Export of groundnuts increased fairly steadily during the latter half of the 1850s and throughout the 1860s. Groundnuts increased in value from £11,611 in 1840 to almost £50,000 (or 27% of total export) in 1867. But French imports and exports fell steadily through the 1880s until by the 1890s almost no groundnuts were shipped at all.

Export of palm produce went primarily to Britain (palm-oil) and France (palm kernels). Heddle again was the pioneer of the palm kernel trade, which he began in 1846 by exporting £4 worth. Export of palm produce increased fairly steadily during the late 1850s particularly palm kernels, which by 1861 exceeded that of oil. Palm-oil exports increased from 6% of the total export in

1829 to over 20% in the 1850s, but dropped thereafter. Palm kernel exports increased from about £27,000 in 1860 to over £107,000 in 1880, centred mainly in the Sherbro District. But the mid-1880s (like the mid-1870s) was a period of European economic depression. Prices fell steadily, including those of African produce. Palm kernels which averaged about £14 a ton in Liverpool in 1884 dropped to £9 a ton in 1886. Palm oil fell within the same period from £38 to £19 a ton. Tied to European market Sierra Leone was hard hit.

The Colony's small, but valuable, trade with the interior in gold, ivory, and hides depended on the Fula caravans being able to pass safely along the paths to the coast. In 1821, in answer to a request by the Alimami of Futa Jalon asking Governor MacCarthy to mediate in a war in the northern rivers which was interfering with trade, the Governor sent Dr. O'Beirne, an army surgeon to Timbo. O'Beirne travelled overland from Port Loko through Limba country rather than by the usual Rio Nunez route, hoping that the Fulas would follow his example. However, by early 1822, the war was still on, and the Governor sent Lieutenant Gordon Laing of the Second West Indian Regiment to arrange a truce. Laing followed the Rokel River through the Temne and Koranko countries to Falaba "where he was well received the first European visitor".¹ Trade increased, gold exports rose from £818 in 1833 to nearly 20% of the total Colony exports in 1860. Hides went to the U.S. where there was a steady American market. This was further

1. Fyfe, A Hist. ... p.148.

increased after 1852 when American dollars were made legal tender. The value of hides exports rose from £10,832 in 1850 to £32,881 in 1860, and £46,452 in 1867. Ivory rose from 7.2% of the total exports in 1829 to 14% in 1850.

The Temne/Susu war in the Port Loko and Kambia areas, beginning in the 1850s, diverted the caravan route from Port Loko, so that the major portion of Colony trade with the interior now passed through the Rokel (Magbeli). T.G. Lawson, the Government Interpreter, in a memorandum in 1879 states: "this branch of the Sierra Leone River [i.e. the Rokel] supply more trade in produce viz: groundnuts, palm kernels, rice, palm-oil, camwood etc. two or three times than the other branches"¹ (that is the Port Loko and Scarcies areas). But by this time the Rokel was already losing ground to the Sherbro region. Also long before this period the inland peoples had become aware of the great benefit derivable from the development of "legitimate commerce", and many of them now wished to trade directly with the coastal merchants rather than through the privileged middlemen.

The boom on the Rokel did not last long. This was due primarily to a series of developments: political, economic, social and military, both on the Rokel itself and in the supplying regions. Added to this was the increasing French effort~~s~~ to divert produce to their own centre in Conakry. It was, however, partly the very boom of the mid 19th century that brought about the decline of the trade on the Rokel River. Some of the outlying regions, Yoni in particular, wanted a share in the boom, and to establish a

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Jan 3, 1879.

direct contact with the coastal traders instead of passing their goods through the middlemen. The coastal merchants were also desirous of having direct contact with the various inland peoples themselves. This way both the coastal merchants and the inland peoples would derive greater benefit from their trade transactions. But it meant ruin to the coastal middlemen, and they would most likely resist such a development.

By the middle of the 19th century, caravans of traders from Yoni, Gbonkolenken, Kolifa and Taiama areas, had started visiting the Colony at regular intervals with their produce. They received tremendous amount of encouragement from the Colony administration, and were made most welcome by the Colony traders. In Freetown, they exchanged (to a greater advantage) their produce for European manufactured goods like salt, tobacco, rum, firearms and so on. On such visits they often met Government officials with whom they conversed freely, and who seem most anxious that they be comfortable and well treated. This had increased their confidence in themselves, and so lessened or even ended their reliance on, and respect for, the coastal Temne and Sherbro whom they had looked upon in former years as their "whitemen".¹

But this development meant ruin for the middlemen. To start with they resorted to all sorts of tactics to arrest the situation. They tried as much as possible to discourage these inland peoples from going to the coast by telling them all sorts of fabrications

1. G.I.L. Memo by Lawson, Jan. 23, 1879.

about the coast.¹ They also spread malicious rumours about the real intention of the Colony towards their territories. In 1872 the Rokel Temme fostered a rumour that the Government in Freetown intended to claim that part of their country as far as the Okra Hill.² And so they appealed to the inland peoples - the Mende in particular - to unite with them to destroy the Colony in order to retain their independence and sovereignty. It was when these tactics failed that they resorted to fight.

The Yoni had a grievance against their neighbours to the North - the Masimeras - for not allowing them free access to the trading centres on the Rokel - Magbeli in particular. They also had a grievance against the Kpa Mende to the South who did not allow Yoni traders to pass through their territory in order to take their local produce to Senehun and the other centres of trade on the Ribbi and Bumpé. They were offended by the Colony's refusal to increase the stipend paid to their chief.³ But in the middle of the 19th century their attention was concentrated mainly on the booming Rokel river region.

The first Yoni attack on Masimera was in 1856 when chief Sori Mattot of Yoni sent his warmen to raid Masimera.⁴ Traders on the River, fearing that the war might spread to the water-side, sent a Delegation to Freetown asking for Government intervention.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. G.L.N.C. Hill to Sori Matot & Co., Sept. 29, 1862.

4. Lawson and Parkes, op.cit., p.30.

In 1857, Governor Hill commissioned Richard Albert Oldfield and Captain Luke of the Second West Indian Regiment, to proceed up the River to endeavour to bring peace between the warring factions.¹ By the time the commissioners reached Magbeli, Oldfield was already worn out and seriously ill. He sensibly remained in Magbeli while Captain Luke travelled through Masimera and Yoni countries attempting to contact the leaders of the two factions. In the meantime Oldfield had been taken (a dying man) to Freetown where he died shortly after arrival. Soon after, Captain Luke himself was obliged to return to the Colony owing to a breakdown in his health. And so the war continued.

Then in May, 1859, the Yoni made a destructive attack on Magbeli, where they sacked and plundered the C.M.S. station "consisting of several expensive houses".² These attacks marked the beginning of a long period of conflicts on the Rokel, and in its supply regions in the hinterland, which eventually crippled the trade on this most important river. It was not one war, but a series of contests in which the issues changed, and the parties changed with them. But right at the heart of the contests was the economic motive of the contestants hence the description of "trade wars". Because of the constant wars, life became very insecure, and because of the necessity to establish some form of permanent personnel trained in the use of more modern weapons, warfare, which had hitherto been the concern of every able body in the land, became a job for specialists. The rise of the professional

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

warrior was, therefore, a feature of the late 19th century, and it owed its origin to the insecurity engendered by the political and economic rivalries of the times.

The already complex situation was further complicated by the inter-play of these professional warriors. They became a necessary evil. For these professional warriors, bold, daring and sometimes patriotic, were utterly lawless in most cases. The chiefs realized their destructive influence, but found they could do nothing about it, for they needed these warriors and their services to maintain their own position. Some of the warriors became very wealthy and powerful, so much so that they came to overshadow the civilian rulers altogether, and could easily impose their wills upon them, hence their importance - politically. These professional warriors contributed immensely to the chaos of the late 19th century Temne land.

Another contributory factor to the confusion was the apparent unwillingness of the African rulers to let go an attack or insult unavenged, and, as these insults and unprovoked attacks increased with the rise of the professional warriors, the chaos increased too. There were also the petty jealousies among even the so-called peacemakers, whereby a peacemaker would do everything possible to prevent the success (where he had failed) of another peacemaker. The crippling effects, particularly for the local people, of these developments on the commerce of the Rokel was great; it also adversely affected the Colony which found that it could no longer rely on the Rokel trade for its essential supplies.¹

1. G.I.L. Memo by Lawson. Nov. 18, 1873.

This was felt even more keenly at a time when the routes via Port Loko were no longer safe for caravans.

The administration in Freetown resorted to all sorts of ways to restore peace on the Rokel River. One of these was the use of local rulers as peacemakers. The most useful African rulers to the Colony in this respect were the two chiefs of the Bulom Shore, Alimami Sanusi Modu of Lungi and Bai Mauro of Kaffu Bulom. Alimami Lahai Bundu of Foredugu, and chief Gbanya of Senehun were also employed on different occasions by the Colony either for peacemaking or for restoring properties or persons plundered or captured. Colony and European traders resident in the areas affected or involved in the wars were encouraged by Colony authorities to remove to other areas, as it was believed that their removal would force the chiefs who depended on the traders for their essential war supplies to come to peace quickly.¹ But the traders proved very reluctant in removing from the troubled areas because those of them who managed to escape capture and plunder profitted immensely from the wars. Hence one can never trust what they said about these wars.

Perhaps the most important move on the part of the Colony administration in endeavouring to restore peace on the Rokel, was the adoption of the "stipends policy". This policy, the formalisation of the universally accepted African custom of annual presents from a stranger to his landlord - a very deep-rooted

1. C.O. 267/203. Macdonald to Gray, Nov. 21, 1848.

practice, had been anticipated by Governor Turner since 1825.¹ The administration felt that the chiefs would be better induced to co-operate in peacemaking, and in protecting British subjects and interests in their countries, if they received some regular payments (annually in this case). This was first introduced on the Rokel by Governor Findlay in his treaty of peace and friendship with the Temne of Port Loko and Rokel areas in 1831.² This treaty was revoked by the treaty of 1841³ which was in turn revoked by that of February, 1857,⁴ made by Governor Stephen Hill; although (except for some minor alteration) the arrangements with regard to the payment of the stipends to the local chief remained unchanged.

But the policy was not without its opponents, and greatest among these was Doherty, who became governor in 1838. Doherty wrote in 1840 (when the Temne/Loko war was still on) that the policy was "not productive of any adequate compensatory advantage".⁵ He felt that his predecessors, by adopting this policy, had gone too far, and given the barbarous rulers in their neighbourhoods "too important a position".⁶ By visiting them in their countries, and giving them these "numerous bribes" whenever there was any threat of upheaval among them, these natives were made to feel that

1. C.O. 267/66. Turner to Bathurst. Oct. 28, 1825.

2. Treaty No.21. Sept. 23, 1831. Montagu, op.cit.

3. Treaty No.26. Feb. 13, 1841. Montagu, op.cit.

4. Treaty No.57. Feb. 27, 1857. Montagu, op.cit.

5. C.O. 267/159. Doherty to Russell. April 22, 1840.

6. P.P. 1842, vol. xi, p.359, appendix 17. (Doherty's observations on Madden's Report).

the settlement existed only by their toleration. The right course that ought to have been followed was to have made them aware of their weakness, and thus to "establish a necessary influence over them for promoting the interests of our commerce"¹ or blockade the river when they proved stubborn.

But unfortunately, continued Doherty, it was now too late to reverse the policy without injuring the Colonial honour. And the furore that such a reversion would cause among Colony traders, who themselves had further hampered trade by their injustices and violence, would be indescribable. So the policy continued, and the amount of stipend paid to the chiefs, in fact, increased as trade prospered.

The amount paid to the chiefs was reckoned on 5% of the total probable amount of trade likely to be obtained from, or transported through, the particular chiefs country. The value of the stipend was reckoned in "bars" of goods, which was the standard medium of exchange; every manufactured article being valued at so many bars. "The 'bar'" as Dike points out, "was not a circulating currency, but merely an accepted standard for valuing trade goods".² On the Rokel the value of a bar stood at 2/6 until 1853 when it was reduced to 1/- by Governor Kennedy and made payable in cash instead of in goods as hitherto. The system of payment,³ before 1853, was a very complicated one.

1. Ibid.

2. K.O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885. Oxford, 1956, p.104.

3. C.O. 267/229. Kennedy to Pakington, Bart. Dec. 21, 1852.

When a chief called or sent for his stipend, the Governor ordered the payment of so many bars. The Colonial Secretary invited tenders for the supply of these bars of goods, and then ordered them from the dealers or traders who offered to supply them at the lowest rate. The recipient then received the goods at the hands of the trader.¹ The account was then furnished to the Colonial Secretary containing a certificate from two other traders that the price charged was fair and reasonable. This account when approved and signed by the Governor, went forward as the Voucher for the expenditure.

But this system, Kennedy pointed out in 1852,² was pregnant with abuse. Traders often conspired among themselves, and the supplier of the goods often knew before hand which traders were going to certify to the reasonableness of the price charged; they took turns to help one another. Sometimes the goods supplied would not be more than half the total value of the stipend due.

1. Campbell in the treaty of April 11, 1836, (Treaty No.24, Montagu, *op.cit.*) set out the value of Bars in goods.

For 100 bars:

2 pieces blue baft	(at 20 bars)
2 pieces white baft	(at 20 bars)
2 pieces satin stripe	(at 24 bars)
Tobacco	(at 25 bars)
Rum, 5 gallons & Jar	(at 11 bars)
	<u>100 bars</u>

For 50 bars half the above items, for 200 multiply by two, and so on.

For 80 bars:

2 pieces blue baft	(at 20 bars)
2 pieces white baft	(at 20 bars)
1 piece satin stripe	(at 12 bars)
Tobacco	(at 20 bars)
Rum, 4 gallons & Jar	(at 8 bars)
	<u>80 bars</u>

2. C.O. 267/229. Kennedy to Pakington Bart. Dec. 21, 1852.

In this way fraud was perpetrated both on the donor and on the receiver. Many traders, Kennedy went on, imported very inferior articles purposely for this thereby "bringing our manufactured goods into disrepute".¹ These were his reasons for recommending the system of cash payment which began in 1853.

The Alikali of Port Loko got the largest stipend of 600 bars. The two most important principal chiefs in the navigable portion of the Rokel, Bai Simera of Masimera and Bai Koblo of Marampa, received 300 bars each (100 in the 1831 treaty). Bai Suba of Magbali received 100 bars, and Bai Seboru of Yoni also 100 bars (80 bars in the 1841 treaty).

But this policy of "peace-begging"² was essentially a policy of "quid pro quo". The chiefs got their stipends so long as they maintained peace in their territories and gave adequate protection to British persons and property in their countries. Whenever there was disturbance or plunder of the property of any of the British subjects in any particular chief's territory, that chief's stipend was suspended as a punishment for him (whether or not he knew about the disturbance or plunder) until peace was restored or the properties plundered recovered. Or the stipend might be diverted into paying up for destroyed property until the claim was settled.

1. Ibid.

2. J.D. Hargreaves, A Life of Sir Samuel Lewis, O.U.P. 1958, p.54. Hargreaves is quoting Lewis, a leading Creole statesman in the later half of the 19th century, and a strong critic of Governor Rowe's "ineffective and humiliating policy 'of going about peace-begging in the neighbouring districts and paying a lot of money on this begging errand'"

Because of the constant wars which increased the burden of policing the border between the Colony and the Temne country, and the consequent disruption of the Rokel trade, the administration caused to be cut the road linking Prince Alfred's (or Songo) Town through Ribí with Senehun, the water-side town to which traders from Yoní, Gbonkolenken and Taiama brought their local produce for European manufactured goods. The road was intended to ease the burden of policing the borders of the Colony (which was now considerably reduced following the retrocession of part of the ceded Koya territory in 1872) as well as to divert commerce from the strife-torn Rokel region through that new road to the Colony. And within a few years after its construction the road had become a principal trade route.¹

In a private information² for the Governor in July, 1876, Lawson recommended Benkia in British Koya as a "proper place to fix as a station for an agent to be placed among the natives of the Sierra Leone rivers." (Acting Governor Hamilton had suggested a similar post in 1824). Lawson felt that the "presence of an energetic European officer with an able assistant who has the knowledge of the natives and their movements, will not only foster the trade but serve to keep the countries quiet, and in a great measure check the slave trade that is carried on by the Soossoos from the North, and also prevent smugglers in the river.--- It

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Dec. 5, 1879.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. July 28, 1876.

will also be required of the agent at the least once in every two years to visit the interior as far as Sego".¹ The selection of Benkia for this purpose seems quite appropriate for it was situated on a spot that commands the entrances to all the rivers, and creeks, up the Sierra Leone River: Loko Masama, Port Loko, Rokel, and the Koya Creeks. But the hey-day of Rokel trade had passed.

The new road from Senehun to Songo Town not only served as a venue for bringing the badly needed supplies to Freetown, but also cut off the middlemen on the Rokel through whom most of the trade had been transacted in the earlier years. It also meant that the traders from the interior now had direct contact with Europeans and Colony traders on the coast. This, in part, was the cause of the rumour which the Temne of the Rokel caused to spread that the Colony's real intention was to annex their territories, and so called upon the inland peoples to unite with them to fight together and destroy its power before it became too strong for them to handle. But as we have seen earlier the time for such a united action had passed.

1. Winwood Reade was the ^{last} European to visit (in 1870) this part of the Western Sudan; although he himself never reached Sego.

PART II

Perhaps the most remarkable figure in the Rokel politics at the later part of the nineteenth century was Bai Simera Kamal (old) of Masimera, who became the chief of Masimera in 1873.¹ Bai Simera Kamal was a great warrior of Koranko origin (like his Thali hosts) who had been invited by the Masimera people earlier in the century to lead their warriors against Yoni invaders. Tradition² recalled him as a great sorcerer, capable of turning himself into all sorts of shapes and forms. He had his own personal Devil called Shelebente which assisted him in his warfare. His stronghold on river Rapet (a tributary of the Rokel) was reputedly impregnable.

Bai Simera Kamal had assisted Marampa people in their efforts against the Yoni in the 1850s and early '60s. A member of the Bangura clan, he was known only by his warrior name, Yirandigi. When the Bai Simera stool became vacant in the early 1870s, the Thalis invited him to become the principal chief of the country in recognition of his services. He was a man of forthright and forceful character with a clear and perceptible mind. He seemed very ambitious too, and tried in turn to appropriate Yoni and Marampa countries but failed. He clearly overshadowed the other chiefs on the Rokel during this period.

1. G.I.L. Memo by Lawson, Oct. 2, 1883.

2. Oral tradition: Bangura, F., Bangura, B.Y.

Before he became ruler in 1873 he had attempted (in 1872) to raise the whole of the Temne of the Rokel region against the Colony, but failed.¹ The first major action he took immediately after his installation was to place an embargo on the trade with the Colony which caused immense scarcity of rice and other provisions in Freetown, apart from disrupting the general trade. Lawson states that Bai Simera took this action against the Colony on the advice of two persons; one a British subject, (presumably Harding, the Bai's own clerk), and the other, Amara Bonto Manso.²

Lawson, who was the son-in-law of the late Bai Farma of Koya county, and so personally involved in the Rokel politics, blamed Bai Simera for all the troubles on the Rokel River. In fact he had nothing good to say about him. To the administration he was a "proud, selfish, and arrogant spirit"³ who thought of nothing but mischief. The administration tried hard to discredit him in the eyes of the other chiefs on the Rokel, but it seemed the effort was a wasted one, for the Bai continued to pull considerable weight among the chiefs, and automatically assumed the leading role whenever they held a palaver.

The administration throughout this period endeavoured to give the impression that they, and they alone, wanted, and understood, peace. But this is far from being correct. The local chiefs were just as desirous (if not more so) of peace as

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. March 3, 1886.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. June 24, 1873.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Oct. 2, 1883.

the Colony. The Colony wanted peace primarily to protect her trade with the hinterland. But many Colony traders wanted war as an excuse for intervention and even annexation. The local people wanted peace for the protection of their trade with the Colony, and even more; it was they who had to live by and suffer the insecurity and depredation caused by the wars. This was why they were so unsparing in their efforts to secure peace. And it was they, when they knew that they could not solve the problem on their own, sent for the intervention of the Colony government, which they in most part wrongly regarded as an honest broker.

As early as 1863, Bai Koblo of Marampa had sent a letter to the Governor in Freetown (plus a present of a sheep) asking for the Governor's assistance in restoring peace on the Rokel, and also offering to undertake the task himself if the Governor would support him (financially, no doubt). But Governor Blackall declined both his present and the request for assistance, for, as he put it "I have no reason to be pleased with the conduct of the chiefs generally I have had many promises from them which have not been kept, and this Colony has suffered very unjustly from wars which, if you chiefs had honestly joined together, might have been averted."¹ This lack of sympathetic understanding was very characteristic of the administration (with the exception of, perhaps, a few governors like Kennedy and Hennessy) throughout the period under review.

1. G.L.N.C. Blackall to Bai Koblo. Dec. 5, 1863.

And as Lawson, perhaps the most informed official in the administration with regards to native matters throughout the later 19th century, stated "peace-making in the native way is not a light expense and cannot be done otherwise".¹ Unassisted by the Governor, Bai Koblo was unable to proceed with his peace-mission. However, in the meantime developments further inland in Kolifa and Kuniike countries, which involved the Yoni diverted the attention of the latter from the Rokel, at least for a while. But the war between the Kolifa, Gbonkolenken and the Yoni also affected the Rokel, because these were among the most important supply centres for the Rokel trade. And apart from interrupting the flow of produce from those regions, the war by early 1870s was moving rapidly towards the water-side. This, plus the embargo which Bai Simera placed upon the Colony trade, was the cause of the great gathering of Chiefs at Magbeli in March, 1873, in an attempt to resolve the situation.

The chiefs wrote from Magbeli requesting the governor to come "to talk upon the matter which has been the cause of the restriction put upon the trade of your country".² This time the administration, having felt the pinch of the embargo on the supply of her essential needs, and apprehensive of the development in the interior, was willing to honour this invitation. However, Governor Keate was away to the Cape Coast (Ghana) where he was personally conducting the Ashanti Expedition, and so Alimami Sanusi Modu of Lungi, Bulom Shore, accompanied by T.G. Lawson,

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Jan. 14, 1881.

2. C.S.L. Nos. 374 & 5. March 14, 1873.

was empowered to attend the meeting on behalf of the Governor.

Alimami Sanusi Modu, the nephew of Alimami Dala Mohammadu, friend and ally of Governor Campbell, had served the government as a peace-maker since 1841, when he accompanied his uncle in that year's peace mission. In 1870 he helped to negotiate peace between the Gbonkolenken and Yoni; and in 1872 he accompanied Bai Mauro of Kaffu Bulom to pacify the Scarcies area.¹ The Commission was empowered, first to settle the dispute between the Colony and Bai Simera, which brought about the embargo on the Colony trade, and secondly to declare Colony support for a delegation of Rokel chiefs who were to go inland to try and bring peace to the disturbed areas before the war reached the water-side.

The great palaver² at Magbeli lasting from 23rd to 26th June, 1873, was attended by Bai Simera, leader and spokesman for the chiefs, Bai Kurr of Mabang, Satimaka of Mamaka, Bai Komp of Kolifa, Bai Seboru of Yoni (represented by one of his head-chiefs), Bai Koblo of Marampa, Bai Yola of Mayola and several sub-kings and chiefs (except Bai Suba of Magbeli who was ill) - altogether about 400 people in all. On the 23rd of June Alimami Sanusi Modu and Lawson delivered the Governor's message. Bai Simera, speaking on behalf of all the chiefs assembled, replied that the kings and chiefs would "hang head" over the Commissioners' message and would let them know their minds as soon as possible.

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1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, June 15, 1880.
G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, July 15, 1881.
G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Oct. 14, 1881.
 2. G.I.L. Lawson's Report, June 30, 1873.

On the 26th of June another great assembly met in the Palaver House at Magbeli. And as on the previous occasion, Bai Simera got up to speak on behalf of the Chiefs. He started by thanking the Governor for honouring their invitation and regretted that the Governor himself had not been able to attend personally. They had placed embargo on the Colony trade because they felt (wrongly as it turned out) that the Governor was not on their side. The embargo was now lifted, and they hoped that they would not find it necessary in future to employ such drastic action against the Colony. He complained that in the years past Europeans as well as native merchants used to do a large amount of business in the country and they always respected the chief's and their laws. But for the past ten years such merchants were not seen among them, (trade had shifted) but petty traders, who were disrespectful to the chiefs, and impertinent to their laws. He asked that these merchants be curbed.

Touching on the situation in the interior, Bai Simera said he and Bai Koblo had undertaken to do their best to put a stop to it before it reached the water-side. They were sure of success if the Governor would assist them financially. Bai Simera also made the important point that for peace to be established permanently and a stop put to the frequent wars that impede trade and prevent produce like rice, palm-kernels, palm-oil, beniseed, camwood and so on from reaching the water-side from the interior, it would be advisable to bring into treaty obligations with the Colony (and allowed stipends) those rulers and chiefs in whose

countries those articles were produced. These chiefs and rulers among others, included Bai Komp of Kolifa, Satimaka of Romamaka, Bai Polon of Ro Polon, Bai Lal of Malal and their sub-chiefs.

The water-side chiefs, said Bai Simera, also considered their stipends too small and hoped that the governor would take that into consideration. And as a final point, the Bai asked that the governor grant permission for Alimami Sanusi to remain on the Rokel to represent the governor while he and Bai Koblo proceeded to the interior on their peace mission. This was a most astute political and diplomatic move on the part of the Bai, for as long as the Alimami remained on the Rokel, the chiefs would be assured of the Governor's support. Also his presence there as the Governor's personal representative would give a sense of security to the people. And perhaps a deeper motive was Bai Simera's personal suspicion of the Colony government. He needed Alimami Sanusi as a hostage to forestall any underhand action by the Colony authorities.

So for a short spell of time there was co-operation - even if open friendship was not there - between the Colony administration and Bai Simera and his other chiefs on the Rokel. Bai Simera and Bai Koblo went, as agreed, to the interior for "peacemaking" on behalf of themselves and the Colony government. The Governor granted both of them advances on their annual stipends to meet the cost of peacemaking, and were promised greater rewards if they succeeded. The new spirit of co-operation went so far to the extent that Governor Berkeley could ask Bai Simera for volunteers

from his country for the Ashanti Expedition.¹

But the Rokel chiefs failed to pacify the interior. Bai Simera seems to have made up his mind, even before he accepted to make peace, that Yoni power, the only really effective challenge to his own, must be crushed. Besides, the Rokel chiefs had not had the opportunity of avenging earlier attacks Yoni had made on their territory. And so the peace-mission in actual fact turned out to be an opportunity for Marampa - Masimera to plan with their allies the best way to destroy Yoni. And Alimami Sanusi returned to Bulom Shore with the Rokel still far from being pacified.

In 1874, Masimera, with the support of Marampa and Kolifa, resumed attacks on Yoni. By 1876 Masimera seemed to be gaining the upper hand. Bai Fonti of Ro Mendi and Bai Banta, King of Buweah, both of whom were Bai Simera's relations, joined Masimera and her allies.² Bai Sebora of Yoni sued for peace, and sent messengers to the governor of his intention to end the war.³ But, deluded by his early successes, Bai Simera pressed on. He would accept nothing but the total destruction of Yoni military power.

In July, 1876, Alimami Lahai Bundu, son of Mohammadu Bundu of Foredugu, and successor (1864) of Bokari Sila, his uncle, offered to mediate.⁴ And in January, 1877, the Governor invited Alimami Sanusi and Bai Mauro of Kaffu Bulom to join Alimami Lahai

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Dec. 9, 1873.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Nov. 15, 1876.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Jan. 10, 1876.

4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. July 11, 1876.

to negotiate with Bai Simera, on his behalf, for peace.¹ In the meantime the war had spread to other hitherto uninvolved regions; to Ribŋi and Kpa Mende territories, and to Foredugu, Koya, Lahai Bundu's territory.² The Yoni made peace with Mabang and Kolifa, and turned their full attention to Masimera. The Governor invited Gbongsoe, a renowned warrior and Chief of Gbonkolenken to assist in the peacemaking.³

The Yoni refused to talk peace until they had avenged themselves on Masimera. In May, 1877,⁴ they sprang a devastating attack on Bai Simera and his allies. Bai Simera's army was routed and the fleeing warriors were pursued into Marampa and into some parts of Koya where they had encamped, destroying many towns and capturing several people including some British subjects. T.G. Lawson, in a memorandum on 28th May, reported that "the whole of the Rivers are in a confused state, the kings and chiefs have taken refuge in some other places."⁵ Alimami Lahai Bundu, assisted by Gbanya of Senehun (Kongbora Chiefdom) and some Taiama chiefs, helped to recover some of the British subjects captured by the Yoni⁶ and tried to bring the Yoni to a peace talk. Alimami

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Jan. 18, 1877.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Feb. 21, 1877.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. March 13, 1877.

4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. May 28, 1877.

5. Ibid.

6. C.S.L. No.629, May 29, 1877. Also G.I.L. Lawson to chief Gbanya. Oct. 8, 1877.

Sanusi and his party barely escaped with their lives, gave up the peace talks, and returned to their own countries now in turmoil.¹

The Yoni, having now avenged themselves fully on the Masimera and their allies declared they were ready to talk peace. But Bai Simera refused to negotiate. He recouped his scattered and depleted army, and sent war men to attack a Yoni town, Mafonde - killing seven persons and taking about 120 prisoners.² In December the Yoni retaliated, destroyed two Masimera towns, and carried away over 200 persons.³ Bai Simera realized he was fighting a losing battle. Bai Sebora, immediately after this retaliatory attack largely as a result of Alimami Lahai Hundu's efforts, sent to inform the Governor that he had agreed to travel to Magbeli to meet him or his representative for peace talks. He arrived at Magbeli on the 8th December, 1878, and early in January, 1879, Bai Simera also arrived.⁴

By April, 1879, the peace-makers had succeeded in getting the contending parties to accept peace.⁵ And what was left was the customary shaking of hands. Governor Rowe asked the chiefs to come to Freetown for this. Bai Sebora moved from Magbeli to Foredugu, Lahai Bundu's town, and would not go any further for he

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Oct. 8, 1877.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Nov. 28, 1878.

3. G.I.L. Harding's Report. Dec. (wrongly dated Nov.) 5, 1878.

4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. April, 23, 1879.

5. Ibid.

had come thus far only waiving the custom of his people which prevented a king from visiting a port "where flood and ebb acts". And had done so "solely from the great respect he had for His Excellency."¹ From Foredugu Bai Seborá sent to ask the governor to come up the river or send a trustworthy officer to represent him at the ceremony of shaking of hands. He would, however, rather that the governor himself went for there were many things to arrange with him "for the future good of the country and Sierra Leone".²

But this important final ceremony never took place. And that it did not was the result of certain social and political developments in Koya. The Administration in Freetown, because of the proximity of the Koya territory to the Colony, had always felt that any serious disturbance in Koya was bound to affect the welfare of the Colony as well as that of the British subjects resident in Koya itself. It was partly this, and Koya resistance to the growing influence of the Colony in the country, that led to the Koya war of 1861. Since that war Koya Temne had become virtually a subject people except in name. The war not only destroyed Koya military power and undermined effective local leadership, but also made any future challenge to the Colony influence ineffective. However, between 1862 and 1872, Koya managed to preserve some form of cohesion and orderliness. But in 1872 the only unifying force - Alexander Bai Kanta - died, and Koya Temne became a drifting leaderless people.

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. June 6, 1879.

2. Ibid.

This state of affairs was not wholly the result of the Colony influence, but was also contributed to by the Political organisation in the country which made the office of the head chief rotational among the various sub-chiefs and queens after the death of a substantive holder. This system worked fairly satisfactorily until Colony influence undermined the authority of even the head-chief let alone the subordinates. Pa Ansumana Konko, the Regent Chief¹ after Bai Kanta was a cantankerous blind old man who, unable to control the other chiefs and queens effectively resorted to settling one section against the other.² Bokari Bomboli, another sub-chief, was an inveterate mischief-maker who delighted mainly in raiding and plundering the British subjects resident in Koya.³ Both Ansumana Konko and Bokari Bomboli, with Dumbuya, the professional warrior they employed for their raids and attacks, spent varying terms of detention in the Freetown goal for their activities.⁴ Dumbuya finally got deported to Lagos.⁵

Santigi Sori Kondito, who was described as a Principal chief of Koya, and who it seems could have affected some order and strong leadership in the territory, was not even in Koya, but chose to

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1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Nov. 22, 1876.
 2. G.I.L. Lawson to Ansumana Konko. Aug. 21, 1876.
 3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. July 3, 1880.
 4. G.I.L. Lawson to Bai Mauro and Alimami Sanusi. Aug. 11, 1880.
also Memo. by Lawson. April 13, 1880.
 5. G.I.L. Lawson to Bana Seri. Sept. 18, 1882.

reside in Port Loko where he engaged in his business activities.¹ The three surviving queens of Koya; Bome Rufah, Bome Warah and Bome Poseh, supported by a few of the lesser chiefs, proved powerless to effect peace and order, and had to appeal to the Colony government each time the peace was threatened. The confusion and disorder was further increased by the Lokos resident in Koya and in the settlement, who sometimes deliberately provoked the local Temme. A similar provocation by them was one of the immediate causes of the Koya war of 1861. And after the war the provocation continued spearheaded by the Loko leader, Megbana Bure (alias Songo) from his stronghold - Songo Town. Like Ansumana Konko and Bokari Bomboli, Kegbana Bureh also had to spend some time in Freetown gaol.²

Throughout these troubled years in Koya, the region that enjoyed the most effective control was Foredugu - Lahai Bundu's town. And the administration in Freetown relied very heavily on Lahai Bundu for maintaining the peace and order in his own area of jurisdiction. With the governor's favour and support the family's power and influence increased considerably. In 1864 after the Koya war, Lahai Bundu was made an Alimami, in succession to his uncle, Bokari Sila.³

But the Koya Temme (and all Rokel Temme for that matter) had always felt jealous of the growing power and prestige of the Bundu

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. June 1, 1876.

2. G.I.L. Statement by Queens and chiefs of Koya. Nov. 10, 1878.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. June 20, 1878.

family. They resented it. But now the family's reputation was spreading far and wide, even beyond the bounds of Koya, as a result of the successful peace negotiations between the Yoni and Masimeras. This was too much for the Koya Temne, particularly the family of the late Naimbana, whose two sons Bana Seri and Sengbe headed the anti-Bundu movement. Bana Seri had declared in 1877¹ that he cared nothing for Lahai Bundu and all the Bundukas as their grandfather, Mori Bundu, was a slave redeemed by his own parents (which is not true), and this being so all Mori Bundu's descendants he considered to be his slaves though they may be in power.

Bai Simera, who, apart from his hatred of the Bundu family, was also willing to avenge himself on the aged Bai Seboru of Yoni, now Alimami Lahai Bundu's guest, transferred the services of his professional war leader, Pa Misiri (a Yoni man by origin) to Bana Seri and his Koya supporters. In May 1879,² Pa Misiri, leading Koya warriors, made a sudden and destructive attack on Foredugu, Lahai Bundu's town, captured over ten of his people whom he put in stocks, and destroyed most of Bundu's property. Bai Seboru had to be smuggled out of Foredugu to a trading factory in Rotifunk for safety. (He died there the following year in exile). Pa Misiri claimed ignorance of the fact that Lahai Bundu was peacemaking between Yoni and Masimera.

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Sept. ?, 1877.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. May 5, 1879.

By July, 1879, the war in Koya had spread inland as far as Masingbi on the Rokel. Many Koya towns, beside Bundu's, were destroyed, and war was carried to the upper part of Ribbi. A letter from the queens and some chiefs of Koya reporting the situation to the Governor states that Koya was "overflowed with refugees". The queens and chiefs dissociating themselves from the attack or any charge of duplicity in it went on, "Alimami Bundu is our son and chief, and it was with our consent when your excellency sent him for peace-making between the Yonnies and the Masimeras. We aided him in doing so with no less than £70 (seventy pounds)."¹

Lahai Bundu solicited and got the support of Yoni warriors who were more willing this time than usual because it gave them the opportunity of avenging the insult on their chief who died in exile. Two important Port Loko chiefs; Kura Bamp and Limami Kru supported Bana Seri, and allowed him to use their territories for preparation for his war activities.² Both of these chiefs in turn were related to the Alikali of Port Loko on the mother's side, "which ties Africans generally prize more" so that "the Alikali will naturally lean more in their side should they be inclined in the favour of Bana Seri."³ Santigi Sori Kondito, the Koya principal chief resident in Port Loko, supported Alimami Lahai Bundu because his mother and Lahai Bundu's dead father, Mohammadu

1. G.I.L. Queens and chiefs of Koya to Lawson. July 8, 1879.

2. Ibid.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Sept. 1, 1879.

Bundu, were of the same father.¹

Bai Koblo of Marampa died while this Koya war was going on, and Santigi Momo Raka, who later became Bai Suba of Magbeli, succeeded him as Regent Chief. Then Bai Simera suddenly attacked Marampa, seizing the opportunity of the occasion of the death of its chief. He destroyed several of the principal towns, including Magbeli.² His intention, no doubt, was to appropriate Marampa and so become ruler of both Marampa and Masimera. Santigi Momo Raka hurriedly raised an army and built a strong stockade near Magbeli to organise the defence of his country. He had the support of some of Port Loko chiefs.

In the meantime a strong military expedition from the Colony, commanded by Governor Rowe himself, nicknamed Gbomboboru by the local Temne, had routed Bana Seri and Pa Misiri's warriors from their strongholds in Koya.³ Their stockades in Majackson, and on the Island of Magbanku, were destroyed and the warriors put to flight. The fleeing warriors, disappointed and deprived of the loot they had expected (and probably also on Bai Simera's instigation) turned against Momo Raka and attacked his stockade near Magbeli.⁴ But Momo Raka defeated them, killing a substantial number. Lahai Bundu, now relieved of Bana Seri menace, transferred his Yoni mercenaries to Momo Raka. Momo Raka, returning from Koya after the negotiations with Lahai Bundu, travelled via Port Loko

1. Ibid.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Oct. 2, 1883.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. April 13, 1880.

4. G.I.L. Statement by Sori Kamara, "a young chief of Port Loko" March 24, 1880.

which he thought was a friendly country. But at Mafare, Kombo Kamara, a nephew of the Alikali and personal friend of Pa Misiri, like whom he was a professional warrior, attacked Momo Raka's party, plundering a lot of their property.¹ Then Momo Raka with his Yoni mercenaries marched on Robis, Kombo Kamara's town near Port Loko, and destroyed it, as well as several others.

In Koya, Bai Mauro and Alimami Sanusi Modu of Bulom Shore, joined the queens and chiefs of the country, and Port Loko chiefs, at Benkia, in retroceded Koya, and successfully pacified that distracted country in July, 1880. In September, Governor Rowe sent a steamer to Bankia to bring the assembled chiefs to Freetown where the final ceremony of shaking of hands, and the signing of a peace treaty were concluded.²

But on the Rokel, Pa Misiri and his follower professional warriors, got out of Bai Simera's control and disorder and misery spread far and wide. So the same peacemakers in Koya decided to join the Rokel chiefs for pacifying that region. Momo Raka wrote to inform the governor that he had given up the struggle "for the Administration's sake ----- unless Misiri refuses to comply."³ But Momo Raka's Yoni mercenaries felt they had not been sufficiently rewarded for the assistance they gave their new employer, and so attacked parts of Koya and Ribbi districts. Sori Kesebe of Rotifunk felt the Yoni attack on his territory was at the instigation of

1. G.I.L. Lawson to Bai Mauro. May 31, 1880.

2. G.A.L. No.43. Streeten to Momo Raka. Sept. 24, 1880. also G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Sept. 6, 1880.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Oct. 28, 1880.

Lahai Bundu (hitherto a close friend of his) and planned secretly to retaliate. Disaffection also arose within Pa Misiri's own army who turned against him and killed "the whole of his obstinate and mischievous war chiefs who would have been against the peace making."¹

In November, 1880, the peace-makers succeeded in getting the two contestants (Santigi Momo Raka and Pa Misiri) together, although not without the customary lavish distribution of presents.² By December 13, the two sides had agreed to end the struggle. This having been accomplished, the peacemakers sent invitation to all the principal chiefs and rulers of the Rokel region, including Port Loko and Yoni Chiefs, for a general peace making in the country. The venue for this general assembly was Foredugu, the chief town of Mendi Maforki, a little above Port Loko. By January 16, 1881, most of the chiefs had arrived in Foredugu, and it seemed everything was now set for the final pacification of Temne land.³

But on January 11,⁴ the party of Yoni warriors who had not

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Nov. 5, 1880.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Nov. 6, 1880.

The presents included;

150 pieces of clothes of various kinds

10 cases of gin

5 Demi-john of rum

4 oxen

In addition, Bai Mauro and Alimami Sanusi were each given £20 to meet personal expenses. See G.I.L. Lawson to the two chiefs, Nov. 18, 1880.

3. Ibid.

4. G.I.L. Statement by messenger from Bai Mauro & Co. Jan. 19, 1881.

yet left the Rokel but had now got out of Momo Raka's control (including some Mende mercenaries) made a sudden attack on the town of Foredugu, destroyed it and several others, and plundered the chiefs of all their property. Many of the chiefs, including Bai Mauro, who had now assumed the leadership of the negotiating party, had to run into the bush to save their lives. The attackers were eventually beaten and driven away, but it was now impossible to continue the peace-making at Foredugu.

According to a memorandum by T.G. Lawson, the Government Interpreter, on January 29, 1881,¹ it appears some of the very chiefs assembled at Foredugu for peacemaking were involved in that unprovoked attack. Lawson did not mention any names, but those chiefs involved would most likely include Alimami Lahai Bundu and Port Loko chiefs, all of whom had tried at the peace settlement at one time or the other, but had failed. It is also possible that Bai Simera of Masimera was implicated in the attack, for he was perhaps the most disappointed among the assembled chiefs: he had failed to arrest the growing Colony influence on the Rokel, the Yoni power had proved too strong for him to subjugate, and he had not been successful in seizing the control of Marampa and of its most flourishing commercial centre - Magbeli. Both Lahai Bundu and Alimami Sanusi Modu of Bulom Shore had been attacked in turn peace-making; now it was Bai Mauro's turn to have his efforts frustrated.

After the attack at Foredugu, Bai Mauro and some of the chiefs

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Jan. 29, 1881.

moved to Port Loko trying, with the Governor's encouragement, to assemble the various chiefs again. But where all others had tried and failed, no one was willing that Bai Mauro alone should carry the glory. He remained in Port Loko until September, 1881, but could not get all the chiefs together again. He gave up, and returned to his country Kaffu Bulom, a dying man.¹ He was reimbursed by the Colony with a sum of £57.2s. for the losses he suffered in the attack at Foredugu. On September 16, 1881, he died.² It looked like the peacemaking would have to be concluded in Freetown or through some other neutral channel, for no one among the chiefs was willing that any other chief should succeed where he had failed.

In the meantime the situation on the Rokel remained unsettled and chaotic. Namima Kamara, the sister of the late Bai Kurr of Mabang (who died in 1876) had to travel through Yoni and Koya to

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Sept. 7, 1881.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Oct. 14, 1881. Bai Mauro, otherwise known as Lamina Sogo, became chief in 1862. His father was Pa Yira of Kumrabai (Loko Masama), a relation of Bai Sherbro (King George) of the Bulom Shore. He had been of service to the Administration since 1858 during the Temne/Susu war. He assisted Bai Kanta of Koya in the election of Lahai Bundu as Alimami in 1863 (the installation ceremonies were performed in 1864). He assisted the Colony in restoring order in Port Loko in the disturbances that followed the death of Alikali Moruba Kindo in 1871. He assisted, in conjunction with Sanusi Modu, in pacifying the Scarcies in 1872, and was rewarded by an addition of 400 bars (£20) to his stipend, which was thus increased to a total of £82.10s. pa (Sanusi Modu got 200 bars reward). Bai Mauro was a surety for Koya safe conduct following the retrocession of part of ceded Koya in 1872. He accompanied Rowe to the Scarcies again in June 1876, and played a leading role in the peace negotiations on the Rokel (Koya) which lead to the Koya peace treaty of 1880.

Freetown in April, 1882¹ to report to the governor, Mabang's readiness to elect a new Bai Kurr. In November, 1882, Governor Havelock sent Dr. Hart, the Colony's principal Medical Officer, and Mr. Vohsen, the Principal Superintendent of the French Company, a large mercantile establishment, to the Rokel Chiefs to try and take up the peacemaking where the chiefs left off. Makonte in Masimera was selected as the venue for this final peacemaking. Bai Simera, however, true to his policy of non-fraternisation with the Colony, was very unco-operative. At first he refused entry altogether to the commissioners, and when at last they succeeded in persuading him to let them through, he deliberately directed them wrongly.² And even then, he insisted that before he could go to Makonte to attend the peace conference, the war fence at that place must be broken down. But Alimami Konte, chief of the town, a sub-chief under the Bai Simera refused to do this, so long as the other war fences in the country were left untouched.

It seemed Bai Simera had some grudge against the Alimami, and wanted to use this opportunity to punish him. If Konte had destroyed the war fence at Makonte, then the possibility of resisting Bai Simera would have been denied him. However, the commissioners eventually got to Makonte for the peace settlement. But while they were busy negotiating with the chiefs warmen from Momo Raka's stockade attacked some Mendi Maforki towns, and destroyed two in Port Loko district, in retaliation for a former

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. April 24, 1882.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Dec. 21, 1882.

attack made on his war fence at Karchik, near Magbeli, by people from Ansumana Tombo's stockade. Ansumana Tombo was another professional warrior from Mendi Maforki, and also a friend of Pa Misiri. This unforeseen development clouded over the deliberations of the peacemakers, and for a while it looked like there was going to be a general outbreak of war.¹

In a memorandum on December 21, 1882, Lawson with a slight touch of exaggeration states "the country is actually desolate and ruined, all the flourishing towns ruined, broken and depopulated, and are now the habitation of elephants and other wild beasts."² However, by May 1883, Dr. Hart and Mr. Vohsen had succeeded in assembling all the chiefs of importance on the Rokel. These included Bai Simera of Masimera, Alimami Konte of Makonte, Momo Raka - Regent of Magbeli, and Marampa chiefdom as a whole, Canrey Madigba - chief of Karchick, (Momo Raka's stronghold), Pa Misiri - Bai Simera's war chief, Bai Fonti - chief of RoMendi, (Bai Simera's ally), Ansumana Tombo, Bai Komp - King of Kolifa, Karamgha - Bai Komp's war chief, Bai Yoso - King of Mayoso, Masa Paki - King of Mapaki, (Bombali country), and Abdulai Kaloko (alias Yangfateah), chief of Matotoka in Tane County, (described by Lawson as "a very good chief." (He visited the Colony in April, 1880, and in 1882 was paid a stipend and given presents totalling £25.)

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Dec. 4, 1882.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Dec. 21, 1882.

Pa Sanna, the blind Regent Chief of Yoni, through whose assistance the commissioners succeeded in reaching Makonte, was prevented from attending the meeting because of civil war in his country. However, the commissioners successfully pacified the distracted Rokel.¹ And by early 1884 things had improved considerably. Lance Corporal Grant accompanied by Momodu Waka, the Colony's overland Messenger, reported from their mission to the Rokel in February 1884 that "almost the whole of the towns that had been destroyed by the late war are rebuilt - ---- the country is full of trade, produce of all descriptions is coming down in abundance."²

Lance Corporal Grant and Momodu Waka, had been sent to the Rokel to invite the chiefs for a peace treaty in Freetown, with the Sierra Leone Government. But by May, 1884, the chiefs had still not honoured the Governor's invitation - busy rebuilding their destroyed towns and villages, according to information reaching Freetown.

In May news reached Freetown that a great number of chiefs were assembled at Magbeli for some purpose not yet known. So Captain Compton and T.G. Lawson, the Government Interpreter, went to Magbeli to take the opportunity to find out what was holding the chiefs up.³ Compton and Lawson found out that the chiefs assembled in Magbeli were there not, as Freetown had supposed, to arrange for the signing of the peace treaty but for a far more

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. March 27, 1883.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Feb. 16, 1884.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. May ?, 1884.

serious matter.

The civil war in Yoni which prevented Pa Sanna from attending the peace conference in Makonte arose because of Pa Sanna's attempt to prevent Kondo and the other professional warriors in Yoni from carrying war into Bumpe and Ribí. Yoni efforts at carving a foothold for herself on the Rokel River had been foiled, and she now turned her attention to the more prosperous area of Bumpe and Ribí. But the Bumpe and Ribí countries (vague and uncertain though the extent was) were British protected areas, and any attack on the territories was bound to rouse the terrible anger of Her Majesty's Government. Kondo and his associates succeeded in reducing Pa Sanna to their will, and the assembled chiefs were quite aware of the consequences that would follow their having their way in Bumpe and Ribí. This explains the reason why the chiefs felt so serious about the whole situation. But they failed to restrain the Yoni from carrying out their designs over the Bumpe and Ribí. However, the story of this new development that eventually led to the Yoni Expedition of 1887, does not belong here, and would be related in its proper place.

The period 1828 - 1884 is very crucial in the history of the Rokel region (as indeed it is in the history of the whole of Temne country). From about the last quarter of the 18th century, the Temne had been in decline; dominated by the Susu in Port Loko area, angered by the Loko on the Rokel and elsewhere, and harassed by the new settlement in Freetown. But by the beginning of the period under review, the Temne had entered into their period of

revival. And so 1828 - 1884 was essentially a period of change which affected both social, political and economic life of the people. In Port Loko area the Temne had (in 1816) successfully destroyed Susu domination. In 1828, they turned against the Loko who were defeated and forced to seek refuge in other areas. However, some Loko were allowed to remain in Temne areas where they were gradually absorbed by the Temne.

But the Temne failed to contain the growing influence of the settlement in Freetown. There are two main reasons for this: first, is the fact that the Colony had behind her the power and might of the British Empire; secondly (and perhaps more important) the course of the development in their social, economic and political life during this period rendered the efforts of Temne rulers ineffective in challenging the Colony's pretensions. The founders of the settlement - powerful humanitarians in Britain - believed strongly that Africa was barbarous and uncivilised because Africans traded in slaves and were not christians. To civilise Africa, give her christianity and develop her legitimate commerce which, by its inherent superiority over the trade in human beings (illegitimate by contrast) would raise the debased African to the level of a civilised man.

Freetown, right from the time of its establishment, was conceived as a base for spreading those "blessings of industry and civilization". But all these were to be achieved informally through missionary enterprise and free trade. However, for trade and missionary work to prosper there must be law and order. This,

in turn, could only be established, either through a continuous use of force, or the establishment of some sort of Colonial rule. The latter alternative was galling to the British Government whose experience in the West African politics so far had not been favourable in the pestilential West African coast, and who was not prepared to spend the hard-earned British tax-payer's money over a region where little or no return could be expected.

But the policy of "relief and retire" failed to solve the problem because it made little or no attempt to understand the people or the circumstances of the situations involved. The politics of the African rulers, no doubt, were complex and perplexing to the administration, which was apparently baffled by them. Even T.G. Lawson (the Government Interpreter) who was by far the most informed official in the Administration over native matters throughout the later part of this period, was baffled on many occasions. And his suggestions for solution of the problems could only be pragmatic, not lasting. The policy of "peace-begging" also proved ineffective for most of the treaty chiefs only spent their stipends in procuring arms and ammunition, the possession of which increase the risk of war among the people. Also the stipends created jealousies among some of the local rulers. The Rokel chiefs were particularly offended by the disparity between their own stipends and those of Port Loko chiefs, which remained unchanged after the 1857 treaty, even though the Rokel afterwards (i.e. until early 1870s) became the most important centre of trade.

Towards the end of our period the enthusiasm of the earlier

years had given way to frustration - frustration expressed with a high moral tone of righteous indignation bordering sometimes almost on incivility. In a handing over remark in May, 1877, the Administrator in charge states: "I regret to say that it is quite clear to me that the efforts of Her Majesty and the people of England to raise the people and continent of Africa up to the standard of a civilised nation are frustrated by savages worse than brutes whom the chiefs supposed to be governing are incompetent to exercise any control and are therefore in reality not chiefs or they would their people obedient to their will."¹

Two major considerations dictated Temne relations with the Administration in Freetown; first, the immense value they all placed upon the trade with the Colony, and secondly, their desire to preserve their independence and sovereignty. The development of legitimate commerce had altered the basis of the people's economic structure which had hitherto been rooted in the slave trade. But the people got adjusted to the situation quickly. However, the European traders on the coast began to encourage direct contact with the producing regions in the interior, largely in response to the demands of the peoples in the interior themselves. This, the coastal middlemen resented and tried to obstruct because it threatened their privileged position.

As the period progressed, and the Rokel trade increased, so did the Temne become more and more desirous that the trade should not be disturbed. The series of meeting and palavers they held

1. G.I.L. Administrator's remarks. May 28, 1877.

with the Colony representatives (most of which were initiated by the chiefs themselves) show the concern the local rulers felt towards the frequent wars and disorder in the region. They co-operated with the Administration in the various attempts made at making the Rokel free and safe for trade. They welcomed the series of peace and trade treaties and arrangements with the Colony and among themselves in 1831, 1836, 1837, 1841 and 1857. They welcomed the stipend system (which was paid in cash from 1858) first, because it provided them with the extremely useful liquid cash which is so much easier to carry and secondly because it gave them the assurance, as long as it was paid, that the Colony was on their side.

The attitude of the chiefs towards the settlement ranged from open friendship to open hostility. The majority of them, however, seemed lukewarm and cautious. The chiefs, indeed, ~~may~~ might be poor, and their territories small (in some cases); but they regarded themselves as, and were, independent sovereigns in their own right. And they were all very jealous and sensitive about it. They addressed the Governor, the Queen's representative, as their equal, and co-operated with him only when he accorded them their due respect. They withdrew their co-operation and imposed sanctions on the Colony whenever they felt that they were not being fairly treated, or the Governor was not on their side.

Throughout this period, Bai Simera of Masimera was the only Temne ruler that received an unmitigated condemnation from the Colony administration. Bai Komp of Kolifa, was, to the Government

"a nice king [with] a good character".¹ In return for his efforts during the peacemaking on the Rokel in the 1880s, he and his war chief, Karamgba, won the Queen's medal of honour.² Of Bai Yoso of Mayoso (who spoke English fairly well) Hay, writing in August, 1886, says: "----there is nothing to lead me to think otherwise, but good of you."³ T.G. Lawson describes Bai Sebora of Yoni (who died in exile in 1880) as "a grave dignified-looking person"⁴ who was pushed to attack the Rokel region by the arrogant spirit of Bai Simera. And for Pa Sanaq, the blind Regent chief of Yoni (after Bai Sebora) Lawson had nothing but praise, for "this chief has always been willing and ready to do" what is right⁵ (i.e. whatever the Colony requested him to do). Bai Kurr of Mabang (who died in 1876) was described as "a very good old king",⁶ and of Santigi Momo Raka who became Bai Suba An Pessor of Magbeli in 1887 Lawson said, "no better man than he can be appointed."⁷

But in the confused and perplexing situation of the latter part of our period, the local Temne chiefs, hampered by situations

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1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Sept. 14, 1887.
 2. G.A.L. No.75. Havelock to Bai Komp & Karamgba. Aug. 14, 1884. But the Medals were still lying on the Governor's table in September 1887 uncollected (see G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Sept. 14, 1887).
 3. G.A.L. No.41. Hay to Bai Yoso. Aug. 19, 1886.
 4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Dec. 27, 1878.
 5. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. April 13, 1883.
 6. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. April 24, 1882.
 7. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Dec. 13, 1886.

and developments beyond their control, became less and less able to cope with the problem of restoring law and order. And the Colony influence, as the only effective power in the territory, increased in proportion as the chiefs control weakened. The only chief who saw the logical outcome of this development, and was prepared and bold enough to oppose it openly, was Bai Simera of Masimera. But the Bai was alone in his gallant opposition to the spread of British influence and power in his country and became more and more isolated as the effects of his wars threw the Rokel into greater disorder and chaos. At long last he was forced to capitulate.¹

1. But the Bai Simera remained uncompromising in his attitude towards the Colony and openly supported the Yoni in the Yoni Expedition of 1887, and was put in gaol by Governor Rowe.

CHAPTER VITHE TRADE WARS:THE YONI EXPEDITION OF 1887.

During the second half of the 19th century a series of prolonged conflicts, engendered primarily by commercial rivalry, engulfed large sections (though not in equal degree) of what later became known as the Sierra Leone Protectorate; particularly those regions on or near the river heads beyond which the rivers are no longer navigable, where the various peoples of the hinterland brought their produce for sale to wealthy middlemen and to Colony and European traders, and bought such European manufactured goods and other commodities as they desired. The rulers of these tide-water trading centres grew rich from rents and duties and competed among themselves for the control of those centres. The competition intensified or abated as trade increased or decreased. Wars broke out, following the traditional alignment of those who lacked trade against those that had it.

On the Scarcies Rivers, on the Port Loko Creek, on the Rokel River, in Bumpe and Ribí area, on the Jong (Taia) River, on the Bum River, and in the Gallinas area, the various local rulers occupying the tide-water trading centres in those regions fought among themselves, and employed professional warriors from the immediate hinterland to fight for them, for the purpose of seizing the control of the trade in their particular areas. Organised inland groups also fought for a share in the trade. The wars were not "tribal", for they were not fought along tribal lines but

principally on a commercial basis which often took no notice of tribal affiliations. Creole and European traders took sides and supplied arms, so supporting the wars which brought them large returns when they managed to escape plunder. Colony officials, forbidden to involve the administration in the local disputes found they could take no effective action to maintain peace and intervened as partisans rather than as mediators.

One of the most critical areas during this period was the Bumpé and Ribí region. The Bumpé and Ribí area¹ had become important since the era of the Atlantic Slave trade. In the 18th century Mende immigrants from the interior swamped the original Sherbro inhabitants. Towards the end of the century a Muslim Mandinka chief ruled the area. And it was in response to his request for trade with the newly established Colony that two emissaries from Freetown, James Watt and John Gray, went up the Kamaranka and the Bumpé Rivers in 1795. In 1820 the Caulkers, descendants of Thomas Corker, an employee of the Company of Merchants trading into Africa, and his Sherbro wife, Seniors Doll, Duchess of Sherbro, leased the Banana Island at 250 bars a year, and Thomas Caulker moved to Bumpé on the mainland and became the ruler of the area.

Following the defeat of the Loko by the Temne in early 1840s, a group of the former, led by Sori Kesebe, a well known warrior, went to fight for the Caulker family in Bumpé. In return for this service the Caulkers allowed him and his followers to settle

1. This historical survey is based on C.H. Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone. O.U.P. 1962. Passim.

at Rotifunk. Sori Kesebe proceeded to entrench himself by the admission of over 200 Fula traders into his settlement; thereby arousing the envy and jealousy of both the Mende and Sherbro, and his Caulker overlords. The Caulkers proved incapable of controlling their many and different subjects effectively. In 1881 the Caulkers formally acknowledged the dubious Turner treaty of 1825 (revived in 1879) which ceded Bumpe and Ribí region to the British Crown. The area involved stretched from the Ribí River southwards to the British Sherbro, but the precise limit, particularly towards the hinterland, remained vague and indefinite.

The landlocked Yoni Temne were perhaps the most dissatisfied inland group from the way their efforts to secure footholds in the trading areas near their country were systematically frustrated by their neighbours to the north and west. They resorted to fight; first against the Masimera Temne who did not allow them free access to Magbela and other trading centres on the Rokel River. Their first attack came in 1859, and for the next 20 years or so they fought desperately to keep the Rokel trade open to their people. The wars spread far and wide - to Kolifa, Gbonkolenken, and Koya - and badly disrupted the trade the combatants were fighting for. By the 1870s Rokel River had ceased being an important centre of trade. Trade had shifted southwards, to Bumpe and Ribí region and to Sherbro area following the development of the trade in palm-produce - kernels in particular - which was given official protection (and subjected to

official duties) after the annexation of the regions in 1870.

As trade shifted so did Yoni interest shift with it, southwards - to Bumpe and Ribí region. But the Kpa Mende refused to allow Yoni traders to pass through their country to Senehun and other river ports in Bumpe and Ribí.¹ At the same time Sori Kesebe and his Loko followers were reported² "in the habit of seizing and plundering [Yoni and Kolifa] people when coming down from their country" to trade. On one occasion he and his followers reportedly detained no less than 147 such traders from Kolifa.³ The first Yoni attack on the Bumpe and Ribí came in April, 1880, when a group of Yoni Mabanta attacked one of Sori Kesebe's towns near Rotifunk, took away "a lot of people" and killed others.⁴ The Mende, who were themselves not friendly towards Sori Kesebe and his Loko and Fula followers, seized the opportunity of this Yoni attack to plunder some of his property.

Governor Havelock summoned all the chiefs of Bumpe, Ribí, Koya, Yoni, and the Mende of Senehun to a general meeting in Freetown "so as to settle finally all disputes and matters in those countries".⁵ But the peace meeting failed to materialize. In March, 1882, chief Gbanya of Senehun wrote to inform T.G. Lawson, the Government Interpreter, that the Yoni had

1. G.I.L. Lawson to John Parker, Aug. 20, 1880.

2. G.I.L. Lawson to Sori Kesebe, dated Mar. 31, 1883.

3. Ibid.

4. G.I.L. Lawson to Sori Kesebe (a reply), dated April 16, 1880.

5. G.A.L. Letter No.51 from Gov. Havelock to Sori Kesebe, dated Sept. 7, 1881.

congregated at some place near his country waiting for an opportune moment to "carry war" into Bumpe and Ribí.¹ However, the Regent chief of Yoni, Pa Sanna, managed to dissuade his warriors from carrying war into a territory under Her Majesty's protection. He wrote the Governor saying "he is in Yoni country on behalf of his Excellency".²

But in March of the following year, the Yoni were once more on the war path, supported by the Temne of Kolifa and some Mende volunteers led by Momodu Say of Kwelu.³ The war seemed to have been organised against Sorí Kesebe and his Loko followers. Havelock wrote to both Pa Sanna and Bai Komp of Kolifa urging them to restrain their warriors from carrying war to Bumpe and Ribí, for "those countries are now the Queen's."⁴ Once again Pa Sanna successfully dissuaded his men from attacking the "Queen's country."⁵

In June, 1883, Pa Sanna and his head chiefs sent a delegation of Yoni chiefs to Bumpe and Ribí - to Sorí Kesebe's town, Rotifunk - to have matters amicably settled.⁶ He sent invitations to both Richard Canre baCaulker, the nominal overlord of Bumpe and Ribí, and Canre Mahoi, the chief of Ribí area, for the general

1. G.I.L. Lawson to Gbanya (a reply), dated Mar. 28, 1882.

2. G.I.L. Lawson to Pa Sanna (a reply), dated May 23, 1882.

3. G.A.L. No.19. Havelock to Mende chiefs of Senehun area, dated Mar. 13, 1883.

4. G.A.L. Nos. 18 and 20. Havelock to Pa Sanna and Bai Komp respectively, dated Mar. 13, 1883.

5. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, dated Apr. 13, 1883.

6. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, dated June 15, 1883.

peace meeting. But neither chief Caulker nor his subordinate, Mahoi, would attend a peace meeting in Sori Kesebe's town. Yoni chiefs felt very much offended by this slight, for, as they charged "it is they (Caulker and Mahoi) who constantly send up to [Yoni] to hire or induce war men to come down to Bumpe by which the name of their country [Yoni] is held up as those who are fond of war and disturbance."¹

Pa Sanna, a blind man of considerable wealth, came originally from Masingbi in Kunike country, where his mother, a daughter of the Kajoros of Yoni Mabanta, had married a Konte.² He (Pa Sanna) had been invited by the Yoni Mabantas to help look after the affairs of that section of the Yoni country. When Bai Seboru Kenkeh died in exile in 1880, he was asked to take over the affairs of the whole country as Regent chief (Pa Rok) with his headquarters at Ronietta. He was assisted by one Pa Gbese. Pa Sanna was recalled as a remarkable medicine man and diviner. He had a soothsayer called Pa Foyimisa to help him. This soothsayer had warned Yoni leaders against their warriors giving military assistance to any "stranger" from Bumpe and Ribí, for the outcome would not be to their best interest. This was the reason why Pa Sanna had been so anxious about maintaining peace between his own country and the Bumpe and Ribí. But the failure of both Caulker and Mahoi to honour his invitation to a general peace meeting was a very serious set back to his policy. For after the

1. Ibid.

2. Oral Tradition: Sira.

slight, it became extremely difficult for him to restrain his warriors - including even some of his own chiefs.

Towards the end of 1883 one Selayamana, the son of Bure Bendu, an important chief of Ribí whose death was believed by his son to have been caused by his rival chief, Canre Mahoi, went to Yoni to hire warriors to help him avenge his father's death.¹ Pa Sanna was still opposed to Yoni warriors going to Ribí to fight. The young warriors revolted,² led by an outstanding professional warrior called Kondo, and forced the Regent chief (Pa Rok) into voluntary exile in his home country - Kunike. The warriors went in to help Selayamana taking with them the sacred guardian spirit of the chiefdom (E yithra). Pa Sanna's own son also joined the warriors taking with him his father's famous war medicines.³

On March 25, 1884, Governor Havelock commissioned Alimami Lahai Bundu of Foredugu, Koya, to talk to Yoni chiefs, and to warn them of the likely consequences that might follow if they carried war to Bumpe and Ribí.⁴ On March 26, before Lahai Bundu had had time to carry out the assignment, Yoni warriors attacked Kantine, a small town on the Ribí, belonging to Canre Mahoi.⁵ The other Ribí chiefs, including Sori Kesebe, quickly mounted a

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Mar. 22, 1884. Also, Oral Tradition: Sira.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Nov. 3, 1883.

3. Oral Tradition: Sira.

4. G.A.L. No.16, Mar. 25, 1884.

5. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Mar. 26, 1884.

counter attack and drove the Yoni towards Koya. The Yoni, in retreat, attacked Mabang and Masanki, both on the Ribí, and burnt a few other villages, plundering and capturing property and slaves.¹ Canre Mahoi sent to hire mercenaries in Tikonko,² and Canre baCaulker sent to Imperi, Sherbro,³ for a similar purpose. Havelock sent a personal message to Yoni chiefs warning them against the possible consequences of Kondo's activities if not curbed. But Momodu Waka, the Governor's overland messenger sent to Yoni, reported that the whole country was in a confused state.⁴ The chiefs had lost control over Kondo and his followers; the only chief, Wiawa of Romesgren, who had any influence on him was away in Gbonkolenken peacemaking. Havelock also wrote both Canre Mahoi and Canre baCaulker warning them against hiring mercenaries for "foreign forces often do greater harm than good."⁵

On April 25, the Yoni made another attack on the Ribí but were driven away by Sorí Kesebe's war men who pursued them as far as Malancho (Yoni) which the pursuers captured and burnt taking about 258 persons including some important chiefs.⁶ Havelock was rather pleased with this, and as an incentive for greater

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1. G.I.L. Statement by Bangang, son of Canre Mahoi, Mar. 27, 1884.
 2. G.A.L. No.25. Havelock to Canre Mahoi, Apr. 14, 1884.
 3. G.A.L. No.27. Havelock to Richard Canre baCaulker, Apr.14,1884.
 4. G.I.L. Momodu Waka's report, Apr. 9, 1884.
 5. G.A.L. Nos. 25 and 27. Havelock to Mahoi and Caulker resp. Apr. 14, 1884.
 6. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Apr. 25, 1884.

effort, offered a reward for the capture of Kondo.¹ Lawson appealed to traders to co-operate.² In the meantime Rokel chiefs gathered in Magbela and sent a delegation of 23 of their number to the governor "to ascertain his mind" on the situation,³ and to inform him that they had arranged to send a delegation to Yoni to try and secure peace.⁴

Then, in May, 1884, the war took a dramatic turn for the worse; the Mende of Taiama got involved.⁵ The Taiama Mende, a group of the Kpa Mende of Moyamba District, Sierra Leone, came, according to local traditions,⁶ to their present home some time in the 18th century. Their leader-founder, who was a great hunter, was called Kori. (He gave his name to "Kori chiefdom" of which Taiama is the chiefdom headquarters). When Kori and his followers arrived in this region they made Fodikamba, the Koranko chief of Foindu (Yoni) their landlord.⁷ And it was from here (Foindu) that they went a-hunting. During one of these hunts Kori killed an elephant very near the present site of Taiama and, in accordance with Mende customary practice, decided to establish a settlement there.

The first few years of the settlement was not a particularly

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1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. May 3, 1884.
 2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. May 6, 1884.
 3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, May 12, 1884.
 4. G.A.L. No.45. Havelock to Bumpé, Ribí and Senehun chiefs, May 16, 1884.
 5. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, May 16, 1884.
 6. Oral Tradition: Gbappi.
 7. Oral Tradition: Vandí.

happy period; for the Banta "owners" of the land attacked and raided it from time to time, from their important town of Mano, about 14 miles from Taiama, then ruled by a sorcerer called Bayohun. After a series of reverses Taiama warriors eventually succeeded in capturing Bayohun.¹ And with this defeat of Mano the Taiama Mende became the supreme power in that area. But after the successes of Taiama against the Banta, the Yoni became jealous and apprehensive of their one-time guests. Under their war leader, Pa Roge of Foindu, recalled as a wonderful warrior,² the Yoni began to organise raids against Taiama and other Kpa Mende settlements in the area. During one of these raids Pa Roge and his men killed one of the wives of Kagbeke the chief of Taiama. Taiama retaliated by preventing Yoni traders from passing through their country to Senehun and other river ports in the Bumpe and Ribí to trade.³ But Yoni attacks on the Ribí also affected the Mende themselves by rendering the trade route from Senehun to Mongeri, which served the latter, insecure.

The Mende decided to attack. Fierce fighting ranged for three days, at the end of which Kondo's stockade was taken with many killed on both sides. In June, 1884, there was another Mende attack,⁴ organised primarily by the Mende of Senehun, who belong to the same Kpa Mende group, but including large numbers of warriors from Taiama area, on Robari and Makondu. But they

1. Oral Tradition: Gbappi and Sinnah (for an account of Bayohun)

2. Oral Tradition: Gbappi.

3. G.I.L. Lawson to Parker, Aug. 20, 1880.

4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, July 8, 1884.

were repulsed in both places by the Yoni who drove them back into their country.

In August Pa Sanna, now back in Yoni, went to Masimera to arrange with the important chief of this old Temne country, a settlement that would ensure peace between his country and the Bumpe and Ribí.¹ Bai Simera of Masimera had been engaged since June by Governor Havelock to help restore peace. But it seems Freetown had little confidence in him as a peace-maker because of his obvious predisposition in favour of the Yoni and his uncompromising attitude towards the growing Colony influence in Temne country. His intense dislike of the Loko and the Bundukas on the Rokel and in Bumpe and Ribí areas were also bound to influence his assessment of the disturbed situation in those areas. He wrote² to inform the governor that the family of Lohai Bundu of Foredugu were responsible for the state of war and confusion in the country. But Governor Pinkett vehemently rejected this, adding, "such report is not credited by this government."³

In March, 1885, Bumpe and Ribí rulers reported that some Yoni war men were gathering in Masimera in preparation for launching an attack on their country, but that they had taken appropriate measures and sent war men to Masafi, the Masimera town where they were gathered, attacked it "killing and capturing

1. G.I.L. Lawson to Lahai Bundu, Aug. 26, 1884.

2. G.A.L. No.94. Pinkett to Bai Simera (a reply), Oct. 7, 1884.

3. Ibid.

a great number" of the Yoni warriors.¹ In April the Mende of Taiama attacked Yonibana and sacked it.² The Yoni in retaliation took "a very large army" to Gbangbama, a Kpa Mende town, but were defeated.³ And a month later the Mende again defeated them in an encounter which took place near Taiama.⁴

After this the Yoni withdrew from the Taiama front and concentrated on Bumpe and Ribí. In July, Alimami Sise Loll of Rokel (a village near Magbela on the opposite side of the river Rokel) went down to Freetown and reported to the Governor that "the Yonidwere preparing in three divisions to attack Guja, Bompeh and Ribee", and implored him to help put a stop to it.⁵ In November, the Yoni attacked Mafengbe, in Koya, and quickly overran most of the upper part of that country, including Lahai Bundu's towns.⁶ On November 24, they attacked Songo (or Prince Alfred's) Town, including some of the towns in ceded Koya.⁷ Bai Simera of Masimera, and Bokari Bomboli, ~~an~~ important chief of a ceded Koya town - Bankaloll, were said to be privy to this last attack "on account of the hatred they bear towards the Bunduka family".⁸ Governor Rowe, back again in the Colony, wrote a

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Apr. 21, 1885.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, May 2, 1885.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, May 19, 1885.

4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, July 10, 1885.

5. G.I.L. Statement of Alimami Sise Loll, July 14, 1885.

6. G.I.L. Lawson to Bumpe, Ribí and Senehun chiefs, Nov. 8, 1885.

7. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Nov. 25, 1885.

8. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Nov. 30, 1885.

stern letter to Yoni chiefs demanding an immediate explanation for their action in bringing war to the Queen's country.¹

Colonial office sanctioned a limited military action mainly of a punitive nature against the Yoni. But Freetown wisely realized that any military action of a limited nature against the formidable Yoni strongly entrenched in their stockades, with their superior knowledge of the countryside, and openly supported by Masimera, Kolifa and Gbonkolenken, would be a humiliating failure.² At the same time reports were reaching Freetown that Richard Canre baGaulker had fallen out completely with his Loko hosts under Sori Kesebe and was planning to employ Yoni warriors to drive them out of his country, including his own chief Canre Mahoi.³

Rowe felt it necessary to tour the troubled parts to employ his own personal influence, which he believed was considerable among the local rulers, to restore normality. But the Yoni threatened to attack him if he came anywhere near their country, and so he wisely kept clear of that area.⁴ When he returned to Freetown he seized some Yoni traders in the Settlement and deported them to the Gambia.⁵ Then he sent letters to Rokel chiefs asking them to meet Major Festing, his special service officer, at Mamaligi in Masimera, and implored them to intercede in the dispute between Yoni and Bumpe and Ribí, and get the former

1. G.A.L. No.55. Rowe to Yoni chiefs, Dec. 1, 1885.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Jan. 9, 1886.

3. Ibid.

4. G.A.L. No.19. Rowe to chief Wiawa (Yoni), Jan. 27, 1886.

5. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Jan. 28, 1886.

to release captured British subjects.¹

Major Festing embarked on his mission² on January 20, 1886, and as he travelled along the Rokel River, he made brief stops in various places to interview and caution the chiefs and their people. He informed his Governor that the main cause of the trouble was "the harbouring by one state of runaways from another, and particularly the receiving by a neutral district of prisoners taken by a friendly district at war."³ During his interviews with the local chiefs he went into lengthy explanations of the meaning and working of European Extradition Laws, the implications of which they "thoroughly understood,"⁴ and the introduction of which he felt, strongly, would eradicate all wars in the country. While he was in Rokel (Alimami Sise Loll's town) some Yoni traders brought rice down to that tide-water trading centre for sale. They were eager to confirm the veracity of "the warlike reports that had reached their ears."⁵ Between Rokel and Rokon (Gembu Smart's town) a distance of about six miles, his party passed "no less than 34 hampers of rice on the road in transit to Rokel"⁶ for sale. Trade was still brisk,

1. G.A.L. No.33. Rowe to Sori Kesebe. Feb. 14, 1886.

2. For Major Festing's Reports see "Correspondence respecting Disturbances in the Native Territories adjacent to Sierra Leone". P.P. 1886, vol. XLVII.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

and life normal; a sharp and disappointing contrast to what Festing expected, and a pointer to the degree of exaggeration that usually accompanied reports of warring activities of the "savage hordes" in the interior.

At Masimera, the aged Bai Simera Kamal suggested the exchange of prisoners with Sori Kesebe before entering into peace talks. But Festing insisted, on his Governor's instructions, that "the insult to the Queen ... be first atoned for."¹ On February 11, a great assembly of over 200 people took place at Makeni, a small border town between Yoni and Masimera, attended by many Yoni chiefs.² Chief Wiawa of Romesgren and Pa Yalu (Pa Sanna's successor as Regent chief) of Ronietta, the two spokesmen for Yoni, denied any knowledge of the attack on the Queen's territory. They claimed that it was the work of their "ungovernable" war boys, and asked for the Queen's pardon. Festing granted this and made the chiefs put their marks on a written undertaking never to allow their war boys to carry war into the Queen's territory again.

The Major exclaimed afterwards that "the war between them, the Gujas, Ribes, and Bumpe's is, I am happy to say, now at an end."³ To commemorate the occasion Yoni chiefs planted two cotton trees and two kolanuts - symbols of peace and prosperity. Then Rowe and Festing sent letters to Bumpe and Ribi chiefs,

1. Ibid.

2. Major Festing's report (op.cit.) Feb. 11, 1886.

3. Ibid.

Sori Kesebe and Canre Mahoi in particular, warning them against any future warring or provocative activities against the Yoni.¹

In April, Yoni chiefs: Bokari Kulama, Pa Kondu of Makondu, Pa Yalu, Bokari Magbese and others, arrived in Freetown for the final peace treaty with the governor.² Bumpe and Ribi chiefs joined later, and the treaty finally got signed on May 10, 1886. Rabin Bundu of Mamaligi got £10 "for his good behaviour ... for sheltering and feeding all the captives recovered from the Yondies." The chiefs then sent the usual letter of gratitude through the Governor to the Queen, containing the usual fine sentiments, beautifully expressed, and promises of good behaviour and co-operation with the Colony authorities in the effort to maintain peace.³ Letters of this nature were usually written by Colony officials or their agents primarily to justify, and to give weight to, the Administration's line of action.

But fine sentiments and promises alone, however beautifully expressed, could hardly be expected to bring lasting peace. Yoni's desire for free access to Bumpe and Ribi remained unsatisfied. The deep divisions and antipathies among the various leaders and peoples of Bumpe and Ribi itself remained unresolved. Kondo, the "Cromwell of Yondeland,"⁴ and his followers did not even attend the peace meetings, for professional warriors lived by war, and peace talks were not in their interest. The Temne

1. "Correspondence" op.cit. Rowe to Sori Kesebe, Feb. 13, 1886; Festing to Canre Mahoi, Feb. 14, 1886.

2. G.A.L. No.54. Apr. 4, 1886.

3. "Correspondence" op.cit. May 12, 1886.

4. Major Festing's report (op.cit.) Jan. 27, 1886.

of the Rokel region remained uncompromising in their attitude towards the Bunduka family. No attempt was made to contain the provocative attitude of the Loko residents in Bumpe and Ribbi and on the Rokel River. The war between Yoni and Taiama Mende continued and was bound to spread to other areas.

Indeed, as the peace treaty itself clearly pointed out, no attempt was made "to go into the causes of war."¹ Freetown failed repeatedly to appreciate the fact that these wars were not merely the result of the "savagery of war-like tribes." The Administration made no serious attempt to understand the situations involved, but felt that by merely collecting the chiefs in Freetown and making them put their marks on a piece of paper, the contents of which had little or no import as far as they were concerned, peace would be secured. Freetown failed to see through the customary African politeness and generosity towards "strangers", and took them for a desire to co-operate.

In the circumstances, one would expect only one result: the continuation of the wars. However, the month of May, when the peace treaty was signed, is the busiest month of the year when the people "brush" their new rice farms for the next harvest. And the next three or four months immediately following this "brushing" is the rainy season, during which period the wars were normally suspended. Many of the warriors would return to their villages to prepare their rice farms, except "those who walk about

1. See Clause IV of Treaty No.101 (May 10, 1886). Montagu, op.cit.

with swords and do not till the land."¹

As the rains began to decrease so did the raids and rumours of raids increase. Deputy Governor Hay invited Yoni chiefs to a meeting again; this time at Mamaligi.² A letter from him was read to the chiefs, giving expression to the much dissatisfaction he felt about the situation in their country, and giving them promises of government assistance if they co-operated to maintain peace, particularly towards Bumpe and Ribi, from which direction they needed fear no attack. With this assurance, the Yoni felt free to turn their full attention to the Mende of Taïama whom they decided must be crushed once and for all.

According to Yoni tradition,³ the people held a big meeting in Yonibana, to plan the best way to prosecute the offensive against the Kpa Mende of Taïama, which meant in essence the capture of the latter's hitherto impregnable strongholds at Juma and Mankore.⁴ While the debate was going on, one of the young, yet unknown, warriors jumped up and swore that he would help Yoni to capture those stockades. His name was Sebankalo Gbandegowa,⁵ later called Gbanka, which means "warrior" in Temne. He requested as his reward, seven (some say six) of the captured slaves, should he succeed in capturing those strongholds.⁶ The

1. Major Festing's report (op.cit.), Jan. 21, 1886.

2. G.A.L. No.95. Nov. 11, 1886.

3. Oral Tradition: Smart, S.

4. Oral Tradition: Bia, S., and Smart S.

5. Oral Tradition: Loya, K.

6. Oral Tradition: Bia, S., Loya, K., Smart, S.

elders agreed to allow him to try. And so began a career that was to make this young warrior the most famous, the most cruel, and so the most feared professional warrior in the history of Yoni Temne. He was certainly the most outstanding warrior in the later years of the era of the trade wars.

Gbanka was a Kamara from old Yonibana town (Sar Fera). His father was Pa Semando.¹ His mother was a Kpa Mende from Talama area.² He was brought up in Ronietta, where he lived for a long time with his mother. During his early life, he showed no signs of a future great warrior, and was even often sneered at for his effeminate actions. However, he was a good drummer, particularly the Kissi drum called Panga, the drummers of which were often nicknamed Gbandegowa.³

Gbanka left Ronietta under very humiliating circumstances.⁴ His mother had dreamt about enemies bringing war to Ronietta, and was indiscreet enough to relate it openly in defiance of a customary practice that forbade women to relate such dreams openly. She was ritually killed and Gbanka forced to perform certain humiliating ceremonies connected with the incident. After this Gbanka left Ronietta and settled in his own father's town Yonibana; but he never forgot nor forgave Ronietta people for that humiliation.

1. Oral Tradition: Gbengba.

2. Oral Tradition: Loya K.

3. Ibid.

4. Oral Tradition: Sira.

Then came the war between the Yoni and the Kpa Mende of Taiama. In the early stages of this war the former suffered a series of disastrous defeats, primarily because the Yoni were at that time fighting on two fronts. The Mende had hurled a lot of insults on the Yoni as a result of these defeats, including calling the latter "women".¹ So when Gbanka offered his services in destroying the Kpa Mende, he asked first to be initiated into the Women's Society - Bondo - saying "the Mende have called us women and I am going to destroy them as a woman."² After the initiation ceremonies he undertook a journey to Koranko land (the traditional home of many Yoni Temne) where he met a sorcerer, who gave him some charms (shebe).³

From Koranko land he went first to Masimera, where he fought for Bai Simera Kamal, with the intention of testing the efficacy of the charms given him by the sorcerer in Koranko country.⁴ From Masimera he sent to inform the elders in Yoni that he was now ready for his Mende assignment. War "boys" were got ready for him. The Yoni encamped at two strongly fortified strongholds (Ro Banka) at Makrugbe and Ro Mess, near the Senehun/Mongeri trade route.⁵ From here his war boys successfully stormed and captured Juma, the Mende war camp near Taiama, in March, 1886.⁶ After the capture of Juma, Gbanka's reputation as

1. Oral Tradition: Smart, S.

2. Ibid.

3. Oral Tradition: Loya, K.

4. Ibid.

5. Oral Tradition: Bia, S.

6. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Mar. 8, 1886.

a warrior began to spread. From Makrugbe and Ro Mess his war boys systematically destroyed Mende stockades one after the other, plundering and capturing slaves. His warring activities on the most important route linking Bumpé and Ribí with the interior stopped the flow of trade and caused some concern in Freetown. But his success and reputation also roused the jealousy of the older warriors like Kondo and Kalawa.

On his return to Yonibana, Gbanka demanded the reward of seven slaves promised him by the elders. But the latter, no doubt on the instigation of the old warriors, refused to pay him the reward saying that Gbanka should not ask for a reward fighting for his country.¹ Gbanka became very annoyed and went over to the Kpa Mende, who, after overcoming their initial suspicion, rallied round him; seizing the opportunity to avenge themselves on the Yoni. Many Yoni warriors also deflected and followed Gbanka to the Mende side. Among these was his own brother, Raka, who later became the leader of the Mende warriors of Senehun area.

Gbanka, leading the Mende warriors, first captured both Makrugbe and Ro Mess from the Yoni, and set up his own war-camp at the former.² The Yoni sent to Malal, Masimera and Kolifa for assistance.³ Bai Simera advised⁴ that the misunderstanding be settled peacefully, and sent to request Karamgba, the War

1. Oral Tradition: Bia, S., Smart, S., Loya, K.

2. Ibid.

3. Oral Tradition: Smart, S.

4. Ibid.

~~the~~ War chief of Bai Komp of Kolifa, who had been sent by Governor Havelock to assist in negotiating peace between the Yoni and the Bumpe and Ribi, to help in settling the dispute between the Yoni and Gbanka.

Early in November, 1886,¹ Yoni leaders with Karamgba, held a meeting secretly in Yonibana where they deliberated on measures to adopt against Gbanka and the Mende. While the meeting was going on, Gbanka, who seemed to have no difficulty at all in obtaining information about Yoni's plans and strategies, sprang a sudden attack on Yonibana town. He killed many of the Yoni leaders in a most cruel manner, captured some whom he sold into slavery, and plundered a lot of property. Karamgba was among those that suffered loss, and only barely escaped with his life. Hay got to know about his activities and ordered his arrest; but Karamgba got air of the order and escaped to Mabang. At Mabang he fell out again with his hosts "who caught him and cut off his head."²

Early in January, 1887³ while Yoni chiefs were in Bumpe and Ribi ratifying the peace agreement of May the previous year, Gbanka attacked Ronietta, the chief town of Yoni Mabanta, the town where he grew up, and which he had not forgiven for the humiliations he suffered at the ritual murder of his mother. In the attack Pa Yalu, who had remained at home to look after the chieftdom while

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Nov. 13, 1886.

2. Ibid.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Jan. 7, 1887.

the other chiefs were away, was killed. Pa Kondu of Makondu wrote to the Governor saying the attack "has ... entirely upset Yondi country."¹

It was partly as a result of these activities of Gbanka (whom Freetown called Bangang), and partly as a result of the continued antipathy among the Bumpe and Ribí rulers that Hay commissioned Mr. Revington, the Acting Inspector-General of Police, to tour those areas with a view to collecting relevant information necessary for pacifying those regions.² Revington remained in the Yoni, Bumpe and Ribí countries for nearly six months; interviewing, negotiating, inducing, and reprimanding, until ill-health forced him to return first to Freetown, and later to England, a dying man.

Yoni complaints about the destruction of Ronietta by the Mende under Gbanka, while the former were away ratifying a peace agreement received no direct action from the governor. Further, the Mende of Senehun have now refused totally to allow Yoni traders to come or to pass through their country for trading purposes.³ In February, 1887, the Yoni attacked Mankore village near Senehun in Canre Mahoi's country.⁴ Hay sent letters immediately to Masimera and Koya chiefs warning them "to keep

1. G.A.L. No.20. Jan. 14, 1887.

2. Hay's series of Instructions to Revington - see G.A.L. No.23, Jan. 17, 1887; No.50, Feb. 26, 1887; No.52, Feb. 28, 1887; No.61, Mar. 3, 1887; No.75, Mar. 15, 1887; No.79, Mar. 21, 1887; No.95, Apr.2, 1887; No.98, Apr.5, 1887; No.100, Apr. 7, 1887; No.112, May 5, 1887 and No.141, June 12, 1887.

3. Oral Tradition; recorded in 1966, Sira, K.

4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Feb. 26, 1887.

from mingling in the disturbances."¹ He also sent a letter to Yoni chiefs stating that "the Bampel, Seneha, and Ribbi Districts are now all the Queen's ground and in attacking Mankuri the Yoni have committed an act which may be regarded in a very serious light." He demanded an immediate explanation. But the Yoni had no leader, Pa Yalu having been killed in the Mende attack on Ronietta in January; and so Lamina Kamara, the policeman sent with the letter had to return it undelivered.²

On March 17, Revington reported another Yoni attack on the "Queen's territory" of Bumpel and Ribbi, this time on the town of Tungie near Senehun. Revington suggested a display of force. But Hay rightly pointed out that the consequences would be grave if such a display proved ineffective. He advised therefore that "for the present you continue to use every endeavour to negotiate with these men."³ This advice, Hay must have realised was useless, for Kondo and his other professional warriors would not negotiate with Revington. Hay also sent letters to Kondo, Kongo and Kalawa, the leading Yoni warriors, asking them to explain "at once" why they took war to the Queen's country, and requesting them to "come yourselves or send good messengers to talk over the palaver with me here [Freetown]."⁴ But professional

1. G.A.L. No.53. Feb. 27, 1887.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Feb. 28, 1887.

3. G.A.L. No.79. Instructions to Revington. Mar 21, 1887.

4. G.A.L. No.81. Mar. 21, 1887.

warriors disliked peace talks. Similar letters were sent to Pa Kondu and Pa Bokari Kuliama with some presents,¹ but these chiefs could no longer control Kondo and his warriors; and in any case they seemed by now to be losing faith in a government that had failed to show any sympathy towards their people's legitimate aspirations.

By 26 March² rumours (which Lawson later said were unfounded) were circulating that the Yoni were moving towards the Colony frontier. The police post at Songo Town was reinforced. Hay himself went to Waterloo "to enquire into sundry rumours which have been current lately that Yoni meditate making a raid on Quja."³ On April 2, he instructed Revington "to continue to do all that you possibly can for the protection of the frontier on the Bampah, Ribbe and Senehun sides."⁴ The police in the border villages were alerted and warned to exercise the utmost vigilance. Madam Yoko, wife and unpopular successor of chief Gbanya of Senehun, but a great friend of the Colony, wrote, in conjunction with some Mende chiefs, to say that they on their part had agreed to cease hostility towards the Yoni, and were awaiting instructions from the government.⁵ At the same time chief Kagbeke of Taiama and his junior chiefs reported their efforts to secure peace.⁶

1. Ibid.

2. G.A.L. No.91, Mar. 26, 1887.

3. G.A.L. No.94, Mar. 28, 1887.

4. G.A.L. No.95. Instructions to Revington. April 2, 1887.

5. G.A.L. No.100. Instructions to Revington. April 7, 1887.

6. G.A.L. No.102, Apr. 11, 1887 (a reply).

Gbanka, restrained for the time being from continuing his attacks on Yoni, turned against their friends; Masimera, Malal and Mabang (Kolifa), to the great horror and dismay of the aged Bai Simera Kamal.¹ Gbanka attacked and destroyed Makonte (in Masimera) taking many captives including Bai Simera's own wife, sister and two of his children. Bai Simera wrote Hay to report the attack, and asked for assistance. Bai Koblo of Marampa also wrote asking for advice on what to do. Hay advised them "not to mix yourselves in this palaver either on one side or the other."²

When Gbanka was in Masimera, Malal leaders: Pa Korotheamba, Pa Yamba Yambo (o tsik bana), and Pa Korobo Kende Thanko, sent to warn him against allowing his war to reach their country.³ But Gbanka said he was not going to select. In Malal his war boys first attacked and destroyed Ro Polon, plundering a lot of property. Then he crossed the river (Rokel), but by that time Malal had been able to collect sufficient war men to confront him. The encounter took place near the present town of Marunia, in a grassland called Gbalgal. Pa Korotheamba, the leader of the Malal force, with the assistance of his fierce bulldog, succeeded in routing Gbanka's army. Gbanka himself was captured, but his life was spared for "a warrior should not kill another warrior."⁴ However, he was made to surrender all the property he had plundered at Ro Polon; and promise never to carry war to Malal again.

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Apr. 21, 1887.

2. G.A.L. No.116. May 10, 1887 (same reply to both letters).

3. Oral Tradition: Bia, S.

4. Oral Tradition: Bia, S.

From Malal, Gbanka moved on to Mabang in Kolifa country, where he found most of the villages deserted, the inhabitants having taken refuge in their Sacred Bushes on the news of his coming. At the same time rumours of Yoni attack on Senehun were reaching Freetown. Early in May, the Yoni under Kondo again attacked Tungie.¹ Madam Yoko charged that Kamanda of Bauya, one of her sub-chiefs, was in collusion with the Yoni out of spite for her.² Hay felt he could no longer cope with the situation and telegraphed Rowe who was then in Bathurst to come.³

In the meantime Gbanka's war was spreading chaos and disorder in the interior; in Mayoso, in the whole of Kolifa, and in part of Bombali. In the latter, however, he was defeated and forced to retreat to his stronghold at Makrugbe (Yoni) after losing "several of his warriors [and] many of the captives" he had taken.⁴ From Makurgbe he moved to Yonibana (Rochain Ka Sumbali) "where he is now attending to his farm work till the weather permits him to carry on his raids again."⁵ From Yonibana he sent to inform the Governor that he was "punishing the Timanees- [the Yoni in particular] - for the evil perpetrated by them on the Queen's territory and subjects; that the governor should not look upon him as a bad man".⁶ The Governor replied that he had no ill-

1. G.A.L. No.111. May 4, 1887.

2. G.A.L. No.112. May 5, 1887. "Instructions to Mr. Revington."

3. G.A.L. No.111. May 4, 1887.

4. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. June 8, 1887.

5. Ibid.

6. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. June 15, 1887.

feeling whatever against him and ended "the Mendis have always been the friends of this government and I trust that they will continue so."¹

The rains had come, and, with them the usual temporary cessation of hostilities, and improvements in relations all round. Professional warriors would return to their farms and villages for the needed long rest, and for the enjoyment of the fruits of their labours. In June Lawson reported that relations between the Yoni and Sori Kesebe were good, and that the latter had opened the road between Rotifunk and Yoni.² But the rainy season was not the trading season, and very few Yoni traders were likely to use that road during that period of the year. As the rains lessened and caravans from the interior began to arrive in increasing numbers with their produce, the peoples of the trading centres would become envious, and would attempt to close the roads again. As the rains disappear, old family feuds would revive; political rivals would send into the interior to hire professional warriors to fight for them.

These professional warriors would not know, and would not care to know, the cause they were fighting for, so long as they got the promised reward. When this did not materialize, they would get out of control and would attack and plunder indiscriminately. When there was a chief powerful enough, like Bai Simera of Masimera or Bai Komp of Gbonkolenken (both famous warriors), he

1. Ibid. [Lawson enclosed Gbanka's letter in John Parker's].

2. G.A.L. No.141. June 12, 1887.

would be able to keep his warriors under control. But most Temne (and indeed Sierra Leone) chiefs at this period had been rendered powerless by the incessant wars, which in turn rendered them very vulnerable to attack.

By July, the Yoni had begun to plan their new line of attack on Bumpé and Ribí.¹ But the Mende of Senehun were the first to take the field as soon as the dries set in. Early in August they occupied "certain places in Native Quja."² The warriors involved included many Lokos, led by Jonga and Gbitongo, Sori Kesebe's war leaders, and Raka, Gbanka's brother, who led the attacking party.³ The attack was said to be in revenge of an alleged humiliating treatment of Bome Warrah, one of the Many Queens of Koya, who was said to have been "tied, stocked and flogged" by Koya people for no just cause.⁴ The attack was launched from Rotifunk, Sori Kesebe's town, over-ran some parts of Koya, and set up their stockade at Mawilfila near Mahera (one of Lahai Bundu's town's). Lahai Bundu reported the attack to the Deputy Governor, and started making preparations for a counter-attack.⁵

But Hay seemed in no hurry to demand the withdrawal of Mende warriors from Koya. On August 20, W.M. Huggins, the Acting

1. G.A.L. July 5, 1887.

2. G.A.L. Aug. 17, 1887; Hay to the Colonial Secretary.

3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Aug. 23, 1887.

4. "Correspondence respecting the Recent Expedition Against the Yonka Tribe ..." P.P. 1888, vol. LXXV. W.T.G. Lawson to T.G. Lawson (his father), Aug. 10, 1887.

5. Ibid.

Manager of the Second Eastern and Koya Districts, reported that the Mende warriors had been attacking villages around their stockade in Mawilfila, and were heading for Foredugu, Lahai Bundu's main town; adding "and it only remains for me to say that no one appears much alarmed at the undeniable fact."¹ However, he felt sufficiently alarmed to reinforce the police posts along the borders of British Koya. While the Mende and Loko warriors were spreading ruin in Foredugu area, Gbanka was devastating Yoni country. He routed Yoni warriors at Matenefore and pursued them into upper Koya where some of Sori Kesebe's mercenaries joined him.²

News of his renewed activities spread quickly into the interior causing considerable panic among the people. Bai Komp of Kolifa wrote Hay reporting Gbanka's earlier attacks and about "the treatment we received from the Mendes [led by Gbanka] who took war into our country ... burnt down our towns, plundered our properties, and took our subjects captives; a nation with whom we have not the slightest quarrel."³ In the encounter he had lost the box containing the sacred things of the chief, and also his copy of the treaty of 1884, which he kept in that box. Five hundred of his subjects were taken captives. Bai Kurr of Mabang also wrote a similar letter, and concluded "I refer the matter to you and ... inform you that I am about to ask them why for no reason they took war to my country and thus treated and put me to shame."⁴

1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Waterloo, Aug. 20, 1887.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Aug. 23, 1887.

3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Kolifa, Aug. 15, 1887.

4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Mabang, Aug. 18, 1887.

But the Governor was in no hurry to act. Gbanka and the Mende were friends of the Administration. Also, their activities in the distant Kolifa country constituted no immediate danger to the interests of the Colony. Hay waited for a month and then wrote to the two chiefs requesting them not to attack back for "the whole of Bompeh and Ribbee Districts are part of this Settlement and any attack on them by any chief will be regarded as an unfriendly act towards this Government."¹ Kolifa chiefs must have felt badly let down by this breach of faith, and, like their counterparts in Yoni, Masimera, Marampa and Koya, no doubt became convinced that they could not rely any longer on the Administration for the redress of wrongs perpetrated on them and on their country by the Mende and their collaborators.

In September a combined force of Yoni, Masimera, Marampa, Ro Mendi and Koya warriors inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mende and their allies.² The fleeing Mende warriors headed towards British Koya. Freetown was alarmed. Lawson suggested a meeting of all the chiefs involved in order to prevent the war from spreading into the Queen's country.³ Hay sent Captain Halkett, the Inspector General of Police, to travel through the Bumpe and Ribbi, and British Koya, with a view to preventing the war from spreading to those regions.⁴ He was accompanied by

1. G.A.L. No.187. Sept. 19, 1887.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Sept. 3, 1887.

3. Ibid.

4. Yoni Expedition. *Op.cit.* Captain Halkett's Reports, dated Bumpe, Sept. 5, 1887; Shenge, Sept. 12, 13, 14, 1887; Rotifunk, Oct. 24 and 27, 1887.

Kong Gbanya (the son of late chief Gbanya of Senehun, the husband of Madam Yoko), Santigi Lahai, a headman at Senehun, and Longboat, Sori Kesebe's son, sent by his father to represent him. Chief Kamanda of Bauya promised to accompany him, but failed to show up.

At Tungie, chief Sanna, its headman, refused Halkett entry into his stockade and would not even come out to speak to him. At Bumpe town he tried unsuccessfully to settle the dispute between Sori Kesebe and Canre Mahoi.

But the Temme did not, as feared, pursue the Mende and their Loko allies into the Queen's country; for "they have no palaver with His Excellency." The chiefs met at Magbele and sent a letter to the Deputy Governor to state their case, and to put forward conditions that would ensure peace.¹ They wanted the Temme captives in Mende and Loko hands restored. They demanded compensation for the property damaged and plundered, and restitution for the people killed. They wanted also that the Governor would "kindly elicit from Sori K⁴esebe what we have done against him, that we may avoid another war."² They charged that "among the raiders that came against us ... we observed not a few of the Mendes and Lok⁴os residing in British territory near Waterloo,"³ and appealed to the Governor to "stop these mischief makers."⁴ Hay did nothing.

1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit., Magbele, Sept. 14, 1887.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

(Reproduced from P.P. 1888, vol. LXXV)

The chiefs held another meeting at Magbelé. Lawson heard about it and reported to Hay that "a large section of the Temne clans are uniting to avenge themselves on the Mendis, who have, by their actions, offended many of them, and there seems to be little doubt that the Quia, Marampa, Masimera, Kolifa, Yonwe and Mabang Temnes are now at one against the Mendis."¹ The Deputy Governor wrote to the chiefs warning them against "making a common cause with ... clans [Yoni, in this case] whose antecedents and interests were not identical with theirs."² He could not have been more mistaken, or more completely out of touch with the true state of things in Temne country. For the Yoni were now at one with large sections of Temne people in their antipathy towards the Mende and Loko friends of the Colony.

On October 4, 1887, at approximately 6 o'clock in the morning, a Yoni force 400 strong launched a sudden attack on Senehun.³ The attack was said to have come as a complete surprise; "we never heard any rumours of [it] before they came." But Madam Yoko, the Mende chief of the town, was away on that day, as usual on similar occasions. Two women and a man, all British subjects, were killed. The killed man was John Parker, husband of Lawson's daughter, who as a trusted friend of the Mende chiefs used to write their letters for them, and had been engaged on more than one

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1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.7, enclosure 5. Hay to Rowe, Sept. 21, 1887.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.22, enclosure. Oct. 7, 1887. (Statement of Isaac John, Police Constable from Senehun).

occasion by Colony authorities in peace-making between the Yoni and the Mende. One police constable was wounded in the encounter.

Besides Senehun, six other villages, including Bauya, Mongre (where two more Sierra Leone women were killed) and Manjehun - all belonging to Madam Yoko - were plundered and destroyed - by the Yoni raiders. At Mongre a man from Rotifunk was captured by the Yoni, who cut off "his hand, thumb and ear," and sent him first to Rotifunk, and later to Freetown "to tell the people that they are coming ... and that they will spare no one: Sierra Leone people, English officers and white people will all be treated alike".¹ He was to show himself to the governor and to tell him that they had no further business with him. The attack on Senehun area came from Makondu and was led by Kondo, Bari Sela, Kongo, and Kalawa. It was reported also that some Sofa warriors helped the Yoni.²

By October 7, the Yoni were in the vicinity of Rotifunk where they plundered some farms, and killed two people.³ Sori Kesebe was in Freetown giving evidence in a court case. Hay sent a telegraphic despatch to Governor Rowe,⁴ and another to the Colonial Office⁵ reporting the destructive attack by the Yoni

1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Enclosure 1 in Despatch No.23. Rev. R. West to Capt. Halkett, Rotifunk, Oct. 7, 1887.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.1.

5. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.21. Rowe to Holland, Oct. 18, 1887.

"savage horde", and asking for official sanction for some punitive measure against them. On October 9, the Executive Council in Freetown recommended that 50 rank and file of the 1st West India Regiment, and 10 police constables under Captain Halkett be sent to the disturbed area to protect Colony interests.¹

On October 11, Colonial Office's approval came that "a sharp and severe lesson ... be inflicted" upon the Yoni. War Office was sounded "as to the feasibility of undertaking military operations."² At Lawson's suggestion Songo Town was reinforced by an additional 30 soldiers to forestall any move by Koya Temne in support of the Yoni.³ The two men-of-war, "Acorn" and "Alecto", then in Freetown, offered assistance should their services be needed.⁴ Hay sent a sharp note of warning to the chiefs of Masimera, Marampa, Malal and Koya against colluding with the Yoni. And at a general meeting with them on October 13 and 14, he made Gbanka hand over the wife, sister and two children of Bai Simera, captured in earlier raids, "as a token of goodwill."⁵ The chiefs' demand that the Lokos resident in Koya be ordered out of that territory "as they were a constant source of trouble"⁶ was brushed aside by Hay who ordered the arrest

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1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.23. Oct. 9, 1887. Hay to Holland.
 2. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.5. Oct. 11, 1887. Holland to Hay.
 3. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Oct. 14, 1887.
 4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.8. Hay to Holland (received Oct. 12, 1887).
 5. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.24. enclosure Oct.15, 1887. Hay to Rowe.
 6. Ibid.

and detention in Freetown of Bokari Bomboli, whom Lawson disliked, the leader of the anti-Loko/Mende movement in Koya.

On October 16, Hay wrote to the Colonial Office suggesting that "the only measure that can be adopted for the defence of British jurisdiction, consistent with the honour and dignity of this government, is at least to drive the marauders out, if not to follow them up and inflict on them such a punishment as will have a lasting effect ..."¹ But Rowe, whose faith in negotiations remained unshaken called for caution, and advised "confirming yourself to adopt [only] necessary measures for defence of British jurisdiction."² But whatever action was taken should be such that "would cause the aboriginal tribes beyond the borders of the Settlement of Sierra Leone to refrain under any circumstances from kidnapping, and plundering at any place within the line that marks it, no matter what may be the provocation received from those dwelling within it."³

On October 18, Colonial Office sanctioned "hostile operations against the Yonés," and War Office named Colonel Sir Francis de Winton of the Royal Artillery, as the prospective commanding officer.⁴ On October 19, Lawson reported that Gbanka had attacked

1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.25. Oct. 16, 1887.
Hay to Holland.

2. Ibid.

3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.21. Bathurst, Oct.18, 1887. Rowe to Holland.

4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.12. Oct. 18, 1887.
War Office to Colonial Office.

and destroyed Makondu, the Yoni town from which the raid on Senehun had been launched. The fleeing Yoni defenders had taken refuge in Masimera; and so Lawson felt that any "contemplation of going to Yoni must include Masimera also."¹ On the same day Hay instructed Halkett to proceed to Rotifunk with an escort of 20 men, to ascertain the position of the Yoni, who were reported to have encamped at Mongre, and their numerical strength.²

He was to collect information on the position of Yoni strongholds to Ritifunk and to each other, and on the condition of the roads and the character of the country "having in view the movement of troops." Chiefs were to be made to clear the roads where overgrown. Sori Kesebe was to have huts prepared "for the reception of a large party of men."

On October 20, the principal Koya chiefs wrote Hay pledging their support and loyalty;³ for "from the time of our ancestors" they continued, "the interests of our country has never been disregarded by the Government of Sierra Leone. the people of Sierra Leone are our strangers, insignificant as we may be, and as such are under our special protection." The Yoni by carrying war against the Colony, they pointed out, had done so also against them. But neither Lawson nor Hay took them seriously. Lawson would put no trust on any Temne man as far as the expedition

1. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Oct. 19, 1887.

2. G.A.L. No.196. Oct. 19, 1887.

3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.27, enclosure 2, Romange (Koya), Oct. 20, 1887.

against the Yoni was concerned.¹

Hay agreed with him and commended him for "his well known loyalty to this Government" which alone could have prompted him "to supply particulars damaging to the interests of those with whom he is related."² Hay knew of course that Koya offer of loyalty and support was not wholly disinterested. In fact they were "particularly interested" as "part of the country which the Yoni now occupy, such as Robari, Makondu, Mateneforay is Quia land." And in the event of the success of the hostile measures being taken against the Yoni they might ultimately be the gainers by obtaining possession of those towns. Besides, Hay considered "they are quite prepared to espouse the cause of the side from which the greatest advantage can be gained," and so resolved to place little reliance on them.³

On October 21, Colonel Sir Francis de Winton received his instructions from the War Office.⁴ The objects of the expedition were two-fold; first, to expel the Yoni from the territory under British jurisdiction, and secondly, to inflict upon them "such punishment as may be possible without unduly extending the area of operations, with the view of impressing upon them and the adjoining tribes that they will not be allowed to invade and ravage

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1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.27, enclosure 1. Oct. 20, 1887. Memo. by Lawson.
 2. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.27, Oct. 20, 1887. Hay to Holland.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.16, enclosure, Oct. 21, 1887. War Office to Col. Sir F. W. de Winton.

British territory and kill or carry off British protected subjects with impunity." The Colonel would take such a force of troops as he might deem necessary for the purpose. The Officer administering the Colony would place at his disposal the resources of the Settlement so far as was consistent with the other interests of the Colony.

His steamer, which was scheduled to sail for the West Coast the following day, was to call at the Gambia, where he would meet Rowe, the Governor-in-Chief of the West African Settlements, whose knowledge and experience of West Africa in general, and of Sierra Leone in particular, he would be advised to seek. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had given instructions for Her Majesty's ships, "Acorn" and "Alecto" with the few sailors and marines on board to be placed at his disposal.

In the meantime the Yoni from Mongre, which they occupied in force, sent raiding parties to various parts of Bumpe and Ribí; to Monomo on the Bagru, Mokombo and Ballil on the Bumpe River, and "every unprotected village" between Senehun and Petfu, and Rokai in Cockboro, killing many and capturing many more.¹ When Captain Halkett arrived at Rotifunk on October 24, he found the town full of war boys, preparing to attack and recapture Mongre from the Yoni, but seemed extremely hesitant in making the assault for fear of the Yoni warriors.² Gbanka had recently suffered a crushing defeat in Gbonkolenken and had lost most of his men. He himself was now in Gbangbama (in Banta country)

1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Halkett's reports. Rotifunk, Oct. 24, 1887.

2. Ibid.

apparently recouping his depleted army. From there he sent to inform Sori Kesebe that he would be joining him soon.¹

From Mongre Yoni warriors sent a letter to Sori Kesebe and Canre Mahoi (later forwarded to Freetown) accusing the white man (mockingly called "Juse" - a local name for an albino - instead of the usual and respectful "O Potho") of bad faith.² The white man, they charged, had said that there should be no war, and that no war should be carried to Bumpe and Ribí, yet Bumpe and Ribí people killed and captured others, and their property, with impunity. Now, they said, the whole country were united to teach the people of Bumpe and Ribí a lesson. They had an army of 8,955 warriors drawn from all over Temme country; from Gbonkolenken, Kolifa, Marampa, Masimera, Mendi-Maforki, Malal and Koya. Korothumba, the famous Malal warrior had now joined the Yoni warriors, so had Kalawa and Sifi who "are from the East" and who had warned that "should we go out the sword will destroy lives." The letter ended, "Peace be on those that follow after the straight way."³


They told the messenger to inform Sori Kesebe and Canre Mahoi that they heard that the white people "are coming, so we are waiting for them." On Saturday, 23rd October, they set fire

1. Ibid.

2. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.30, enclosures 1 and 2. dated Oct.24, 1887.

3. The letter was written in Arabic and translated by Sanusi, Government Arabic Writer.

715 SKETCH SHOWING ROADS IN THE YONNIE COUNTRY.



Traced from a Sketch by Capt. Halkett.
V. E. King. 3 11. 87.

to Mongre town and returned to Yoni with their plunder and captives, to prepare for the white man's war.¹ Back in Yoni they divided themselves into three divisions, one division to concentrate on British Koya, and the other two on Bumpe and Ribí.² They put up additional fences and walls to strengthen their stockaded strongholds, and erected ambuscades, "their sole practical opposition to a civilized force". Special attention was paid to their border towns with Bumpe and Ribí. Robari, situated on the summit of a hill near a small brook was surrounded with a thick mud wall, two wooden fences and a ditch about four feet deep.³ Similar defence measures were taken also in respect of Makondu, Ronietta, Mano, Yonibana (which was surrounded by three wooden fences only, and no mud wall, but with the usual ditch), Magbese and other smaller fortifications. Mamaligi, Matenefore, Kalkum, Makonte and Bandasuma, border towns of Masimera country were all similarly fortified.

On October 28, Hay sent 20 non-commissioned officers and men of the West India Regiment under Lieutenant Johnstone plus one medical officer to Songo Town for the protection of that border town.⁴ On the following day news reached Freetown that Marampa warriors had started crossing into Masimera, to take up positions in the fortified Masimera border towns. Hay wrote warning Bai Simera of the possible consequences of allowing his country to be made a seat of war against the Colony. He sent a similar

1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.30, enclosure 4.
Oct. 27, 1887. Memo. by Lawson.

2. Ibid.

3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Halkett's reports. Oct. 27, 1887.

4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.30, Oct. 28, 1887.
Hay to Holland.

letter to the Bai Suba of Magbela.¹ On October 31, 20 men of the 1st West India Regiment under Lieutenant Salt went to take up position at Rotifunk, and Halkett agreed to withdraw 20 of his men for the protection of Masanki. Patrols maintained regular contact between the three garrisoned towns.²

In the meantime Hay had sent secret agents to Yoni and Masimera to report on the situation in those areas. Musa Kalu,³ the agent sent to Masimera, reported that the whole of Marampa and Masimera was full of war fever. There were war boys everywhere who talked excitedly of the approaching war with the white man. The war leader in this area was Momoh Bandaserima. Bai Simera, who wished to have nothing to do with the Government again, relinquishing even his stipend, was in Ro Katchik, the popular Marampa training camp for warriors, on a recruitment drive.

Bai Salamansa of Port Loko, a sub-chief under the Alikali, was at Makondu from where he maintained a regular contact with Magbela and Port Loko towns through his war boys. At Magbela Bai Suba was reported trying to prevent the war, but had decided that should he fail in this he would "follow what the country decided to do."⁴ All the women and children had been evacuated from Rokel and Rokon towns, and the warriors were congregating at Makonte, Bandaserima, Makondu and in particular, Robari.

1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.31, enclosure. Oct. 29, 1887; also No.35, enclosure 3, s.d. Freetown referred to him as "Pa Suba" but the people call him "Bai Suba". The Bai Suba goes through the same set of installation ceremonies as the Bai Koblo, his overlord.

2. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.34, Nov. 1, 1887. Hay to Holland.

3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.36, enclosure 1, Nov. 5, 1887. Musa Kalu's report.

4. Ibid.

Momodu Sawani,¹ the agent sent to spy on Yoni reported that the Mende were collecting war boys at Lungi, Mawoto, Moyamba, Gbangbama, Kwelu and Taiama; partly to avenge themselves on the Yoni, and partly thinking no doubt that this was a good opportunity for plunder. In the meantime reports were reaching Hay that "beating, stoning and whipping" of Yoni and other Temne groups had become rampant in Freetown.²

On November 9, the "S.S. Lagos" carrying Colonel de Winton, arrived in Freetown harbour.³ The steamer had earlier (November 5) called at Bathurst where de Winton conferred with Governor Rowe. Rowe intimated to him that "the capture of Robari would in all probability, end all active resistance," but felt also that "it would be necessary to catch, if possible, certain war chiefs of the Yonis who have been the sole instigators of all these raids ..."⁴ Then de Winton drew a general plan of operations (which Rowe "fully approved").

Colony operations⁵ would be based on Mafenghe, 12 miles from Robari, the farthest town easily accessible by boat along the Ribbi river. Two hundred "natives" would be employed for road cutting. About 400 friendlies (Sori Kesebe, 100; Gbanka, 100; Kagbeke of Taiama, 100; and Canre Mahoi, 100 of their best men) would be needed. For their pay these friendlies would get

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1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.36, enclosure 2, Nov. 5, 1887. Momodu Sawani's report.
 2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Nov. 7, 1887.
 3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.46, enclosure, Nov.10, 1887.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

one shilling and six pence per day. On the Colony side, the Headquarters would provide four officers; the Royal Engineers, one officer and two men; the West India Regiment, eight officers and 250 rank and file; the Police, one Inspector (Halkett) and 50 rank and file. The medical staff would consist of two surgeons, and two dressers. Five hundred carriers would be needed; political agents and interpreters, seven; and store-keepers, two.

The general cash expenses of the expedition was estimated, roughly, at 175 shillings to 200 shillings per day. It was hoped that the £9,000 then in the Commissariat chest would be made available for the operation as the Colonial chest was empty. Hay invited the chiefs of Koya, Bumpe and Ribí, and Mende countries to a meeting at Mafenghe to acquaint them with the general plan of the operation against the Yoni.¹ Lawson suggested, strongly, that "very few ~~Temars~~ be employed ... if possible none at all" since they ~~could~~ not be relied upon. If practicable, local assistants and helpers "should consist principally of Mendés."²

On November 13, de Winton despatched an advance column of five officers and 183 rank and file under the command of Major Pigott³ who had accompanied the commanding officer himself from England. Hay, whose presence it was felt would help to bring the operation to a speedy end,⁴ accompanied the column. Colonel

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1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.49, Nov.15,1887. Hay to Holland.
 2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson, Nov, 10, 1887.
 3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.50, enclosure, Nov.15, 1887.
 4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.49, Nov.15, 1887. Hay to Holland.

de Winton followed on November 15, in a hired steamer "S.S.Susu".¹ Captain Atkinson of Her Majesty's Ship "Acorn" placed 15 of his men at de Winton's disposal to be used for artillery purposes. Gbanka with his war boys was detailed to check the advance of Yoni supporters from Gbonkolenken, Tane and Kolifa areas.²

By the noon of November 15, 1887, the whole Colony force of 17 officers and 278 non-commissioned officers and men had arrived at Mafenghe, landed their stores and erected their tents. On the following day, Hay and de Winton interviewed important friendly chiefs. Two spies went as far as Mayumera, on the road to Robari, but saw no one. On Thursday, November 17, road cutting began with 200 men (later increased to 300 because of the heavy work involved) under Mr. Innis, the Colony Surveyor. Halkett became sick and was taken back to Freetown for medical attention, while Hay assumed the control of the 50 strong Police force. It was decided to make Mafulma, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Robari, the base from which to launch the attack on Yoni.

Intelligence of Colony plans had reached the Temne. Marampa and Masimera warriors in Matenefore moved to Robari to reinforce that important Yoni stronghold. At the same time arrangements were made whereby warriors from Mawilfila, Makala, Makalkum, Warima and Mamaligi would, as soon as the Colony attacked, advance via Mayumera, to cut off the road and so supplies from Mafenghe, and attack the Colony force from the rear. Agents were despatched with slaves to the Scarcies and Melakeri areas to exchange for arms,

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1. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch Nos. 51 and 58, Nov. 1887. War Diary.
 2. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.50, enclosure, Nov. 15, 1887.

guns in particular; and probably rum, which tradition says was distributed lavishly to the warriors to make them bold and fearless.¹

On Sunday 20th November, the attacking column arrived at Mafulma, where they were joined by nearly 1,000 friendlies comprised of Koya, Mende, and Bumpe and Ribi warriors (including some Fulas). These friendlies, however, the commanding officer found useless; "they cling to the rear of the column and their only object is plunder and the capture of slaves."² Leaving 25 men and one officer in charge of the camp, the party moved out of Mafulma at 8.45 a.m. on Monday November 21. At 10.04 a.m. because he "found the Yoni resistance so determined, and was apprehensive lest they should pass round the rear and attack the camp," de Winton increased the guard by 10 men and a serjeant. The attacking column had met the first ambushade about 2 miles from Robari an hour after leaving Mafulma, and when it was being cleared the Temne force, whom they could not see, fired upon them, wounding two of the road makers.

It took the attacking column nearly five hours of continuous fighting, shelling and firing of rockets before the remaining two miles to Robari was covered. Once outside the town fence the capture of this Yoni stronghold was only a matter of minutes. The firing of the rockets seemed to have thrown the whole of the Temne force in disarray causing "the whole of the defenders of the town to stampede."³ The friendlies who had congregated on a higher

1. Oral Tradition: Sira.

2. Yoni Expedition, op.cit., Despatch No.50, encl. Nov.15, 1887.

3. Ibid.

plane behind the attacking column, first saw the stampede, rushed in and began plundering and burning. They had burnt down "considerable portion" of the town before the army could restrain them.

Colonel de Winton reported that "during the whole of the operations we never saw more than 50 of the enemy, so thick and dense is the bush."¹ He reckoned that between 1,800 and 2,000 Temne warriors had been involved in the confrontation. A Yoni prisoner told the Colonel that "we had plenty of guns, as many as you have, and we thought we would be able to stop the white people."²

Under the conditions they were fighting, it was impossible to reckon the number of Temne dead, let alone wounded. Colony losses showed no dead, six severely wounded, and eight slightly wounded. It was thus a crushing and demoralizing defeat for the Yoni and their allies, and the news spread quickly to the surrounding districts producing "a very good effect" on them. After the rout the sky became suddenly overcast with thick black clouds, followed by a heavy down-pour accompanied by thunderstorms as if intended to wipe out the shame of a humiliating defeat.

The operations showed the inability of the Yoni and their allies to cope with the shells and rockets, particularly the latter, of a disciplined army under a tried and experienced officer even in their chosen form of warfare. The ease with which Robari

1. Ibid.

2. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.51, enclosure 2, Nov. 22, 1887.

was taken once the army was outside the fortification showed that the resistance which these war fences or stockades could actually offer was very small indeed, when opposed to a more sophisticated form of warfare. With the fall of Robari the backbone of Temne resistance was broken.¹ Kalawa and Kondo took refuge in Kunike and Ro Bang respectively. Kongo was badly wounded. Yoni allies returning home after the humiliating defeat were heard saying among themselves "these white people they don't come to go back again to their own country, they resolutely come to die here."²

The action of November 21 emboldened the friendlies, and whetted their appetite for further plunder. About 700 of them went into action plundering and burning Yoni villages between Robari and Mamaligi. On Wednesday, November 22, they took the town of Warima, killing four persons and capturing some women and children. On the morning of November 24,³ when the heavy storm that followed the fall of Robari had sufficiently cleared, Major Pigott, with a column of 80 men marched on Makondu. They came across only one ambushade which no attempt was made to defend, and on arriving at Makondu found the town deserted. On November 26, the column advanced on Ronietta. The Yoni hoisted a white flag but fired when the army approached the gates. Pigott ordered his men to storm the stockade with maxim guns. Fifty of the one hundred defenders were killed or wounded. The following

1. Yoni informants, however, spoke of fierce fighting for a long time - See Oral Tradition: Sira.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Nov. 30, 1887.

3. War Diary. Nov. 1887. Yoni Expedition, op.cit.

day the column marched to Ro Bang which they found burnt and deserted. "Hostile action" against the Yoni seemed virtually at an end. Already by December 1, some sections of the army had begun to return to Freetown.

Colonel de Winton sent Mr. J.C.E. Parkes, head of the Intelligence Department, to Mamaligi with a view to opening up communications with the Yoni by means of Marampa and Masimera chiefs, so as to arrange the capture of Yoni war leaders. But Parkes found Mamaligi deserted, although he managed to assemble the chiefs. On December 2, Colonel de Winton met them and made them promise to help capture leading Yoni warriors who had gone into hiding. After the meeting he returned to Freetown to meet Governor Rowe who had arrived from Bathurst since November 28. On December 7 he was back at Mamaligi having travelled via the Ribi and through Robari where he found everything quiet.

From Mamaligi de Winton sent Major Pigott to go and destroy the remaining Masimera war towns; Makonte and Bendasimera, including their rice farms. Friendlies, now operating under Gbanka and Kamanda of Bauya, were allowed to plunder and devastate, and refused to stop when ordered to. In the meantime letters had been sent to Yoni chiefs inviting them to Mamaligi for the grand peace palaver. Governor Rowe also travelled to Mamaligi to assist de Winton in the peace talks. On December 16 the two officers had a meeting with the chiefs of Masimera, Koya, Bumpo and Ribi at Mamaligi. Governor Rowe opened the meeting. He blamed the chiefs for having "brought all these troubles on your-

selves by bringing war boys into the country."¹ Colonel de Winton told them what he wanted to do with their country "which now belongs to me and the Governor."²

His most important objective was to establish such a peace that no tribe would be in a position to threaten in future. Starting with the friendlies, he charged Sori Kesebe with the responsibility of keeping open the road between Rotifunk and Robari, and with furnishing 50 carriers every two months to carry provisions from Mafengbe to Robari for the occupying Colony troops for as long as their presence was required there.³ Canre Mahoi would keep open the road between Mafengbe and Robari and would also supply 50 carriers every two months. His territory, Ribí was extended slightly to include Mafulma town, hitherto Yoni. Lawson's son, William, by a daughter of the late Bai Farma of Koya, was made responsible for the road between Mamaligi and Robari. And Koya country itself was extended to Rosolo Creek and the new boundary cut off Matenefore, Warima and Robari from Yoni. The Ribí river was formally declared the boundary line between Koya and Ribí.

"For their participation in the war against the English,"⁴ Masimera people got a fine of £200 (payable in kind; a bushel of rice being reckoned at 6d.), and Bai Simera their chief, would

1. Yoni Expedition: op.cit. Notes taken at a Meeting held at Mamaligi, Dec. 16, 1887.

2. Ibid.

3. The troops remained in Robari until 1890 - see Report - Chalmer's Commission - Part II - Evidences (Evidence of Gov. Cardew). P.P. 1899, vol. LX.

4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Memo. for Mamaligi meeting, Dec. 16, 1887.

remain in detention in Freetown until the fine was paid. Bai Suba of Magbela (Marampa) was found unblameworthy; but Bai Koblo, his overlord, and the rest of Marampa people, got a fine of £100 for supporting Yoni. Fifty pounds of this fine would be remitted if the chief would help capture Yoni warriors who were in hiding. Chief Kamanda of Bauya, an opponent of Madam Yoko, the Administration's "great friend", was detained in Freetown for "failing to restrain the friendlies under him when ordered to do so." For his own part, Gbanka got seven years in Freetown Gaol.¹

At Makonte, Major Pigott learnt that many Yoni leading warriors were hiding at Ro-Gbongba - a day's march from the former town. De Winton promised to pardon Pa Alimami Konte, the ruler of Makonte, if he helped to apprehend these Yoni warriors.

On December 18, there was another big palaver at Mamaligi attended by representatives from Yoni, and Port Loko.² The purpose of the meeting was to select a principal chief for Yoni country, which had been without one since 1880.³ According to de Winton, this absence of a head chief had been "one of the main

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1. P.P. 1899, vol. LX. Chalmers' Report II, 7754. In 1889 Treaty No.106 established peace between the Yoni and the Talama Mende. In 1897, with the support of the Administration, Gbanka became the Fula Mansa (Gbanka) of Yoni Mabanta chiefdom; and died the following year at Gbonjema helping the Administration to subdue the Kpa Mende who refused to pay the "Hut Tax."
 2. War Diary... Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Mamaligi meeting Dec.16, 1887.
 3. Yoni had remained without a principal chief for so long partly because of the death in exile of Bai Seboru Kenkeh which made the performance of the customary rites following the death of a "Poru" chief difficult, and partly because of the confused state of the country which was brought about by the wars.

causes of the unsettled state of the Yoni country."¹ At the meeting it was agreed that Sey Massa of Warima, known locally as Pa Raka, who had been selected by the Yoni themselves, but whose installation had been prevented by the hostilities, was the rightful person to become the Bai Sebora. He assumed the title of Bai Sebora Queen, in reference to Queen Victoria, whose peace de Winton told him he was appointed to keep in Yoni land. He was particularly suited to this position because he "is a good man [whose] hand has been in no war palaver."² No one had ever heard anything against him.

To mark the occasion de Winton caused two bullocks to be slaughtered for the assembled chiefs. It was arranged that the new Bai Sebora remain in Masimera (at Mamaligi) until things returned to normal in Yoni. Then he could return home for his installation ceremonies. On December 19, de Winton returned to Freetown. And on December 24, Rowe got a telegraphic despatch from Her Majesty's government expressing "much satisfaction"³ at the success of the expedition against the Yoni.

On January 21, 1888, Sir Francis de Winton and his staff left Freetown by the steamer "Ambriz" for the United Kingdom.⁴ By the end of January all the major Yoni warriors (except Kondo)

1. War Diary Mamaligi meeting Dec. 16, 1887.

2. Ibid.

3. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.54. Dec. 24, 1887. Holland to Rowe.

4. Yoni Expedition. Op.cit. Despatch No.59. Feb. 3, 1888. Rowe to Holland.

that took part in the war had been handed over to the Administration, and were all in Freetown gaol. The Colony authorities regarded this as "a matter of much satisfaction."¹ And "as for the Yoni-country," declared Lawson, "it is now to be considered the Queen's by conquest [and] Her Majesty desires to keep it."² But there was no change in Yoni status until the establishment of the Sierra Leone Protectorate in 1896.

Paradoxically enough, the origins of the Trade Wars in the late 19th century Sierra Leone Protectorate could be traced to the development of legitimate commerce in that country, which its protagonists had believed would bring peace and sanity to a land torn by war and slavery. For one of the major incentives to warfare was the desire to get slaves who would grow the "legitimate" produce. With the assistance of local rulers and peoples who quickly got adjusted to the change in their economic life, some form of peace was in fact established, precarious though this might have been. And because there was peace, many peoples from the hinterland moved to the trading centres on or near the river heads for trading purposes. Also the peoples of the hinterland found that to obtain maximum benefit for their commodities it was preferable to take them down to the tide-water towns to sell directly to the wealthy Creole and European merchants. Many African middlemen did not like this and tried to stop the practice.

1. Yoni Expedition: Op.cit. Despatch No.60. Feb. 8, 1888.
Rowe to Holland.

2. G.I.L. Memo. by Lawson. Mar. 12, 1888.

Some of the middlemen themselves were more favoured than others because of the amount of trade that passed through their hands. They, therefore, competed among themselves and fought one another.

The development of legitimate commerce produced other consequences. Because of the relatively peaceful conditions, many more enterprising individual African traders quickly acquired wealth; and wealth means power. The traditional ruler, hitherto the most wealthy, and easily the most powerful in the state, found that he had to share that power with the now wealthy subject, who was prepared to challenge the chief's authority, forcibly, should his interests demand this. This rivalry produced political instability, which, in turn, brought about the rise of professionalism in warfare, for the rivals needed some permanent body of professionally trained war men to maintain their positions.

The Colony, anxious to have its own share in the growing trade set up "Paper Protectorates" over the important tide-water trading centres. But Sierra Leone trade failed to produce its Mackinnon or Goldie to shoulder imperial responsibilities which the Colony was expressly forbidden to take on. The Administration was thus placed in a very difficult and untenable situation. This difficulty was further exacerbated by the Colony's inability to see any rational cause for the perpetual wars, which they explained away as a demonstration of the barbarism of a savage horde.

The later period of the trade wars coincided with the time of a series of trade depressions in Europe, which badly affected the

Sierra Leone trade. Wealthy Creole and European business and professional men formed the Sierra Leone Association, diagnosed (only partly correctly) the Colony's economic problems as a result of the wars in the interior. They demanded as a solution to these problems, the annexation of the immediate hinterland. But many Creole and European merchants benefited immensely from these wars which they perpetuated by supporting one section against another; so their protests and demands for intervention and annexation so as to preserve peace was not always honest.

This was the situation on the eve of the West African Berlin Conference. Meanwhile the French were busy actively undermining British position to the north and east of the Colony, and on the Liberian border. Samori and his Sofa warriors, whom Freetown wanted to use to foil French designs to the east, were pressing hard on the Temne, Koranko and other peoples of the immediate hinterland.¹ In 1882 Britain reached an agreement with France over the Melakuri.² In 1885 an agreement was reached with regards to the Sierra Leone/Liberia frontier.³ In 1886, Samori,

1. For an account of Samori's activities see:

(i) C.H. Fyfe, op.cit. Chapters 17, 18, 19 and 20.

(ii) J.D. Hargreaves: Prelude to the Partition of West Africa. Lond., 1963, Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

2. For an account of the Franco/British rivalry in Melakuri see; J.D. Hargreaves, op.cit., pp.129-144.

also "The French Occupation of the Mellacourie 1865-67" by J.D. Hargreaves. S/L Stud. N.S., No.9, Dec. 1957.
H.A. Gailey: "European Rivalry and Diplomacy in the Mellacourie, 1879-1882." S/L Stud. N.S., No.15, Dec. 1961. is less satisfactory.

3. For the problems of the Sierra Leone/Liberian border see:

(i) C.H. Fyfe, op.cit., Chapters 17 and 18.

(ii) J.D. Hargreaves, op.cit., pp.240-3.

anxious to preserve his most important source of arms supply, agreed to withdraw from Temne country at Governor Rowe's request. But the trade wars continued, and seemed to be assuming greater proportions because the Colony had deliberately whipped up "tribal" feelings and turned the conflict into a Temne/Mende War. However, there was little that was really "tribalistic" about these wars; no northern Temne fought on Yoni side, and the Koya fought against them; the Mende force included Loko, Fula, Sherbro and others, and excluded the southern (Banta) and the eastern (Kor) Mende.

The Yoni Expedition (locally known as the white man's war) of 1887 marked a turning point in British policy towards this part of West Africa. It marked the beginning of a new era in the British relations with what later became known as the Sierra Leone Protectorate. After the successful completion of the Expedition, there emerged (rather belatedly) a consistent and purposeful imperial policy towards the Sierra Leone hinterland as a whole. The Temne (now closer together than ever before), and their problem, became submerged in a wider imperialist design over Sierra Leone.

APPENDIX ATEMNE ORAL TRADITION:AN EVALUATION

Since the nineteenth century interested scholars and others have made conscious efforts to record oral history among the Temne. C.F. Schlenker, a C.M.S. missionary collected some very valuable traditions in Port Loko in the 1840s. Later in the century T.G. Lawson, the Government Interpreter and an experienced Colony official in native matters, collected more over large areas of Temne country. Early in this century E.F. Sayers and Hon. J.A. Songo Davies, both Colonial administrators, made further recordings of Temne oral tradition. Elizabeth Hirst, a historian of the Loko people, Professor V.R. Dorjahn of Oregon University, U.S.A. and Pa Amadu Wurie an educationist/politician of Temne ancestry have also all published¹ recordings (in the form of articles) bearing directly and indirectly on the Temne history.

The remarkable thing is that except for minor additions and elaborations, the recordings in the same areas, where two or more collectors had worked, remain virtually the same. To the traditional Temne, the past is just as important as the present, if not more so. History to him is a living reality. Each of the twenty-five patrilineal Temne clans traces its descent from an eponymous ancestor and claims to be able to recall its history back to this patriach. Long hours are spent (mainly in the evenings) either tracing this descent or recalling the heroic

1. See "Bibliographical Notes" for a list of these publications, and Appendixes B-M for a few selections from my own recordings.

deeds of some of the members of the family. The Temne have often been accused of living in the past by some other Sierra Leone peoples.

The most outstanding aspect of Temne life where rigid adherence to the past is most vividly demonstrated is perhaps in the ceremonies connected with the installation and death of a Temne Paramount Chief. Many Temne believe that their first chief was Bai Farma Tami who came from Futa Jalon. He ruled over all the Temne people and returned to Futa at his death. Subsequently all Temne chiefs come from Futa at their installation and thither they return at their death. In fact a Temne chief never dies, he simply returns to Futa when he is sick and on the point of death to seek cure for his illness. This is why no one is supposed to see the grave of a dead Temne chief.

When the chief becomes seriously sick and is considered beyond all hope of recovery, his head is chopped off, for he is not supposed to die. The people are informed of the chief's serious illness and of his journey to Futa to get cured. And it is this very chief that is supposed to have returned from Futa, fully cured (when new installation ceremonies are being performed), and ready to be reinstalled in his chiefdom. This is why at his "death" he is buried with the preserved head of his predecessor (for after all they are one and the same persons), while his own head will be preserved for burial with the body (again minus the head) of his successor. This way continuity and contact are maintained both with the past and with Futa Jalon, the traditional home of Temne chiefs.

The chieftaincy ceremonies¹ are very long and complicated, and the Temne are always very mindful that they be properly carried out. When a new chief is to be installed in any chiefdom, all the other chiefdoms that follow similar installation procedures as it does, would send representatives who are to ensure that the ceremonies are properly conducted.

In the same way because family histories are regarded as of great importance, the Temne always insist that they be recorded accurately and in the proper manner. The whole family (i.e. the elders) must be present, and the time fixed to suit this arrangement. At the interview the family would delegate the duty of "speaker" to one of their number, who would stop at various points to consult (sometimes secretly) the other members, or one particular member, on points over which he might not be certain.

It is probable that a more balanced account will result from this co-operative effort, and that the information given will perhaps be more accurate. But it has certain drawbacks. The freedom enjoyed by the individual informer is lacking. Apart from the occasional interruptions from the other members of the family, the "speaker" has to be very careful about what information he puts across and how, particularly on the more recent history of the family. True, the individual informer will always try to

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1. Many interesting articles have been published bearing directly and indirectly on these ceremonies; among these are, V.R. Dorjahn: "The Organisation and Functions of the Ragbenle Society of the Temne", Africa, vol. 29, April 2, 1959; E.R. Langley: "The Temne Their Life, Land and Ways", S/L Stud. o.s. No.21, Jan. 1939; A.B. Ture: "Notes on Customs and Ceremonies Attending the Selection and Crowning of a Bombali Temne Chief", S/L Stud. o.s. No.22, Sept. 1939.

enhance the interests of his particular branch of the family, sometimes at the expense of the other branches, but this is a tendency of which the researcher is always aware. However, the individual members of the family seem less inhibited to talk freely after the family history has been given.

APPENDIX BTHE BABA WAR

[Oral Tradition by Alhaji Alimami Sori, Paramount Chief of Kuniike Gbarina; recorded at Makali on Jan. 14, 1967.]

I have been told by old people that Farma Tami was the leader of the Temne. He came from the East crowning chiefs. He came with war leaders. Everywhere he reached and wanted to rest, he had a hole dug round his resting place. And when we were born we met these signs. He went down as far as Koya. Here in Kuniike he left Pa Kuniike who was one of his outstanding followers. Pa Kuniike was the father of three sons; Sanda, Gbarina, and Fulaoso. These sons became the founders of the present three Kuniike Chiefdoms we know today.

In Kuniike Sanda they crowned a Konteh known as Bai Kurr, in Kuniike Gbarina they crowned a Gbolu called Yatangbema, and in Kuniike Fulaoso they crowned a Koroma called Bai Kafari. These chiefs became prosperous. But in Kuniike Gbarina the people refused to work or fight for the Yatangbemas. One of them, Makamamoi by name, became very poor, and because of the shame drowned himself taking his head wife and the sacred things of the chieftaincy with him. This was the cause of the civil war known as the Baba War.

This war caused our people to disperse; some went to Mayeppoh, some went to Yele, some went to Kafe, some went to Makande, some went to Yonibana, some went to Matamp, and some went to Tane. They were all scattered, and were in these various

places for a very long time. Among the refugees in Mayeppoh was a young wife of the Yatangbema. After their stay in Mayeppoh for a long time this wife, whose name was Yabomkani, said she should be taken back to the old place - Kuniike - for she wanted to be buried in the same place where her husband had died.

Then Pa Konkomo, another refugee at Mayeppoh, went to Makande where Pa Lumpimduko (also a refugee) was staying to inform him of the woman's request. Pa Konkomo asked Pa Lumpimduko to get ready to go back to Kuniike with him for he did not want to go and leave him behind. Then Pa Lumpimduko asked Pa Konkomo if he had considered the great difficulties involved in the venture: for example, where were they going to get food and shelter on the way seeing that Kuniike country was so far away. But Pa Konkomo said they must carry out the woman's request.

The two men arranged to set out immediately after harvest. Then they sent to invite all Kuniike refugees who were interested in joining them on the return journey to their country. They sent to Pa Koya Makagba at Yele, Pa Gbonkine at Matamp, Pa Gbondowa at Kafe, and to all the other relatives, asking them to gather at Makona which was at this time strongly fortified and had become a Poro centre. But before these arrangements could be concluded Yabomkani died. She died just after the planting season, that is, just before the heavy rains set in.

So the people sent 30 of their number as an advance party to cut the road, make bridges where necessary, and make other

necessary preparations for the journey. The rest of the party set out in the afternoon after the woman's death in the morning. Their first stopping place was Masurite which was still uninhabited at that time. Everywhere they stopped they built two huts; one for the dead body and the other for Pa Konkomo and Pa Lumpimduko. They also did their own native balming by rubbing plenty of salt on the dead body, so that the body would not decay too quickly. The second stop was at Rowaka where they stayed for a day. Leaving Rowaka they came to Kunike country.

At first it was decided to bury the dead woman at Mayari. But Pa Konkomo pointed out that there would be difficulty with water supply there, and further, that his mother had instructed him that the place where they met elephants would be the proper location to bury the old woman. The people on their arrival in Kunike had seen some elephants at the present site of the chiefdom town of Makali, where the two streams, Mankolo and Mabanth, meet, and even had had to fire their guns to scare the elephants away. So it was decided that that was the proper place to bury the old woman. Some of the people, however, preferred to remain at Mayari. They made their farms and started building houses.

Then all the Kunike people who had scattered as a result of the Baba War came back and settled in their country. Then Pa Lumpimduko and the others made their own laws:

1. That anyone who felt thirsty and wanted to drink palm-wine could go to any palm-tree being tapped and drink to his satisfaction, so long as he did not carry any of the palm-wine away with him there would be no palaver.

- ii. That anybody who felt hungry and came upon a cassava farm could eat to his satisfaction, so long as he did not take any away with him there would be no palaver.
- iii. That everyone had equal right in any part of the land, and that any man to brush first in any particular farming area had an undisputed claim to the particular area he had brushed.

These were the first laws given by the leaders. After the people had settled down then came the white men to Ro Camp (Freetown). They remained at Ro Camp for a long time, but our people heard about them.

APPENDIX CTHE FULAS OF YONI MABANTA

[Oral Tradition by Pa Kapr Sira, a blind christian of Fula ancestry, recorded at Ronietta on Dec. 29, 1966.]

The leader of the Fulas was Farma Tami, who came from the East. It was he who installed all the Fula chiefs of the various territories now under Fula rule. He went as far as Koya where he gave the people their first Fula chief, Kompan Kemant. From Koya he sent Ahmadu Jalloh and Araba to go and found the chieftainship for the Mabanta. The first chief the Fulas crowned at Mabanta was called Masa Kele. Masa Kele had his capital at Ghangbatok. As usual he divided his chiefdom into sub-sections, and one of these sub-sections was the present Yoni Mabanta. Masa Kele placed this section under Amadu Jalloh and Araba both of whom had two sons each. Amadu Jalloh became the first Fula Masa followed after his death by Araba. Araba was succeeded by his eldest son Kahjoro (who became chief by virtue of the fact that he was older than Amadu Jalloh's first son). Kahjoro became a Poro man though he was a moslem. After Kahjoro, Amadu's first son, Binbinkoro succeeded as Fula Mansa; followed by his brother Gbanshankoro. When Gbanshankoro died, Kayito, Kahjoro's brother, was crowned Fula Mansa. And thus was established the four ruling houses of Yoni Mabanta: Kahjoro, Binbinkoro, Gbanshankoro, and Kayito.

The capital of this northern section was first at Kamatho. But later it was found necessary to move from that part to Masoko

[in the present Moyamba District, then part of the Mabanta territory] owing to constant Mende attacks. During the time of Kayito the capital was moved again from Masoko to Bathbana (meaning big stream), and finally to Petfu [the present seat of the Fula Mansa]. At one time when the wars were very serious Kayito had to be smuggled out of Bathbana with the sacred things of a chief to a town in Masimera chiefdom called Ro-Bankra (Masawurr) for safety. It was necessary to do this because the capture of the chief by the attacking Mende would have meant the end of the chiefdom. One of Kahjoro's daughters was given in marriage to a Konte in Masingbi (Kunike). There she got a son called Pa Sanna. This Pa Sanna was brought back to Yoni Mabanta to take charge of things during the absence of Kayito. Pa Sanna was assisted by one, Pa Kagbesemafantha, and they both settled in Ronietta.

APPENDIX DGUMBU SMART

[Oral Tradition by Ahmadu Smart Kanu, a farmer and contestant for the vacant Section Chiefship of Rokon, recorded at Rokon on May 22, 1967.]

Our father who started this place was a Loko man. He came from Kalangba. His name was Koko. His father was Kande Gbanka Kalangba, and he was a chief. One day Koko, accompanied by three of his brothers, went to collect wine from a palm-tree. He climbed up and the three brothers waited for him at the foot of the palm. But after he had finished collecting the wine and was coming down the tree, the special chissel he used for tapping the palm fell from its sheath and wounded one of his brothers on the head. He died from the wound. Then Koko ran away from home to avoid his father's anger, and came to Port Loko. He hid himself in a town called Mininthomo. From here he heard that the Europeans were in Benshali (Bunce Island); that they came purposely to buy slaves, and that the people were afraid of them. Then Koko went to this Island - to the Europeans - to find work. When the Europeans saw him they captured him, and kept him on the Island.

In the meantime, his people in Kalangba were looking desperately for him, and without success. But after some time they found him, and went and reported to his father that Koko was now working under a European. Then his father sent to him saying that since he had now joined himself to the white people and does not want to remain his son, he [Koko] must refund all the expenses he incurred looking for him. Koko told his European

master the whole story, and the European undertook to send some gift to the father: goods, wine and so on. The chief was very happy when he got these presents. And he was telling everybody what the white man had done for him. The European taught Koko how to read and many other things. He was very huge and strong, and so the Europeans called him "Smart" - because whatever he did was very well done.

Then the Europeans began to trust money to him to buy slaves for them. The white men taught him European war tactics. As he [Koko] bought the slaves he taught them what he learnt from the Europeans, and trained them to be good soldiers. He had a training camp at Ro Thumba for this purpose. Then Koko's father sent him a Loko woman to be his wife. He used to go away from Benshali to buy slaves in other rivers. Pa Smart became very good at the trade. He married two Sherbro women, and one Temne. He had very many children. Because of this, and because God had blessed him in the trade, he decided to move from Benshali to find somewhere to settle further up along the river.

Then a conflict arose between his masters, and other traders from another European country. The latter wanted to drive them away. This increased Pa Smart's desire to look for a place of his own to settle with his family. So he followed the Rokel river. At Magbeni (Koya) he found a chief called Nengbana [Naimbana] Farma. Then he asked the chief if he could lodge him there and his family. Then the chief sent him to the Bundukas

and asked them to lodge him. And the Bundukas gave him Mahera to lodge in - just across a small stream called Mabiri. So Pa Smart and his family settled there. Then he approached the chief again and said, I have got a large family and many followers, I want you to give me a big place - large enough for my people. But the chief did not give him any other place. Then he took his boat again, left some of his people at Mahera and took some along with him, with some canons. When they arrived here, they began to fire the canons - they saw nobody and no sign of human was seen anywhere. He brought some tents with him (which he acquired when he was with the Europeans at Benshali) and so set these up for temporary shelter. There were many oak trees (kakon) around. They continued firing. There were many elephants around. So the firing was partly to attract attention, and partly to drive away the wild animals.

At that time the chief ruling here, Bai Simera Kuye Boyo, had just died, and Pa Fira was ruling as regent. Then the people in Masimera heard of this firing, and sent people to come and find out what was happening. The man they sent was Pa Komothi, who was the younger brother of dead Bai Simera himself. He was a hunter. He passed through Marampa side of the river, and crossed to this side at the very spot where Pa Smart had settled. Then Smart told him the reason why he had been firing, and requested to see the ruler of the country. Then they set out for Masimera with Pa Komothi, passing through Yonipet. Smart took some presents with him for the chief; salt, cloths, tobacco and

many other things. The chief was very happy with those presents; and asked Smart to move up to Masimera town itself to be near him. But Smart said he had many children and followers and would like to remain where he first settled if it pleased the chief. Then the chief said it was alright.

Then Pa Fira told him of the palaver between the people of Buya-Romendi and Marampa. The palaver had begun over a bush rat. Bai Koblo (formerly called Bai Rampa) and Bai Fonti, and Bai Banta of Ro-Buya had all gathered to have this matter settled, but because of the seriousness of the case they felt they would need the oldest and the most senior chief in the area - Bai Simera - to help settle the palaver. On considering the evidence before him, Bai Simera had decided in favour of the Marampa people. Then Buy-RoMendi people had shot him and killed him and also Bai Koblo, and seized the sacred things of the chief. Then war broke out in every part of the county. Masimera people had fought for a long time but could not recover the captured sacred things. Then Pa Fira requested Smart's help; but Smart told him that he had another landlord with whom he had settled before moving up to Masimera and with whom some of his followers were still staying - Nengbana Farma. That before he could take up the request it must have the approval of that landlord. Nengbana said he had nothing against Smart fighting for the Thalís.

Then Smart went to Melakuri and invited some Morimen to Masimera, these Morimen were very light in complexion. After these Morimen had completed their work they told Smart to gather

his war men, and assured him that he would succeed. Then Smart went to Loko country, to his father, and explained the whole situation to him. His father then gave him some war men. He brought them and hid them on the small island made by the Rokel River, near Rokon. Then the Morimen said to Smart that during the fighting his war men would come across a young woman, yellow in complexion, and carrying a calabash of water. This young woman should not be harmed, for she was the one who would show them where the sacred things were. At Ro Lankono the warriors found this young woman, and she showed them where the two boxes containing the sacred things had been hidden - under a bamboo tree.

Masimera people were overjoyed. Smart entertained his war men lavishly for he was a very rich man from his days with the Europeans on Benshali. Many of the warriors did not return to Loko country but settled permanently with him at Rokon. The warriors brought with them to Rokon the young woman that showed them where the boxes were hidden. Smart took her as his wife. Then the Thalís told Smart, we have no money to pay you for this great thing you did for us, all we have to offer you is the very staff itself - we want to crown you the Bai Simera. But Smart refused to be made Bai Simera, instead he became the chief of his own section of the chieftdom, and the name of his chieftaincy is Gumbu - a chieftaincy of warfare.

Smart had six (6) sons and four (4) of them became the founders of the present four ruling houses in Rokon: Young, Yaron,

Tabendu and Smart. Gumbu Yaron II was killed in 1898 because he supported the Europeans; he tried to encourage European ways, and also supported the payment of the Hut Tax. And 23 years elapsed before the second Gumbu Tabendu was crowned. I belong to the Smart house.

APPENDIX ETHE FOUNDING OF MAGBELI

[Oral Tradition by Suba Bai Pekai, a farmer and son of a former Bai Suba of Magbeli, recorded at Magbeli on May 20, 1967]

My father was Bai Suba an Peki. Pa Kelboi, Pa Kegbele and Bai Rank came from Marampa, from the house of the Koblos. They were sent by their elders in Marampa to come down here and take over this part of the country. They came primarily to find somewhere to trade. They travelled through Kerfe and Makagbo. At Makagbo Pa Kelboi, who was a hunter, shot an elephant. They pursued the elephant through the grassland to the present site of Magbeli where it crossed the river and died on the site where Rokel town now stands.

Rokel got its name from the name of the hunter - Pa Kelboi - who shot the elephant, and became the earliest settler on that spot. At that time the Rokel river was smaller than it is now. People used monkey bridge to cross the river. This Pa Kelboi had two of his children with him when he came here. He had eight children in all but left the remaining six in Marampa. One of the two sons was called Pa Kewende, and the other, Pa Runia. A Devil told Kegbele that because he had seen him, he would gain the Marampa chieftaincy in time to come. But that he [Kegbele] must change the chieftaincy title from Bai Rampa to Bai Koblo when he became chief. So the name Koblo originated from the name of a Devil. Before this time nine (9) Bai Rampas had been crowned in Marampa, although none of them reigned for very long. So when

Kegbele was crowned he assumed the name of the Devil and he reigned for a very long time - He was called Bai Koblo Kegbele.

One of the sons of Pa Kelboi also met a Devil in a sacred bush in Magbeli. This Devil told him that if they really wanted a big and prosperous town they should move back to the other side of the river - Magbeli side - which was then uninhabited. This son of Pa Kelboi followed the Devil's advice and came and settled at the present site of Magbeli with some of his relations; but some remained at Rokel for there the elephant had been slain. The new settlement was named after Pa Kegbele. Many people came from Marampa to join the settlement at Magbeli including the other sons of Pa Kelboi. Pa Kelboi's children were: Pa Kewende, Pa Runiabana, Pa Ansumana Seki, Pa Kinkato, Pa Sebana, Pa Foimoroki and Pa Futa. By the time Pa Kelboi died the settlements had begun to prosper.

Pa Runiabana, after his father's death, took some money and went to Marampa and said, we the children of Pa Kelboi know that we are entitled to the chieftaincy in Marampa, but since we have now moved from the chiefdom town and found our own settlement we cannot ask for the chieftaincy here any more but we want our own share in governing our own part of the chiefdom. At this time Bai Rampa Kopath (the great ancestor of the present Bai Koblo Pathbana) was the one reigning. Pa Kelboi belonged to that family. At that time also there was a chieftaincy called Bai Suba which was held by the Sankos - under the Bai Rampa. Before that time Bai Suba Kasagba was the one holding the chieftaincy. After him

they crowned Bai Suba An Chancha. The seat of this chieftaincy was Masuba. But Bai Suba An Chancha was very disrespectful to his overlord Bai Rampa and the other senior chiefs in the county. He appropriated all the levies in his section for his own use without any reference to the senior chiefs. So that when Bai Suba An Chancha died, Bai Rampa seized the chieftaincy and said he was not going to give it to any member of that house again. And for a long time no Bai Suba was crowned, so that when Pa Runiabana went to ask for a share in the governing of the chiefdom and a chieftaincy in his own section, he reminded the elders in Marampa about this suspended chieftaincy and asked it to be given to them in Magbeli. And so the chieftaincy was given to him. But when he arrived back he handed it over to his elder brother who, because he was not as rich as Pa Runiabana, was rather reluctant to accept it at first, but was prevailed upon. And he became Bai Suba Kewende I of Magbeli. Bai Suba Kewende reigned for nineteen (19) years, and by the time he died the Bai Suba had become very very powerful.

Because the chieftaincy had become such an important and powerful one under Bai Suba Kewende, when the latter died, the then Bai Rampa secretly planned it and crowned a member of his own family from Ro Gbonke and sent him down to Magbeli. Magbeli people were only informed after he had been crowned. But Pa Runiaban and the elders of Magbeli refused to recognise him as Bai Suba. He died in poverty. In retaliation for the non-cooperation of the Magbeli people, before he died, he took the sacred

things of the chieftaincy to Ro Camp (Freetown) and hid them there saying that since these people refused to recognise me and allowed me to live in poverty, I am going to hide these sacred things so that they will not be able to crown any other Bai Suba after I am dead.

So when he died the people were unable to crown a new Bai Suba because the sacred things were not to be found. One of Pa Runiabana's children - a daughter - by name NaBaronibana - who was very influential in official circles in Freetown was the one that helped in the recovery of those sacred objects. When these sacred things were brought every member of the Kabia family in Magbeli, of any substance, was interested in the chieftaincy; and the competition was extremely intense.

The man who actually brought the sacred things from Freetown to Magbeli was one Pa Sori Nekon who lived at Maferkut. In appreciation of his efforts he was made Bai Suba, and he assumed the title of Bai Suba Tapakon. He reigned for a very long time - 66 years - and died at a very old age.

APPENDIX FGBANKA OF YONI

[Oral Tradition by Pa Santigi Smart, a sub-chief; recorded at Rochendokom, Malal chiefdom on April 23, 1967.]

I am Pa Santigi Smart. My father was Pa Gbasse. He was one of the prominent men who built the war centre at Ro Banka. He was together with Pa Alimami Korobo Kende Thanko. Other prominent warriors in those days were, Pa Kenani, Pa Yambo, Pa Lome, and many others. Then the Mendes came but were driven away. Then the Mendes went to Yoni. This was the time of Gbanka, a Temne warrior from Yoni. The Mende came and fought the Yoni, then our people went over to Yoni to help them. The Mende had their war camp at Ro Mankore. The Yoni were unable to withstand them, and the Mende started to call them "women". Then the Yoni held a meeting. Then Ghanka said, since the Mende are calling us women, initiate me into the women's society (Bondo) and I am going to defeat the Mende and drive them away. He was initiated into the women's society. Then he asked what the people were going to give him if he successfully drove away the Mende. They answered that they would give him seven (7) slaves. So Gbanka went and was successful in capturing Ro Mankore. He returned to Yoni and asked for his seven slaves, but the people said they hadn't got seven slaves. Then he asked for two, but the people still refused to compensate him saying that he [Gbanka] was born in Yoni and was only fighting for his country and therefore should not ask for compensation.

Then Gbanka got annoyed, and went to Mende people. When the Mende people saw him they thought he had brought war to their country and so wanted to run away. But Gbanka told them not to run away saying that the Temne people had treated him badly, and that he had come only to seek the help of the Mende people in order to avenge himself on the Temne. The Mende, however, did not admit him into their stockade until he had taken an oath. He told the Mende about the wrong done him and asked for their help. Then the Mende came with him, captured Roruks, and Yonibana. The Yonibana people sent to Masimera, Kolifa, and to our people for help. Bai Simera asked that the matter be adjusted peacefully.

Pa Alimami Korobo Kende Thanko was the war leader here at that time. All our great war leaders went to Yonibana to assist the people. Gbanka had his war camp at Makrugbe and the Temne built theirs at Ro Mess. The Yoni people and their allies attacked Gbanka but were driven off and many captives were taken to Mende land. Then our people returned home to Roehen.

APPENDIX GTHE FOUNDING OF MARAMPA CHIEFDOM

[Oral Tradition by Pa Chernob Kabia, a Section chief, recorded at Marampa town on May 24, 1967.]

I am one of the Kabias, the owners of this chiefdom. My father was Bai Koblo An Gbamathi who was the predecessor of the present Bai Koblo. Marampa originated from Marampa- Ka- Path, and the founders of the present Marampa came from there. Chieftaincy here was originally known as Bai Rampa, but it was later changed to Bai Koblo. In all we have had 41 chiefs in Marampa Chiefdom.

The man who started this place came from Simia (Koranko country), he was called Kekele. He was a warrior, and had some followers. After they had settled here many other Kabias came to join them, and some of these settled at Masuba. The Kabias captured the whole of this area on to Magbeli, where they left their younger brothers. There were Lokos in the territory when they arrived, but Magbeli was all bush. The chief crowned there became known as Bai Suba. All the Kabias in Sierra Leone today originated from Marampa. In the old days there was a young man who wanted to become the Bai Rampa. But because he knew that there were many senior elders before him, and that the people would not readily accept him as chief, he decided to seek the assistance of a Devil. The Devil undertook to help him, but only on condition that the man, on becoming chief, changed the chieftaincy title to the Devils own name. The Devils name was Ka Koblo.

When the man became chief he changed the name accordingly.

Since then our chiefs have become Bai Koblo. Nine (9) Bai Rampas had ruled before this man, and the present Bai Koblo is the 32nd bearer of that title.

During the early days of the settlement there were many palavers; particularly with the Lokos. This was why people referred to the settlement as Mara Ka e pa: meaning a branch where there was a lot of palaver. In those days when once a chief was crowned people were forbidden to call him by his original name; and anyone who called him by that name would get palaver. He was to be known only by his chieftaincy title. After some time people might even forget the man's own name before he became chief.

There were many wars here, especially during the reign of the first Bai Koblo Queen. The war centre was at Ro - Karchik and Pa Thamba was the war leader. He fought from here to Ro-Mendi and to Ro-Sanda. But our elders did not tell us that the Kabias here ever fought against the Banguras (Thalis) in Masimera. Most of the wars here, however, were defensive wars, and other people came to hire warriors to fight for them in other places.

APPENDIX HGBONKOLENKEN YELE AND THE MENDES

[Oral Tradition by Pa Gbogboro, a sub-chief; recorded at Yele on Jan. 11, 1967.]

The founders of Gbonkolenken Yele were Bantas. Their leaders were Pa Kema and Pa Kongbe, his son, who were Banta hunters. They came to this area primarily to hunt; but hunters were also warriors in those days. They had many followers and their country extended far into the present Mende territory. The Bantas were the first group of settlers in this area; they were here before the Mendes. But when the Mendes came they attacked the original inhabitants and took their lands away from them.

Many of the people were forced to move across the river to the present site of Yele town. But their first settlement was on a small island (an Yel) formed by the river Teye, an important tributary of the Pampana [Taia] river. Here they employed a powerful Moriman to make shebe for them, and to help them recover their lost lands. Pa Kongbe's son, Pa Gbonklo, became the head warrior. They fought many wars with the Mendes. The population on the small island increased rapidly by the addition of many refugees from the Mende wars.

Then someone tampered with the wife of the Moriman employed to make shebe for the warriors, and in retaliation the Moriman caused the river to overflow and destroy the food crops, and so

forced the people to move from the island to look for another farming area. Many of the people who moved from the island settled permanently in their new farming area which they fortified strongly and called "Ro Banka". The name was later changed to Yele (from an Yel). The Mendes were the only tribe our people fought.

APPENDIX IMASIMERA CHIEFTAINCY

[Oral Tradition by Bai Yola Bangura, a Section Chief; recorded at Masimera town on May 25, 1967.]

Masimera is a very old chiefdom. Rowala, in Kolifa, is the only chiefdom which is older than Masimera. It was Rowala people that came here to crown our first chief and also the first Bai Kurr of Mabang. Rowala and Masimera have the same chieftaincy ceremony - Gbenle. Bakbamp was the boundary between Kolifa and Masimera. And Rochen Kanesiri was the boundary with Yoni, and on the Koya side, River Mabiri was the boundary. Farama Tami brought chieftaincy here. The first Bai Simera was called Pa Nes. He was the son of Kelegbethle. He had four sons; Bai Simera Tamabai, Bai Simera Plein (otherwise known as An Gbara), Bai Simera Yesi (otherwise called Thonkla) and Bai Simera Kambaseki. Bai Simera Pa Nes was also known as Kamal. All these chiefs were warriors.

The Bai Yola is the man next to the chief. They are usually brothers, the younger brother assuming the title of Bai Yola - the chief in charge of the chiefdom's wealth. The founders of the chiefdom came from Simia, Ro-th^oron. They were Banguras (Thalis). They came with Farma Tami. Their leader was Kelegbethe, and he was the ancestor of all our chiefs. They were hunters. They used to carry a white fowl with them, and anywhere the cock first crew was an indication for a settlement. Also any place where they killed an elephant, or a leopard. We have crowned 41 chiefs in all at

Masimera, that is, Bai Simeras, and 18 Bai Yolas. When Bai Simera died, Bai Yola looked after the chieftdom until a new Bai Simera was installed.

There was boundary dispute¹ between Marampa and Buya Ro-Mendi people. The two made fences in the boundary and joined them together. They used to set traps along the fence; if any of the traps caught an animal on the Marampa side that animal belonged to the Marampa people and would not be touched by Ro-Mendi people, same if it was the Ro-Mendi side, the Marampa people would not touch it. But on one occasion, one of the traps caught a bush rat on the Marampa side, the Ro-Mendi people got there first and took it away. They gave the animal to the women to cook for them and it was already on fire when the Marampa people arrived. The latter knew that the animal had been caught on their side of the fence and so went and took the pot and the meat in it away. The women told their men of the incident and there was a fight. This fighting later developed into war between the Marampa and Buya Ro-Mendi chieftdoms. So all the elders got together and the chiefs, including Bai Rampa of Marampa, and Bai Simera of Masimera. The latter being the oldest and the most senior of the chiefs was asked to decide the case. He decided in favour of the Marampa, and immediately he pronounced his judgement the Ro-Mendi people shot him dead on the spot.

1. The account that follows reflects an interesting slight deviation from the popular tradition.

APPENDIX JTHE SUSU DOMINATION OF PORT LOKO

[Oral Tradition by Alhaji Bomporo, a Bangura and an important Muslim leader and trader, recommended specially to me by the present Alikali of Port Loko; recorded at Port Loko on May 27, 1967.]

The Portuguese came here over two hundred years ago. They anchored at Old Port Loko, that is, Bake Loko. When they arrived they found hunters here. The Portuguese saw the hunters and spoke to them, and the hunters welcomed them. The hunters were hunting elephants. The Portuguese gave them wine, tobacco, cloths, and so on. Some of the Portuguese settled here permanently, and their descendants are still here today. There were only seven towns in the whole chiefdom then.

Then the Susu came to this area, and the Temne had no power over them. Our own ancestors came from Sanda country, from a town called M'komre. When they came, one of their sisters married the then Susu ruler here, who was called Brimah Konkori, who came and took the town. The Susu came from Melikuri, and every year Brimah Konkori sent 100 slaves to that place. One of our people became annoyed with the Susu regarding their domination of the country and over the way Brimah Konkori was treating his wife, whom he married from our people. On one occasion Moruba Kindo, one of our ancestors, helped to repair this woman's house. In return for this the woman blessed him, saying that he would never be vanquished on a battle field.

He then asked the Susus to crown him, and they did after he

had paid £20. He took the title of Alikali. This is how the title came to this chiefdom. But he travelled to Susu country for the coronation. When he returned from Susu country he called a meeting secretly, of the elders, where they planned to overthrow the Susu domination. Moruba Kindo then made his own Tabule, when Brimah Konkori heard the drum, he sent some people to go and find out who it was. In those days when there was war people were not killed, but only wounded so that they could be captured. Then war broke out between the Susus and the Temne. Our people invited some Mori-men, the Bundukas to work for them. Brimah Konkori was driven away and he escaped to Romange; but was captured and killed on attempting to cross the river. In those days when a warrior was killed, the victors used to cut off his head, and carry it to their chief as a sign that the enemy had been vanquished. Then this head would be wrapped up in a white cloth and buried. With the capture of the war leader the war usually came to an end. After the war Port Loko people got their own chief, the first being Moruba Kindo, a Bangura. After him Fatima Brimah was crowned - he was a Kamara. The Bundukas who were the Mori-men, because of their help during the encounter were granted special privileges by our people. These included exemption from court actions, road brushing, working for the chief, or arrest for any offence.

This town in those days was called Bake Loko. Loko people used to come down here in large numbers to trade. This was how the name Bake Loko came about, for Bake Loko means the wharf of the

Lokos. To transport produce to the sea coast in those days people used to tie big sticks together and set them afloat on the river. Produce were then carefully loaded onto these rafts and guided to Freetown. The rafts were directed along the left bank of the river because the currents were too strong on the right side. Later huge oak trees were hollowed out and made into small canoes with shades over them. Later still the small canoes developed into barges which were later powered by motors. There were a lot of wealthy people here. And because there were no roads people used to come here in order to join the boats to Freetown (Ro Camp).

The Temne and the Loko were the original owners of this area. The Temne were on the Maforki side of the river, but there were some of them among the Loko on the Bake Loko side. The Loko came a long time ago to trade. The trading centre was given the name Bake Loko because the Loko were in the majority. When the Europeans came, they named it Port Loko. Our ancestors were great hunters. They killed an elephant near the stream here, and so decided to settle. Then the Susu started to come. The most important among them was Brimah Konkori. He had money and wine, and our people had none. But the Susu got their money through selling our people. So our people decided to join together and drive the Susu away. The Temne and Loko people are the real owners of the town and this was why they united to drive the Susu away from their country.

Masimera people went and insulted Melikuri people. So Melikuri

people sent war to Masimera. Brimah Konkori was one of the Melikuri warriors. When the war came to an end Brimah Konkori came to Bake Loko, and finding many of his countrymen here decided to settle. The Susu complained to him that some of them had been killed by the local people, so Brimah came and took over the country.

APPENDIX KTHE FOUNDING OF YONI MAMELA RULING HOUSES

[Oral Tradition by Pa Rok Kenkeh, a sub-chief; recorded at Yonibana on Feb. 5, 1966.]

Pa Yesi and Pa Yenku were both great hunters. They lived at Rogbane [an old village near Yonibana, now uninhabited]. They hunted far and wide. They killed an elephant on a site very near the present old Yonibana - near "Gbunth Narank" [elephant's pool]. They found the place very ideal for settlement because there was good water supply, and also because they, being great medicine men and diviners, foresaw that the site was going to be a prosperous one for a settlement. So they decided to settle there and went back to invite their hosts - the kamaras - to join them in the new settlement. They all built the place and called it Sar Ferah - meaning in Temne "white stones" - because of the many white pebbles found in the area.

Pa Yesi and Pa Yenku came originally from Koranko land, from a town called Konkurobaia. There were Kamaras already in Yoni settled at Rogbane when the hunters arrived, they themselves [the hunters] were Kamaras, and they became guests of two of the Kamaras at Rogbane: Pa Fendemoru and Pa Kisi. The Temne came from the East and were originally Korankos. They are called Temne outside their own territory.

The new settlement near Rogbane was known as Sar Ferah for many years. During those early years there was no Poro in the area. Poro was at Yoni in Bonthe Sherbro. The Kamaras decided

to send one of them to Yoni-Sherbro to bring Poro to Sar Ferah.

Kondor was chosen to go to Yoni (Sherbro) and from there he brought "an Fari" - the crown - with Poro to Yoni land. He was instructed in Yoni-Sherbro to travel overnight on the river Taia back to his land and to carry a cock with him. Anywhere the cock first crew there was to be the seat of Poro in Yoniland. The cock first crew at Maseri and there Kondor and his party stopped, and Maseri became the centre of Poro society in Yoniland.

Because of his labours Kondor himself was made the first Poro chief of Yoni. He became known as Bai Seborah Kondor, "Seborah" being the title of the chieftaincy. Kondor was succeeded by his "brother", Mankota. But the people at Maseri mocked Mankota because he was a man with one eye. On the night of his coronation the people mocked him with a very offensive song.

Mankota was sorely offended by this insult; and decided to return the "Fari" to Yoni (Sherbro) where his "brother" had brought it from.

He left Maseri for Yoni-Sherbro via Sar Ferah. When he reached Sar Ferah the people urged him not to return the crown and asked him to stay with them and remain chief. And the name Sar Ferah was changed to Yonibana, that is big Yoni.

Mankota died at Yonibana and was succeeded by Bai Seborah Bumineh. After Bumineh, Bai Seborah Gbassia became chief. Thus was established the four ruling houses in Yonibana: Kondor, Mankota, Bumineh and Gbassia.

APPENDIX LTHE MALAL CHIEFTAINCY

[Oral Tradition by Pa Santigi Kanu, a sub-chief; recorded at Malal on April 23, 1967.]

Our fathers told us that Bai Tagbonko was the founder of Malal. His brother was called Pa Wotho and they came together. They were Lokos by tribe.

The first Kalolo who came to this region was from Matonkara, where he first settled. He was an elephant hunter. He was a Gbara Seri. While hunting in this region he came upon a mysterious box containing the sacred things of a chief. He took the box to Masimera, and Bai Simera crowned him chief for Malal area. However, he preferred settling in Masimera itself, and there he died. When he died the Masimera people sent message to Malal people informing them - particularly his people in Matonkara - and Bai Tagbonko in Malal. The whole chiefdom was informed of his death. His successor was crowned at Masimera, but Malal people asked that the new chief settle among them. He was a Kalolo like his predecessor and was also a great hunter. He settled in Malal in response to Malal people's request. But he did not reign for very long because he was caught while hunting by a leopard, and killed. He was buried on the spot where the leopard killed him. His successor who was also a Kalolo suffered from small-pox. He came from Matonkara and was crowned at Malal - the first chief to be crowned here. But he died as a result of the small-pox attack. Following his death there was dispute in the land, and the box

containing the sacred things got lost in the war that followed the dispute. For a long time we could not crown a new chief and it was the Gbaras that finally recovered the sacred box from Marampa where it was kept by the Tarawales. After the recovery of those sacred things Bai Lal Katanka was crowned, he was a Gbara. He said that he did not want to be crowned at Masimera, so Gbenle officials were sent to Malal to supervise his installation. He was crowned at Malal. When he died Bai Lal Sumana Harry who was born at Rosint [Malal chiefdom] succeeded him. Bai Lal Sumana Harry was succeeded by Bai Lal Pa Dika who was followed by Bai Lal Owealayi. After him came Bai Lal Kakuber, my father. He was the first staffed Paramount Chief in Malal Chiefdom. He was succeeded by Bai Lal An Soela. Then there was a dispute. After the dispute Bai Lal Kalolo was crowned. It was during this chief's reign that the chiefdoms were amalgamated. He was succeeded by Bai Bairor, the present Paramount Chief. In the early days people used to run away to avoid being crowned chief. This was why perfect strangers used to become chief in some chiefdoms. People ran away because of the great responsibility involved in being a chief. Further, once crowned the chief's person became sacred, which meant in those days that he could no longer lead the life of a warrior, and so shut off from the glory and popularity surrounding a successful warrior. There were, in those days, two types of chiefs:

the warrior chief, and

the civilian chief.

But the warrior chiefs were subjected to the civilian ones, in fact they fought for them. However the warrior chief sometimes got out of the control of the civilian ruler. But the civilian rulers never went to war.

APPENDIX MPA LOLUM OF MALOLUM

[Oral Tradition by Pa Santigi Bia, a sub-chief; recorded at Malolum (Malal chiefdom) on April 23, 1967.]

Pa Lolum was the founder of Malolum. Pa Lolum came to this place from Makrugbe - a village in Kolifa. He came by way of Kemap - a Temne territory. When he came he did not at first settle here. He was a timber trader. He transported the timber along this river - the Seli or Rokel River, to (Freetown) Ro Camp. He stayed here for some time trading, then he moved to Makonte in Masimera and stayed there for three years also trading. From there he went back to Makrugbe. When he came back to Malolum he found a chief - Bai Kalolo - the first chief in this chiefdom. Bai Kalolo had been crowned in Masimera and came here to rule after completing the necessary installation ceremonies.

The whole of this area was all bush at that time. Pa Lolum found the country very lovely to look at. He was not able to go up the river because another important chief was already there who was called Thonkara Gbla. He was a very important man. So Pa Lolum settled here and started building grass huts. He stayed with Bai Lal Kalolo I. Then his brother, Bai Bairoh, came to join him, and the two of them decided to settle here permanently. Another brother of his, Pa Kra by name, also came to join Pa Lolum. Pa Kra was the one who later founded Mara on the other side of the river. Other relatives also came to join the settlement: prominent among these were, Pa Pitem'tafi and Pa Dander.

Pa Lolum was a great warrior, and a very rich man too. He was always successful in battle. He had many followers, men like Pa Enfende, and Pa Kondom'lal, who were also great warriors like him, and it was these followers that he often sent on his warring activities, and he very rarely went into the battlefield himself. The most famous warrior among his followers were Pa Yamba Yambo and Pa Korothonamba. It was Pa Lolum's followers that started ground-nuts farming at the present site of Roehen. Then others came and asked to be allowed to settle at that place. The chief in Malal allowed them to settle there. But Malolum was the first town to be built around here. When Pa Lolum died, the chief - Bai Lal Kalolo I, was still alive. Then Bai Lal Kalolo sent word round informing everyone that his warrior, Pa Lolum, had died. He summoned all the people to build a house over his grave. That house is still standing today. Malolum, Mara, Madora, Mamile, and Maroki were all founded by Pa Lolum and his followers, and during his lifetime he was the owner of all those places, and the people in them used to bring food, clothing and so on to him as presents particularly when he became old and incapable.

Timber trade was very important here in those days. The journey to Freetown from Malolum used to take one month. Other produce were also carried to Freetown in small boats from Malolum. The small boats went as far as Magbeli where the traders change into larger boats. Timber was the most important item of trade, but there was also a small trade in Kolanuts and, later, groundnuts.

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This falls into three categories:

(i) Governors' despatches (in bound volumes) to native chiefs in the neighbourhood of the Colony, starting from 1862, first known as Governor's Letterbook to Native Chiefs (G.L.N.C.) and later (from 1878) as Governor's Aborigines Letterbook (G.A.L.).

(ii) A series of bound volumes starting from 1871, known as Colonial Secretary's Office's Letterbook to Native Chiefs (ref. C.S.L.) containing mainly complaints about and from Colony residents in the neighbouring territories.

(iii) Memoranda and letters to local rulers in bound volumes - eleven in all - by T.G. Lawson, Government Interpreter from 1852 to 1888; and known as Government Interpreter's Letterbook (G.I.L.).

(b) Oral Traditions.

These were recorded throughout Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts (Northern Province), except in Koya where I was unable to meet the local rulers because of the political crisis in the country towards the end of my stay in Sierra Leone. Reference to the Traditions has been made simply by quoting the name of the family spokesman or the person who did most of the talking at any recording session (see Appendix A). Copies of the recordings are available in the Edinburgh University Library. The following list of informants' names, includes the particular spokesman's occupation or status, the place of recording, and date.

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